The power to transform structures: power complexes and the challenges for realising a wellbeing economy

The paper addresses how to realise a wellbeing economy that directs economic activity toward human and ecological wellbeing with fair distribution of resources, challenging growth-dependency and aligning with post-/degrowth visions. It highlights a gap in wellbeing-economy research: insufficient attention to the time-space-specific political-economic conjunctures in which struggles occur, leading to underestimation of obstacles, especially for post-/degrowth pathways involving planned disaccumulation in certain sectors. The authors propose an analytical lens centred on the co-evolution of structural and agential power and introduce the concept of power complexes—industry-linked actor coalitions able to reproduce or transform structures. They pose four research questions: (1) How have power complexes exercised agential power within and through time-space-specific power structures? (2) Which actors dominate today’s power complexes, and why? (3) What are their key strategies? (4) What are the implications and challenges for realising a wellbeing economy based on post-/degrowth visions? The study’s purpose is to provide a framework that explains the political-economic barriers to a wellbeing economy and to inform strategy for transformative change.

The article synthesises strands of critical political economy and related literatures rather than offering a standalone review section. It draws on regulation theory (Aglietta; Boyer and Saillard; Becker) to conceptualise modes of regulation stabilising accumulation regimes, and on strategic-relational state theory and strategic selectivity (Jessop; Poulantzas) to link structures with agency. It engages work on financialisation and neoliberal globalisation (Epstein; Durand; Rodrik; Piketty), fossil capitalism and the Great Acceleration (Malm; Steffen et al.), livestock-agribusiness impacts (FAO; Twine; Tang), and digital/platform capitalism and surveillance capitalism (Srnicek; Zuboff). It incorporates lobbying and corporate power research (Hofman & Aalbers; Drutman; Hanegraaff & Poletti; OECD), including trade associations, PR, think tanks, and media influence. This synthesis motivates the concept of “power complexes” and a heuristic to analyse firm-to-state lobbying.

Conceptual-analytical study combining: (1) A regulationist-inspired historical analysis tracing co-evolution of three modes of regulation (colonial-liberal, Fordist, neoliberal) and four power complexes (financial, fossil, livestock-agribusiness, digital) to explain structural-agential dynamics; (2) Development of an analytical heuristic for firm-to-state lobbying based on Hofman & Aalbers’ socio-spatial approach and the TPSN (Territory–Place–Scale–Network) framework (Jessop et al.). The heuristic poses four guiding questions: who are the key actors; how lobbying is actualised in space; which resources are mobilised (material and immaterial); and which policies are targeted (proactive vs reactive). (3) Illustrative analysis using secondary sources of four emblematic corporations—Blackstone (financial), BP (fossil), Bayer (livestock-agribusiness), and Alphabet (digital)—to demonstrate the heuristic. Political party contributions are treated as related but separate from lobbying. No primary data collection was conducted; all evidence derives from secondary literature and reports.

- Structural–agential co-evolution: Modes of regulation wield structural power and are strategically selective, favouring particular actors, interests, and strategies. Power complexes exercise agential power within and through these structures and can transform them. The financial complex dominated colonial-liberal regulation; finance declined under Fordism while fossil and livestock-agribusiness rose; finance re-emerged with neoliberalism alongside the rise of a digital power complex. Since 2008, in an interregnum, all four complexes remain powerful, often reconfigured. - Historical data points: Britain accounted for 44% of world overseas investment by 1914; oil’s share of global energy rose from 5% (1910) to over 60% by 1970; fertiliser and pesticide use increased by 1338% (1935–1970); livestock accounts for over 16% of GHG emissions; global AUM rose from USD 84.9 trillion (2016) to 111.2 trillion (2020) with projections of 145.4 trillion by 2025; agricultural subsidies exceed USD 851 billion annually. - Contemporary strategic selectivities: Neoliberal-era structures and post-administrative state trends favour multi-/transnational corporations over civil society, labour, and public bureaucracies due to factors like high capital mobility, multi-scalarity and technical complexity of policymaking, barriers to access for alternative actors/science, and outsourcing of expertise from the state. - Firm-to-state lobbying heuristic validated across cases: • Blackstone (financial): Multi-scalar lobbying links local real estate transactions to national legal/tax frameworks (e.g., Spain’s Urban Rental Law, REIT tax reliefs) and EU-level financial regulation (e.g., Solvency II, Capital Markets Union). Trade associations (Invest Europe) and revolving doors support strategies; positioning as a ‘competent partner’ enabled acquisitions from Spain’s SAREB. Illustrative outcomes include municipal divestments (Madrid) and regulatory adjustments benefiting leveraged buyouts. • BP (fossil): Extensive trade-association network (67 associations with dues ≥ USD 50,000), use of lobbying firms, and revolving doors (in 2022, 24 of 35 US BP lobbyists were former officials). Multi-scalar lobbying advanced LNG lock-ins (e.g., Germany’s LNG Acceleration Act approving 12 projects) while reactively opposing building efficiency and decarbonisation packages (EPBD, EED, Hydrogen and Gas package). Post-Ukraine securitisation expanded access to EU advisory venues (Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group) lacking public-interest representation. Supermajors more than doubled 2022 profits, largely maintaining fossil investment and shareholder payouts. • Bayer (livestock-agribusiness): Through CropLife networks and other associations (BusinessEurope, CEFIC, Euroseeds, Pensar Agro), Bayer proactively/ reactively lobbies to maintain pesticide-dependent agrifood systems (e.g., EU glyphosate re-approval). Operates at supranational and national scales (e.g., CropLife Brazil) and exerts cross-border pressure (e.g., on Mexico’s proposed glyphosate ban). Mobilises finance (top spender in Brussels), revolving doors (>85% of US lobbyists are ex-government), and techno-immaterial resources via GM/precision agriculture to frame dependence on its technologies. • Alphabet (digital): Extensive affiliations (Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, 250+ third-party organizations), opaque legal/consultancy networks (e.g., firms unregistered in EU Transparency Register) to reactively dilute antitrust/privacy regulation (e.g., EU DMA/DSA). Multi-scalar efforts targeted municipal to EU levels (e.g., Sidewalk Labs’ Toronto Quayside attempted to circumvent planning norms; abandoned after civil-society pushback and rising regulatory demands). Heavy resource mobilisation: third-largest EU lobbying spender; in the US, 96 federal lobbyists in 2022 with 82% ex-public sector; investment in critical infrastructures (subsea cables, broadband) increases ‘too big to fail’ leverage. - Implications for a wellbeing economy: The four power complexes threaten ecological sustainability, equity, and democracy. Limiting capital’s structural power and corporate lobbying influence is essential. The authors outline three strategic challenges: (1) build unconventional alliances including certain capital fractions while advancing decommodification and foundational provisioning; (2) operate across all spatial dimensions (territories, places, scales, networks) and pursue selective deglobalisation (e.g., capital controls) to expand political room for manoeuvre; (3) institutionalise alternative ways to mobilise resources and democratise policymaking, combining bottom-up participation with securing positions within state apparatuses.

The framework clarifies how power complexes wield agential power within strategically selective structures, addressing RQ1 by linking historical modes of regulation to the rise and reconfiguration of financial, fossil, livestock-agribusiness, and digital complexes. RQ2 is answered by demonstrating how contemporary selectivities—high capital mobility, technocratic complexity, weakened public bureaucracies, and barriers to civil society—elevate multi-/transnational corporations as dominant actors. RQ3 is addressed through the firm-to-state lobbying heuristic and four illustrative cases, showing multi-scalar, resource-intensive strategies that proactively lock in favourable policies and reactively block constraints (e.g., fossil LNG build-out; pesticide regulation; antitrust and privacy rules). RQ4 is addressed by deriving strategic implications for post-/degrowth-oriented wellbeing transitions: the need for broad, cross-class coalitions (including some capital fractions), multi-scalar organising, and institutional innovations to counterbalance corporate lobbying and enhance democratic, decommodified provisioning. The significance lies in reframing wellbeing-economy debates to engage explicitly with power and the socio-spatial practices that reproduce or transform regulatory structures.

The paper contributes a concept of power complexes and an analytical heuristic for firm-to-state lobbying, embedded in a regulationist historical account of how structures and agency co-evolve. It shows that today’s interregnum continues to favour corporate actors across financial, fossil, livestock-agribusiness, and digital complexes, posing acute risks to environmental sustainability, equity, and democracy—core pillars of a wellbeing economy. Strategically, the authors highlight three challenges for a post-/degrowth-oriented wellbeing economy: (1) forge unconventional coalitions including supportive capital fractions while expanding decommodified foundational provisioning; (2) act across territories, places, scales, and networks, enabling selective deglobalisation to reclaim political space; (3) institutionalise democratic alternatives to firm-to-state lobbying by strengthening participatory/deliberative institutions and occupying strategic positions within state apparatuses to translate outcomes into laws and funding for essential provisioning. Future research and practice should develop in-depth case studies of power complexes and lobbying networks, evaluate coalition-building strategies across scales, and design institutional reforms to curb corporate lobbying power and democratise governance.

The study is conceptual and relies exclusively on secondary sources; no primary data collection was conducted. The four corporate cases are illustrative rather than full in-depth case studies, limiting generalisability and causal inference. Political party contributions are treated as related but excluded from the core analysis of lobbying. The focus is skewed toward Europe and the United States, which may underrepresent dynamics in other regions. As a cross-sectional synthesis conducted during a volatile interregnum, findings may evolve with shifting regulatory and geopolitical contexts.