Social pathologies and ideologies in light of Jürgen Habermas: a new interpretation of the thesis of colonisation

The paper situates itself within contemporary debates in Critical Theory about the meaning and forms of social critique, noting philosophy’s distinctive self-reflective turn from critique of society to a social philosophy of critique. Against the backdrop of Critical Theory’s move away from its Marxist origins—and the resultant sidelining of ideology critique due to worries about epistemic privilege—this article argues that a close reading of Habermas can clarify the relation between the theory of communicative action and ideology critique. The research aim is to analyze the role that critique of ideologies plays in Habermas’ Critical Theory and to reinterpret the colonisation of the lifeworld thesis as a form of ideology critique. The study proceeds by: (1) mapping major contemporary models of social critique with particular attention to ideology critique; (2) presenting Habermas’ colonisation diagnosis while distinguishing two levels of critique embedded in the theory of communicative action—critique as discursive redemption by participants and critique as an observer’s social diagnosis; and (3) testing whether one or both levels can be read as ideology critique. The significance lies in reconciling Habermas’s communicative framework with a non-paternalistic, reflexive form of ideology critique focused on restoring discursive articulation.

The paper surveys and organizes contemporary models of social critique using Michael Walzer’s tripartite schema—discovery, invention/construction, and interpretation—relating them to external/transcendent versus internal/hermeneutic approaches. Axel Honneth reframes this into weak (interpretive) and strong (transcendent) critique while proposing reconstructive-immanent critique as a strong yet non-transcendent alternative; he also distinguishes a genealogical critique that exposes repressive historical origins of norms (linking to Nietzsche and Foucault) and traces its Frankfurt lineage from early ideology critique to the dialectic of Enlightenment. The review highlights current exemplars: - Hartmut Rosa’s immanent critique of temporal relations, linking social acceleration to alienation and social pathologies. - Rainer Forst’s critique grounded in the right to justification and human dignity, diagnosing structural violence as exclusion from justification orders and framing social critique as critique of relations of justification. - Rahel Jaeggi’s immanent critique of forms of life as ensembles of practices aimed at problem-solving and learning, overcoming liberal neutrality about ethical contents. - Benno Herzog’s critical theory of invisibility, analyzing the invisibilization of suffering. The genealogy and transformations of ideology critique are traced from Marx: religion as perpetuating injustice; ideology as universalization of particular class interests; and critique of political economy (surplus value, legal equality concealing exploitation). The Frankfurt School’s shifts are reviewed: 1930s fascism theory (anti-liberal ideological elements), then postwar critique of culture industry (mass culture stabilizing domination). Habermas’s early engagement with ideology critique is discussed: in “Technik und Wissenschaft als ‘Ideologie’” he identifies technocratic ideology (replacement of democratic will-formation by technical decisionism) while rejecting a qualitatively different science/technology; and in “Erkenntnis und Interesse,” he connects deep hermeneutics and self-reflection to emancipation. Contemporary rehabilitations of ideology critique within Critical Theory include: Honneth on ideology as false recognition; Forst on ideologies as naturalized justification complexes; Pereira on besieged imagination; Rosa on non-thematized temporal norms; and Jaeggi on ideology as naturalization/universalization of interests. The author proposes two additional features crucial today: (1) neoliberal individualization of failure that obscures structural causes and hinders articulation of oppression; and (2) lack of discursive articulation (Diskursivierung) via hegemonic discourses that preclude thematization. Drawing on Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics, ideology critique is modeled as a reflective provocation that suspends interaction to restore authentic discourse (mentor/therapist analogies), transforming unconsciously motivated behavior into responsible action. Matthias Kettner further ties ideology critique to psychoanalytic interpretation aimed at dissolving self-reification by externally reintroducing communication to undo discursive blockades. This “lack of discursive articulation” becomes the key to reinterpreting Habermas’s colonisation thesis as containing an ideology-critique moment.

The article undertakes a theoretical-conceptual reconstruction and reinterpretation in three steps: 1) Cartographic mapping of current models of social critique (external/constructivist, hermeneutic/internal, reconstructive/immanent, genealogical) and reformulation of ideology critique’s core features, adding two contemporary traits: neoliberal individualization of failure and lack of discursive articulation. This draws on extensive secondary literature (Walzer, Honneth, Forst, Jaeggi, Rosa, Herzog) and classical sources (Marx, early Frankfurt School). 2) Analytical exposition of Habermas’s theory of communicative action and society: distinction between communicative vs. strategic rationality and action; validity claims and discursive redemption; differentiation between lifeworld (culture, society, personality) and system (economy and administration; steering media money/power); rationalization processes; and the colonisation of the lifeworld. Here the author distinguishes two levels of critique embedded in Habermas: - Critique as discursive redemption (participant perspective in the lifeworld). - Critique as diagnosis (observer perspective on system-lifeworld pathologies). 3) Comparative-interpretive argument that aligns the first-level and second-level critiques with models of ideology critique, concluding that only the diagnostic (observer) level qualifies as ideology critique under the proposed definition centered on discursive blockage. The argument is supported by textual analysis of Habermas’s works (TCA I–II, Faktizität und Geltung, earlier essays) and by illustrative application to Habermas’s example of juridification in family law, showing how system media supplant communicative coordination and suppress thematization. Throughout, the study employs immanent critique: reconstructing normative potentials within modernity’s own practices rather than invoking an external Archimedean standpoint, thereby avoiding epistemic paternalism while preserving critical force.

- The colonisation of the lifeworld thesis in Habermas can be read as a form of ideology critique when ideology is understood as the elimination or restriction of discursive articulation (blockage of thematization of validity claims). - Habermas’s Critical Theory contains two distinct levels of critique: (1) critique as discursive redemption (participant perspective), and (2) critique as diagnosis (observer perspective). Only the second, diagnostic level fits the reinterpreted model of ideology critique, because it reveals systemic mechanisms (money/power) that systematically distort and displace communicative coordination. - Colonisation functions dually as a social pathology and as ideology: by substituting understanding with steering media, it produces a systematic restriction of communication that yields the “appearance” of discursive redemption as an objective power and fosters objectively false consciousness (Habermas 1988, pp. 278, 350). - This reinterpretation integrates Habermas’s earlier account of technocratic ideology (replacement of democratic will-formation by technical decisions) with the TCA colonisation thesis: both concern the displacement of discourse by system media. - The juridification of family law illustrates colonisation’s ambivalence: initial emancipatory effects (dismantling patriarchal authority) are accompanied by reification and a shift from value/norm-based integration to formal-systemic integration, exemplifying lack of discursive articulation within a lifeworld domain. - Habermas’s model supports a reconstructive-immanent critique rather than a radical ideology critique of a “totally administered society.” He maintains confidence in the residual and renewable normative potentials of everyday communicative practices; new social movements can be seen as attempts to reconquer lifeworld spaces. - Conceptually, ideology critique should target not merely the thematization of false universalizations but the unveiling of power structures that render certain validity claims non-thematizable in the first place.

The study’s reinterpretation addresses its central question—how ideology critique figures within Habermas—by showing that the colonisation thesis, read through the lens of discursive blockage, yields an immanent critique of ideology at the diagnostic level. This avoids epistemic asymmetry: rather than positing a privileged knower who unmasks “false consciousness,” the analysis reconstructs how system imperatives condition communicative structures, restricting possibilities for discourse. Situating Habermas between hermeneutics and systems theory clarifies the dual function of critique: normative grounding in communicative rationality (participant level) and empirical-diagnostic exposure of social pathologies (observer level). The findings connect Habermas’s early technocratic ideology critique with his later system-lifeworld framework, offering a unified view of how ideology operates in late modernity: via substitution of discursive will-formation by steering media and the consequent de-thematization of contested norms and interests. This contributes to ongoing debates (Honneth, Forst, Jaeggi, Rosa) by specifying ideology’s mechanism as discursive elimination and by proposing immanent standards—inscribed in modern practices—to evaluate and resist colonising trends. The implications are twofold: analytically, it refines the concept of social pathologies to include ideology as a mechanism that masks and reproduces them; politically, it orients critique toward restoring conditions of discursive articulation in domains vulnerable to monetization, bureaucratization, and juridification.

The paper concludes that Habermas’s colonisation of the lifeworld contains an internal moment of ideology critique when ideology is defined as lack of discursive articulation. Colonisation is a peculiar social pathology that simultaneously functions ideologically by eliminating understanding as a mode of coordination and, hence, suppressing thematization. Consequently, critique of colonisation assumes the form of ideology critique aimed at re-establishing normal communicative processes. This is a modest, non-radical ideology critique: unlike Adorno, Horkheimer, or the later Marcuse, Habermas rejects the thesis of a totally administered society and sustains confidence in the enduring normative potentials of everyday communication. New social movements can be read as attempts to reverse colonisation by reconquering lifeworld spaces. The reinterpretation also bridges Habermas’s early technocratic ideology critique with TCA’s colonisation thesis, revealing a consistent concern with the displacement of discourse by system media. Future research could elaborate how this framework applies across specific domains (e.g., platform economies, expert discourses) and how discursive institutions might counteract colonising dynamics without foreclosing emancipatory potentials.

The article acknowledges the modest scope of the ideology critique it attributes to Habermas: it does not advocate a radical critique of a “totally administered society,” but rather a reconstructive-immanent critique focused on restoring discursive articulation. The analysis is theoretical and interpretive, relying on textual reconstruction and illustrative examples (e.g., juridification in family law) rather than extensive empirical investigation. Moreover, the colonisation thesis itself, as noted, does not fully detail the mechanisms by which steering media replace understanding in specific crises, often appealing to broad phenomena (bureaucratization, monetization, juridification). These constraints delimit the generalizability and empirical specificity of the conclusions.