Enhancing federal inter-governmental relations and state building in Somalia

Political changes worldwide have renewed interest in federal solutions for addressing political conflicts, with extensive scholarship on federal theory, practice, and integration/disintegration. Power-sharing between central and peripheral authorities has become a common post–Cold War civil war settlement strategy tailored to political and historical contexts. Inter-governmental relations (IGR) are the interactions and coordination among all levels of government, while federalism partitions powers so national and local governments are each autonomous within their spheres. Federalism is widely considered a promising strategy for Somalia’s power-sharing among clans and for national unity, peace, and security; however, in authoritarian contexts it can exacerbate tensions and undermine unity. Somalia’s federalism discourse is marked by contradictions and limited primary academic studies since 1991. Clan as a political instrument predates independence and has continued to shape politics, hindering agreement on a federal power-sharing model and slowing progress on security, stabilization, institution building, reconciliation, service delivery, peace building, international relations, and resource mobilization. The study’s objective is to assess how federal–state intergovernmental relations affect civic state building in Somalia. Specifically, it evaluates conflicts between federal government and federal member states in IGRs, identifies a suitable model to reduce tensions, and assesses the extent to which weak IGRs hinder civic state building. The main research question is: How has federal–state intergovernmental relation hampered civic state building in Somalia? Given IGRs’ importance in facilitating cooperation and negotiation in federations, the study contributes by focusing on Somalia’s federalism and its impact on federal–state political power-sharing.

The review covers intergovernmental relations (IGR) models, Somalia’s IGR context, civic state building theory, African state-building, and Somalia’s state-building experience. Intergovernmental relations can be vertical (between federal and constituent units) or horizontal (among states or local governments). Experiences from Italy and Ethiopia highlight challenges when IGR mechanisms are weak or top-down, and underscore the need for legal frameworks and dedicated institutions to manage IGR. Two principal IGR models are discussed: (1) Dual/competitive federalism, emphasizing inherent competition and zero-sum power struggles between levels of government; and (2) Cooperative/executive federalism, emphasizing shared responsibilities and negotiation across levels. In Somalia, the Provisional Constitution declares a federal state with powers delineated (e.g., foreign policy, security, citizenship, immigration, monetary policy at the federal level), and espouses cooperative principles. However, ambiguity, lack of detailed provisions (especially for local government as a third tier), and contested devolution have fueled widening FGS–FMS conflict. Literature cautions that poorly implemented decentralization/federalism in contexts lacking attention to local realities can provoke conflict. Civic state building literature distinguishes civic versus ethnic conceptions of identity and nationalism, noting that purely civic or ethnic states rarely exist; civic identity is multidimensional and often rests on ethno-cultural foundations. In post-colonial Africa, identity politics, democratization, and state formation are shaped by historical inter-identity relations, state nature and leadership quality, party formation, and electoral design. State-building traditionally entails territorial control, law and order, resource extraction, and eventual democratization. Many African state-building efforts have struggled due to centralized, authoritarian state structures and the challenges of broadcasting power over sparsely populated territories. Somalia’s state-building has faced tensions between imported, top-down state models and indigenous communitarian (clan-based) governance. External state-building attempts have struggled; scholars propose bottom-up approaches, stronger municipal support, and culturally congruent models. Reviews note that imported systems often lack compatibility with Somali culture, religion, and traditions; clan-based federalism can entrench tensions and hinder inter- and intra-state relations, suggesting the need for leadership and institutional reforms and indigenized approaches.

Qualitative research design using literature synthesis, in-depth interviews, interview schedules, and guided questionnaires to explore how federal–state IGR affects civic state building in Somalia. Ethical procedures included informed verbal consent, confidentiality, and anonymization of participants. Twenty-seven respondents were interviewed: 20 males and 7 females, reflecting women’s lower representation in political and traditional institutions. Participants included policymakers, academics, senior civil servants (federal and regional ministries, directorates, executive agencies), traditional elders, religious scholars, women and youth groups. Age range 25–75; diverse socio-economic, educational, gender, professional, experiential, and geographic backgrounds. Sampling was purposive, with initial contacts known to researchers and subsequent snowballing to identify additional key informants. Four interviews were conducted in each of the five FMS major cities, and seven in Mogadishu (FG headquarters). Interviews were conducted in convenient settings to encourage open responses and adhered to professional ethics.

• Intergovernmental relations (IGR) are conflictual: Despite a federal structure, relations between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMSs) are characterized by tensions and conflicts, with widening gaps over the past years.
• Constitutional and institutional inadequacies: Both federal and state apparatuses lack sufficient constitutional provisions to clearly delineate powers; conflicting federal and state constitutions; incomplete councils; absence of a constitutional court to interpret ambiguities; frequent turnover of constitutional committees; minimal IGR laws exist but are not honored/enforced by either level.
• Executive-level friction: Weak power-division rules foster sequential, uncooperative behavior between the federal president and prime minister, compounded by clan dynamics.
• Compromised Upper House: Intended to represent FMSs and mediate disputes, the Upper House is viewed as ineffective due to poor relations with the Lower House, member ineptitude, insufficient provisions, and its de facto representation of state presidents who nominate members.
• Rule of law deficits: Lack of independent judiciaries at federal and state levels; laws perceived as non-inclusive reduce public trust; conflicts of interest among leaders lead to disregard for existing rules.
• No agreed IGR/power-sharing model: Absence of a clear, accepted IGR model fuels disputes. Respondents diverge on whether cooperative or competitive models fit Somalia; many note relationships function on personal/clan interests rather than institutional norms. Some propose cooperation in politics with healthy competition in service delivery (education, health, development).
• Elite dynamics and “government owners”: Elites are constrained by security risks and lack of free speech, often swayed by clan pressures. Individuals and groups (“Milkiilayaal”) who claim to have built the government seek privileges (jobs, projects, scholarships, public property), exacerbating IGR dysfunction. Suggested remedy: ethical coalitions (religious leaders, businesspeople, intellectuals) forming parties to advance national interests.
• External interference and dependency: Excessive international involvement and economic dependency complicate federal–state relations and policy coherence.
• Centralization without decentralization: FGS limited largely to Mogadishu; FMS leadership concentrated in single cities; neither level meaningfully decentralizes, with leaders prioritizing position retention over national thinking and IGR development.
• Civic state-building hindered: Negative IGR correlates with stalled development and service delivery (e.g., FGS–Jubbaland conflict). Low nationalism linked to historical authoritarian practices, coercive taxation, and lack of responsive governance; populace associates “government” with burden rather than service.
• Indigenous state-building neglected: Current processes (including federalism) are perceived as imported and unnatural. Respondents advocate culturally congruent, religion- and custom-informed approaches, domestic investment, broader elite inclusion beyond the Hawiye–Darood “duopoly,” and free, fair elections.
• Desired future: Strong federal state with clearly split powers, capable institutions, impartial judiciary, rule-based politics, priority on development, and open, respectful communication between federal and state levels.
• Sample/data notes: 27 respondents (20 male, 7 female) across FMS cities and Mogadishu; multiple stakeholder categories; qualitative insights supported with direct quotes.

Findings directly address the research question by showing that weak, contested, and personalized federal–state IGRs undermine Somalia’s civic state-building through constitutional ambiguity, unenforced laws, ineffective mediating institutions (Upper House, judiciary), and clan-dominated elite politics. These conditions foster mistrust, policy conflict, duplication, and poor service delivery, slowing nation-building and undermining public identification with the state. The absence of a shared power-sharing/IGR model and reliance on personal/clan ties over institutional rules impede cooperative problem-solving. Elite fragmentation, influence of groups claiming ownership of the state, and constraints on free speech limit reformist leadership. The significance lies in highlighting that durable civic state-building requires: (1) revising and clarifying constitutional allocations and IGR frameworks; (2) strengthening impartial judicial and legislative mediation mechanisms; (3) institutionalizing rule-based politics; and (4) indigenizing state-building to align with Somali culture, religion, and customs while reducing overreliance on external actors. The results align with broader federalism literature warning that poorly contextualized federal designs in authoritarian or polarized settings can exacerbate divisions, and they contribute context-specific insights for post-conflict governance design.

Somalia’s legal framework supporting federalism and federal–state relations is weak and inconsistently enforced, hampering cooperation, generating policy conflicts, and degrading service delivery. There is no agreed model of IGRs and power sharing between FGS and FMSs. Mediating institutions (Upper House, judiciary) are ineffective; elite dynamics—including groups claiming ownership of the state—further destabilize IGRs. Neglecting indigenous, culturally congruent state-building approaches exacerbates mistrust and stalls civic state development. Recommended actions include: reviewing federal–state IGR laws and constitutional clauses to clearly delineate powers; strengthening intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms and independent adjudicative capacity; enforcing existing legislation; prioritizing rule-based over kinship-based politics; and embracing indigenous approaches attentive to Somali culture and religion. The study contributes novel, context-rich evidence on Somalia’s IGRs and offers lessons for other fragile, post-conflict settings, while encouraging future comparative work beyond fragile federal systems to include peaceful and non-federal states.

The study focuses on Somalia—a context with weak federal structures—which limits generalizability; future comparative testing in peaceful and non-federal states is recommended. The qualitative design relies on purposive and snowball sampling of 27 participants; women were underrepresented due to low representation in political and traditional institutions.