Philosophical introspection is a hallmark of social philosophy, especially within Critical Theory. A shift from critique of society to the social philosophy of critique has sparked debate about the meaning of "critique." This paper focuses on the role of ideology critique in Habermas' Critical Theory, specifically reinterpreting his colonization of the lifeworld thesis as a case of ideology critique. It will first map contemporary models of social critique, emphasizing ideology critique; second, it will present Habermas' diagnosis of lifeworld colonization, differentiating two levels of critique within his theory of communicative action: critique as discursive redemption of validity claims and critique as an observer's social diagnosis; finally, it will compare these levels to ideology critique, arguing that the second level functions as such.

The paper reviews various contemporary models of social critique, drawing on Walzer's categorization of critique as discovery, invention, and interpretation. Honneth's distinction between weak and strong critique, and his concept of reconstructive critique, are discussed. Other models reviewed include Rosa's immanent critique of temporal relations, Forst's critique based on the right to justification, Jaeggi's critique of forms of life, and Herzog's critical theory of invisibility. The paper then delves into different versions of the critique of ideologies, from Marx's original formulation to interpretations by Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, highlighting Habermas' early rejection of epistemological asymmetry in favor of explaining the perpetuation of oppressive institutions through hidden strategic aims. Various contemporary re-interpretations of ideology critique are also considered, leading to the author's proposed definition of ideology, incorporating elements of naturalization, universalization of particular interests, individualization of responsibility, and lack of discursive articulation. Apel's transcendental pragmatics and Kettner's connection between psychoanalysis and ideology critique are also discussed, emphasizing the importance of "lack of discursive articulation" as a key feature of ideology.

The paper employs a primarily conceptual and analytical methodology. It uses a comparative approach, examining different models of social critique and contrasting them with Habermas' theory. The author analyzes Habermas' theory of communicative action, distinguishing between communicative rationality (oriented towards understanding) and strategic action (oriented towards success). He identifies two levels of critique within Habermas' work: (1) critique as discursive redemption, where participants in communication attempt to resolve validity claims; and (2) critique as social diagnosis, where an observer analyzes social pathologies. The paper examines the relationship between these two levels of critique and the concept of ideology critique, specifically the concept of 'lack of discursive articulation'. The argument is developed through textual analysis of Habermas' work and relevant secondary literature, focusing on the concept of colonization of the lifeworld as a key example. The author uses examples such as the juridification of family law to illustrate the substitution of understanding by power as a form of action coordination, arguing that this constitutes both a social pathology and an ideological process. By synthesizing existing literature with a close reading of Habermas' work, the author constructs a new interpretation of Habermas' position on ideology critique and its relation to his theory of communicative action.

The paper's key finding is a reinterpretation of Habermas' theory of communicative action, showing that his diagnosis of the colonization of the lifeworld implicitly contains a critique of ideologies. This critique, however, differs from the more radical critiques of Adorno and Marcuse. Habermas' critique focuses on the "lack of discursive articulation" caused by the substitution of understanding (communicative action) with money and power (systemic action) as coordinating mechanisms. The paper distinguishes two levels of critique in Habermas' work: critique as discursive redemption (a participant's perspective) and critique as social diagnosis (an observer's perspective). It argues that the latter constitutes a form of ideology critique because it unveils the power structures that prevent the thematization of certain validity claims. The paper illustrates this with the example of juridification in family law, showing how the replacement of understanding with power leads to a lack of discursive articulation and thus constitutes an ideological process. The author rejects the idea that Habermas' critique is purely transcendent; instead, he argues that it's an immanent critique grounded in the normative basis of modernity and the potential for communicative action within the lifeworld. The paper also clarifies Habermas' position on ideology, arguing that while he doesn't explicitly endorse a systematic critique of ideology, his analysis of the colonization of the lifeworld implicitly addresses ideological processes by highlighting how power structures distort communicative processes. It suggests that this interpretation is consistent with Habermas' early critique of technocratic ideology.

The reinterpretation of Habermas' colonization thesis as implicitly containing an ideology critique offers a novel perspective on his work. It bridges the apparent gap between his emphasis on communicative rationality and his critique of systemic distortions. The paper shows that Habermas' focus on the restoration of communicative rationality, while not a direct engagement with the Marxist concept of ideology, nonetheless tackles the same issues from a different angle: the mechanisms of domination that prevent open communication and critical self-reflection. The paper's findings contribute to the ongoing debate about the nature and scope of ideology critique within critical theory, offering a more nuanced understanding of Habermas' position. It also has implications for understanding the role of social movements, suggesting they represent attempts to counteract the colonization of the lifeworld and re-establish communicative rationality.

This paper offers a novel interpretation of Habermas' theory, demonstrating that his analysis of the colonization of the lifeworld implicitly incorporates a critique of ideologies. This critique centers on the suppression of discursive articulation through the substitution of understanding with systemic steering mechanisms. Future research could explore the implications of this interpretation for understanding contemporary social and political issues, examining specific cases of colonization and their ideological dimensions in more detail. This could also include a comparative study of Habermas' approach to ideology critique with that of other critical theorists.

The paper primarily relies on a textual analysis of Habermas' work and secondary literature. While this provides a strong foundation for the argument, empirical research could further validate the claims. Additionally, the focus is mainly on Habermas' theoretical framework; a more extensive exploration of empirical case studies would strengthen the analysis. Finally, the paper focuses primarily on Habermas' theory, and a deeper engagement with other critical theorists, like Adorno and Horkheimer, might enrich the comparative analysis.