Emergent governance responses to shocks to critical provisioning systems

The study investigates how the configuration and functioning of formal and informal governance and infrastructure shape urban responses to shocks, and how those responses influence subsequent reorganization and potential transformation. It focuses on two crises in Cape Town, South Africa: the 2017–2018 Day Zero drought that threatened municipal water supply, and the 2020–2021 COVID-19 pandemic lockdown that precipitated a food access crisis. Although access to water and food are constitutional rights in South Africa, governance arrangements distribute roles across public and private actors in distinct ways, affecting rights, risks, and rewards. The research asks which actors and institutional combinations structure critical provisioning systems, how shocks expose limitations and interdependencies, and how emergent responses lead to governance innovation or retrenchment. The purpose is to foreground capacities and constraints for transformative change in resource governance, highlighting where governance of infrastructure reliability, access rights, risk management, and reward distribution align or diverge.

The paper builds on scholarship on social-ecological resilience, critical infrastructure governance, and polycentric and hybrid governance. Prior work emphasizes that disturbances reveal institutional limitations and interdependencies, and that polycentric, decentralized arrangements can enhance flexibility under uncertainty. Literature on commodification and rights highlights tensions between market provisioning and state obligations to guarantee access. Studies of urban water governance in the Global South reveal hybrid formal/informal provisioning and implications for equity and lived citizenship. Research on food systems points to concentrated corporate control alongside important informal networks, and longstanding urban food insecurity. These strands inform the analysis of how shocks reveal or reshape governance roles, power dynamics, and infrastructural constraints in Cape Town’s water and food systems.

The study employs comparative qualitative case studies of two Cape Town provisioning systems under shock: water during the 2017–2019 drought and food during the 2020–2021 COVID-19 lockdown. Data for the COVID-19 Community Action Networks (CANs) case were collected by the second author beginning April 2020. From a metropolitan network of approximately 170 CANs, eight neighborhood CANs (from both privileged and precarious areas) and two metropolitan-level coordinating groups were purposively selected for prominence, cross-community linkages, and access to key actors. Three interview rounds (April–June 2020; August–October 2020; March 2021) were conducted, with 42 semi-structured interviews (one to three activists per group per round). Interviews were supplemented by participant observation in online discussions and seminars. Human subjects approval was obtained from the University of Cape Town; interviewees provided consent. For the drought Water Service Intermediary (WSI) case, the lead author conducted nine interviews in 2021–2022: five with entities that held WSI contracts during the drought and four with municipal politicians or a quasi-public economic development agency representative knowledgeable about the WSI program. WSIs were identified via media and key informants; a full municipal list was requested but not provided. One informant estimated no more than two dozen WSI contracts at the drought peak. Human subjects protocols were approved by Arizona State University’s IRB; interviewees provided verbal consent. These data were supplemented with publicly available 2019 interviews from the Cape Town Drought Response Learning Initiative and prior documented observations. Interview data are protected under human subjects protocols and are not publicly available.

- Water case (WSIs): As drought restrictions intensified (domestic use curtailed to 50 liters per capita per day; citywide pressure reduction), affluent residents and especially large commercial property managers sought alternative supplies (groundwater, recycling, small-scale desalination) and applied to be designated as Water Service Intermediaries (WSIs) to legally source, treat, and supply water to end users. The City repurposed the WSI mechanism—originally for out-of-network institutions—to move high-volume users off the stressed municipal grid. WSIs reported steep learning curves, significant capital costs, and long payback periods, yet perceived no viable alternative to maintain operations and obligations to tenants and employees. The City faced risks: potential revenue loss (jeopardizing cross-subsidization for indigent households), water quality/backflow contamination, and public attribution of failures to the state. As Day Zero risk receded, the City reasserted control: it introduced a fixed pipe connection fee, clarified in its 2019 Water Strategy that WSI contracts were limited to non-serviced areas or emergencies, adjusted tariffs, and tightened sanitation compliance. Most two-year WSI contracts were not renewed, private systems were mothballed, and users returned to municipal supply despite reduced post-drought demand. - Food case (CANs): COVID-19 lockdown caused an economic shock that undermined food entitlements, especially in low-income communities. There were no systemic food shortages because formal supply chains remained operational; hunger stemmed from income loss and initial constraints on informal trade. Civil society CANs rapidly mobilized via social media to identify needs, pool resources, and deliver relief (food vouchers, community kitchens). During April–June 2020, more than half of emergency food relief in Cape Town was provided by emergent civil society groups. Cross-suburb pairings bridged privileged and precarious neighborhoods, creating new social infrastructure and solidarity. State response was limited and at times politically contentious; interactions with CANs were uneven. Over time, donor fatigue reduced operations. Some CANs formalized as non-profits, diversified into community development (e.g., community gardens), and contributed to broader dialogues on food governance. The crisis heightened government attention: a special national social grant was extended, and city/provincial actors began allocating resources and engaging in participatory strategy processes for longer-term food security, including limited funding to CANs and support for urban agriculture.

The two crises demonstrate how shocks open governance spaces, reveal hidden interdependencies, and enable non-state actors to step into provisioning and risk management roles. However, the durability of such openings depends on how rights, risks, rewards, and infrastructure control are configured. In water, the City’s political, financial, and public health accountability—rooted in centralized, capital-intensive, and tightly regulated infrastructure and cross-subsidization—created strong incentives to recentralize after the acute drought. Thus, modular, decentralized provisioning via WSIs delivered short-term resilience benefits but was ultimately deemed financially and politically problematic. In food, the inherently modular, decentralized provisioning infrastructure and historically limited direct state role allowed civil society to become critical providers during the crisis, highlighting deficits in welfare nets and market failures to ensure rights. The visibility and legitimacy gained by CANs helped catalyze renewed state engagement with food governance, though sustained capacity requires institutionalization and resources. Overall, while polycentric, decentralized governance is often advocated for resilience, these cases reveal resistance from incumbent public actors (concerned with revenue, control, and liability) and tensions with equity objectives. Effective transformation requires recognizing distinct governance functions—provisioning, rights realization, risk management, and reward distribution—and negotiating roles across public, private, and civil society actors before crises.

Shocks to critical provisioning systems can catalyze governance innovation, surface hidden roles and interdependencies, and reconfigure legitimacy among state and non-state actors. In Cape Town, WSIs temporarily decentralized water provisioning during drought but confronted entrenched financial, infrastructural, and liability logics that drove re-centralization post-crisis. Conversely, CANs emerged as pivotal food relief providers during COVID-19, building cross-community solidarity and prompting greater governmental attention to food system rights and risks. The paper contributes a comparative lens showing how the material characteristics of infrastructure and existing distributions of rights, risks, and rewards shape whether polycentric governance openings persist. Future work should: examine models for equitable cost- and risk-sharing in decentralized water provision; evaluate institutional mechanisms for sustaining community-based food provisioning; and develop deliberative, pre-crisis compacts that clarify roles and responsibilities across sectors to better align resilience with social equity.

Findings are based on qualitative case studies in a single metropolitan context and are not statistically generalizable. Interview samples were purposive and limited: eight CANs plus two coordinating groups (42 interviews across three waves) and five WSIs plus four public/quasi-public informants (nine interviews). A comprehensive list of WSIs was unavailable from the City, potentially omitting perspectives. Data access is constrained by human subjects protections, limiting public transparency. Longer-term governance outcomes remain evolving, introducing temporal uncertainty.