Emotional policies: Introducing branding as a tool for science diplomacy

The paper addresses a central gap in science diplomacy (SD): how science projects and policies can effectively aid SD objectives. It proposes branding—understood as a deliberate process of adding emotional meaning to political phenomena—as a tool for nation-state decision makers to influence various audiences' perceptions. Building on evolving SD literature that emphasizes strategic aims, national needs, and emerging global challenges, the authors bring new actors (beyond foreign ministries) into focus and argue for new tools to further SD agendas. The study introduces branding to SD to incorporate symbolic communication and emotion into what is often treated as a rational policy process. Two research questions guide the work: (1) Who is targeted by specific SD activities? (2) How do SD activities reach and influence different target audiences? The paper situates this inquiry within the "Science for Diplomacy" perspective, in which science is used to improve international relations, and it proposes a three-layered framework (policy tool branding, policy branding, place/nation branding) to structure analysis of branding in SD.

The authors synthesize strands of research on nation/place branding, policy branding, and soft diplomacy. Prior studies link nation branding to enhanced international relations, tourism attractiveness, and support for foreign policies. Soft power (Nye, 2004) has diversified into cultural, science, water, sports, and global health diplomacy. The growing internationalization and marketization of science and higher education elevate reputation management for institutions and national science sectors. Transnational education (TNE) increasingly intersects with economic policy, international relations, and development policy. Branding, originating in marketing, has been applied to politicians, places, nations, and policies, but its role in SD is underexplored. Conceptually, a brand is a sign that identifies an object and evokes associations, forming emotive associative networks that can vary by audience and be subject to unintended meanings. Effective branding requires strategic frameworks, integration with longer-term political objectives, alignment of communications, involvement of brand communities, and active brand management. The literature also identifies key limitations: image–reality gaps, information overload from over-complex brands, and governance/coordination challenges among multiple stakeholders.

The study adopts an explorative, comparative case study approach to apply and demonstrate the proposed three-layer branding framework in SD. Case selection: (1) German transnational higher education (TNE) as a science-for-diplomacy field with many state-funded projects, multiple ministerial actors, and evolving policy aims; (2) the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) as a coordinated, science- and knowledge-based branding process in water diplomacy. Data: For German TNE, publicly available documents from ministries and intermediaries (28 strategy plans, 6 official websites, 577 media interviews and public speeches) and 14 expert interviews (first author). For DDA, re-interpretation of an existing dataset of 40 Dutch national government policy documents and 120 semi-structured interviews with 100 individuals (Dutch policy makers, private sector experts, academics, and policy makers/local experts in targeted countries). Analytical strategy: Use the three branding layers (place, policy, policy tool) to assess brand definition, communication, management, purposes, and limitations in each case, and compare branding coherence, target audiences, and alignment with political objectives.

• Framework introduction: A three-layered branding framework (place/nation branding; policy branding; policy tool branding) is articulated for analyzing science diplomacy branding.
• German TNE case:
  • Scope: Over 74 long-term cross-border higher education projects in 34+ countries, educating 35,000+ students; includes 14 bilateral German universities, 8 Centers of Excellence, at least 16 German institutes/faculties, and ~30 individual study programmes at foreign partner universities.
  • Place branding: Activities under slogans like "Wissenschaftsstandort Deutschland" aimed to present Germany as a science nation, but with overlapping/contradictory aims and weak linkage of TNE projects to the German science brand (limited use of national symbols; weak visibility on partner and German university publications).
  • Policy branding: No overarching, coordinated TNE policy brand; three funding ministries pursued separate aims (foreign affairs, education/research, development), diluting branding efficiency and focusing more on domestic competition than international audiences.
  • Policy tool branding: Multiple tool types (bilateral universities, faculties, institutes, Centers of Excellence, African Science Service Centres, individual programmes) existed as detached projects. Some exceptions (German–Kazakh University; German–Mongolian Institute; Centers of African Excellence) received limited branding, but overall brand visibility was low and inconsistent (e.g., non-use of common logos).
  • Result: Fragmented branding across layers undermined SD effectiveness and visibility.
• Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) case:
  • Place branding: Strong alignment with national water identity (e.g., "Nederland, waterland"); government linked international delta management to existing place brand and committed to an "international marketing programme" for the water and delta sector.
  • Policy branding: Three ministries collaborated (Economic Affairs, Infrastructure & Environment, Foreign Affairs/Foreign Trade & Development Cooperation), producing joint policy briefs (International Water Ambition, 2016), forming an International Water Cluster, and publishing "The Delta Approach" brochure to articulate a unified policy model and present the "Dutch Water Sector" as a cohesive actor.
  • Policy tool branding: Diverse tools showcased (e.g., Delta Works; Room for the River) under slogans like "Bring in the Dutch." Variation in project logos and sometimes contrasting tools slightly reduced consistency but overall supported the brand.
  • Result: Coordinated branding across layers increased visibility of the Dutch state, attractiveness of the water management sector, and supported bilateral relations and economic opportunities.
• Comparative insight: Coordinated brand creation, communication, and management—embedded in strategic objectives and supported by interministerial collaboration—are key to effective SD branding; fragmented governance and mixed objectives weaken branding impact.

The findings demonstrate that branding can function as an emotional, symbolic communication tool in SD to influence varied audiences across three interconnected layers. Addressing the research questions, the cases reveal that: (1) Target audiences differ by layer—place branding targets global publics and partners; policy branding targets foreign policy makers and stakeholders; policy tool branding can target specific sectoral partners and beneficiaries. (2) Influence mechanisms hinge on coherent narratives, aligned stakeholder communications, and sustained brand management. The German TNE case shows that fragmentation among ministries and projects, absent overarching strategy, and weak visual/identity linkage to the national science brand limit the capacity to shape international perceptions or leverage TNE for SD. Conversely, the DDA illustrates that aligning place identity, policy model articulation, and tool exemplars under a joint interministerial strategy can elevate a nation’s profile, open economic opportunities, and strengthen bilateral ties. However, even successful campaigns face challenges: potential ambiguity at the tool layer (e.g., hard infrastructure vs. adaptive measures) and insufficient feedback mechanisms for brand maintenance. The results underscore the need for designated brand managers and governance structures that harmonize branding activities across layers, anticipate audience interpretations, and mitigate risks such as image–reality gaps and over-complex messaging. The broader significance lies in reframing SD to include reputation and emotional narrative management, acknowledging the role of non-state actors in brand networks, and recognizing the potential politicization of science when branding is used for diplomatic aims.

The paper contributes a conceptual framework that situates branding within science diplomacy through three layers—place, policy, and policy tool—and demonstrates its utility via two contrasting cases. Key conclusions: (1) Effective SD branding requires active brand creation and management, interministerial coordination, clear responsibilities, and integration into strategic policy frameworks; appointing an independent brand manager can mitigate conflicts and align activities. (2) Uncoordinated or unsuccessful branding can harm diplomatic endeavors, with risks at any layer potentially cascading to the nation brand; benefits and risks are unevenly distributed among actors, warranting further systematic research. (3) The role of foreign ministries shifts toward coordinating multi-stakeholder brand networks, while the use of branding risks politicizing science; careful consideration is needed when branding scientific activities for diplomatic purposes. Future research should apply and refine the framework across more cases within single fields, examine branding during global crises (e.g., COVID-19) and competitive contexts, and study linkages between branding, project funding, and on-the-ground management by science diplomats.

Conceptual and practical limitations are acknowledged. Conceptually, brands face: (1) Image–reality gaps when branded claims exceed capacities, threatening credibility; (2) Information overload from over-complex or multi-meaning brands leading to misinterpretation; (3) Governance challenges where unclear responsibilities and large stakeholder sets hinder coordination and maintenance. Empirically, the study examines only two cases in different scientific fields, limiting generalizability and analytical depth. In the German TNE case, interministerial fragmentation and the absence of a brand manager curtailed coherent branding; in the DDA case, ambiguity at the policy tool layer and limited mechanisms for feedback/brand updating constrained maintenance. The datasets include interviews not publicly available, which may limit external verification, though documents supplement analysis.