Predictors of the prevalence and importance of the observed trinary control system in rural China

The study addresses how social control operates in rural China within a trinary framework of formal, semiformal, and informal mechanisms. While Western research emphasizes a binary model, Chinese communities integrate semiformal institutions—especially village committees—that bridge state and society. Prior work shows semiformal control is prevalent and effective, yet little empirical research examines its predictors, particularly in rural settings where Confucian practices are embedded. This study investigates village-level structural and individual-level factors that predict (a) the observed prevalence of participation by government, police, village committees, and xiangxian in community order maintenance activities; and (b) perceived importance of these mechanisms. The purpose is to advance understanding of how social structures and individual roles shape the trinary control system in rural China.

The paper reviews foundational definitions of social control and elaborates the concept of semiformal control, which in China blends formal authority with local, community-based mediation. Historical and contemporary research documents semiformal mechanisms (e.g., tiao-jie and bang-jiao) as widespread and effective in China, distinct from Western contexts where restorative justice often complements formal systems rather than integrating with them. Village committees are central semiformal organizations, implementing state policy while mediating disputes, coordinating with police, assisting reentry, and supporting administrative tasks. Prior studies show semiformal control reduces crime and victimization, but predictors of its prevalence and importance remain underexplored. Structural predictors reviewed include economic disadvantage and ethnic heterogeneity. Western literature finds poverty and heterogeneity undermine informal control via weakened cohesion. Chinese findings are mixed; some urban studies link community poverty to lower semiformal control, while others find weak or no association for formal or informal control. This study adds a rural-specific structural indicator—village collective revenue per capita—as a key economic resource shaping control capacity, alongside percent poor families and ethnic heterogeneity. Individual-level predictors include: (1) cadre status (village committee members), expected to observe and value greater participation by village committee, government, police, and xiangxian; (2) Communist Party membership, expected to associate with higher observed participation and importance; (3) gender, with prior Chinese studies mixed, leading to a hypothesis of no effect; (4) age, hypothesized to be positively related to valuing control; and (5) education, included as a control without a specific directional hypothesis.

Design and data: A 2021 nationwide village survey in rural China collected village- and individual-level data. Interviewers were trained graduate students with rural ties and dialect familiarity, facilitating access and response quality. Face-to-face interviews were conducted during January–February 2021. Sampling sought geographic and economic diversity across 25 of 31 provinces, selecting one village per county for 164 villages. A total of 2,460 individual questionnaires were distributed; 2,343 were completed (95% response). Village-level questionnaires were completed by village leaders. Measures: Dependent variables captured both prevalence and importance of four control mechanisms—township/upper-level government, paichusuo (police), village committee (semiformal), and xiangxian (informal)—across 10 community order maintenance activities (family disputes; house/property disputes; villager disputes; villager vs. village committee; villager vs. village-owned economy; villager vs. government; shangfang/appeals; mass incidents; land expropriation and housing demolition; community safety/crime control). Prevalence was ranked per activity (most=4 to least=1). Importance per activity used a five-point scale from very important to not important at all. Composite sums across the 10 activities were also constructed for each mechanism. Independent variables: Village-level—collective revenue per capita (from rents, enterprises, donations, subsidies, balances), percent poor families (dibao and wubao categories), and ethnic heterogeneity (single vs. multiple ethnic groups). Individual-level—cadre (1/0), Party member (1/0), gender (male=1), age (years), and education (years). The observed prevalence of each mechanism within an activity was also included as a predictor of its rated importance for that activity. Analytic strategy: Two-level (multilevel) models estimated village- and individual-level predictors of prevalence and importance for each mechanism within each of the 10 activities and for the overall composite indices. Primary models used multilevel linear regression; robustness checks employed multilevel generalized ordinal models for ordinal outcomes, yielding largely consistent significance patterns. Reporting focuses on coefficients significant in both approaches to balance robustness and interpretability. Descriptives: Among 164 villages, collective revenue per capita ranged 0–12,019 yuan (mean 448); mean percent poor families was 10% (0–57%); 8% of villages had more than one ethnic group. Among 2,343 individuals, mean age was 55.5 (18–98); 65% male; mean education 7.1 years (0–19); 6% cadres; 9% CCP members.

- Village-level effects: Village collective revenue was the only consistent structural predictor of observed participation for key mechanisms. Higher collective revenue was associated with greater observed participation by village committees (semiformal) in multiple activities (e.g., villager vs. village-owned economy; villager vs. government; shangfang; mass incidents; land expropriation/housing demolition) and with lower observed police participation (formal) across seven of the ten activities and in the overall participation index. Collective revenue showed no association with xiangxian (informal) or township/upper-level government participation. Thus, collective revenue differentially predicts semiformal (positive) and formal police (negative) prevalence. - Individual-level effects on prevalence: Cadre status, gender, and age predicted prevalence in select activities. Cadres more often observed village committee leadership in land expropriation/housing demolition disputes and were less likely to observe xiangxian participation in villager vs. government disputes. Males, compared to females, more often observed government leading in shangfang, land expropriation/housing demolition, and community safety but reported lower police involvement in family dispute mediation. Older respondents observed higher police participation in family and house/property disputes but were less likely to report higher government participation in villager vs. village-owned economy disputes. For the combined 10-item index, age predicted higher overall police participation. - Predictors of importance ratings: The observed prevalence of a mechanism strongly and positively predicted its importance rating across all activities and in composite indices for all four mechanisms. Village collective revenue positively predicted the importance of the village committee in activities related to shangfang, mass incidents, land expropriation/housing demolition, and community safety, indicating economic resources strengthen perceived importance of semiformal control in these domains. Cadres rated the village committee as more important for shangfang and community safety and rated government more important in villager disputes, mass incidents, and land expropriation/housing demolition. Party affiliation, gender, and age showed activity-specific effects but were generally not significant for the combined indices. - Sample/statistical context: N=2,343 individuals nested in 164 villages from 25 provinces; 65% male; mean age 55.5; mean education 7.1 years; 6% cadres; 9% CCP members; villages averaged 10% poor families; 8% multi-ethnic; collective revenue per capita mean 448 yuan (range 0–12,019).

Findings address the research question by identifying distinct structural and individual predictors of the trinary control system in rural China. A key structural resource—village collective revenue—enhances semiformal (village committee) participation and reduces reliance on formal police in many dispute and order-maintenance contexts. This underscores how locally controlled economic capacity enables semiformal institutions to mobilize resources (e.g., staffing, equipment, compensation) for conflict mediation and routine safety, consistent with the integrated nature of Chinese community governance. The strong link between observed participation and perceived importance suggests that visibility and engagement of each mechanism bolster its legitimacy and standing in the community. Individual roles also matter: cadres—embedded in governance structures—are more likely to observe and value village committee and government interventions. The results imply that Western-derived constructs of informal control and their structural antecedents (e.g., poverty, ethnic heterogeneity) may not generalize cleanly to rural China, where longstanding kinship networks, cultural norms of harmony, and village institutions shape control capacities differently. Overall, the study advances understanding of how semiformal control operates alongside formal and informal mechanisms in a non-Western, rural context.

This study contributes by jointly modeling village-level structural features and individual characteristics that predict the prevalence and perceived importance of formal, semiformal, and informal control in rural China. It demonstrates that village collective revenue is a pivotal resource bolstering semiformal control while reducing reliance on police, and that actual participation strongly elevates perceived importance across mechanisms. Cadres tend to value and observe more involvement by village committees and government, aligning with their mobilization roles. Policy implications include strengthening village collective economies and encouraging coordinated participation among government, police, village committees, and xiangxian to enhance order maintenance. Future research should employ probability sampling to improve generalizability, extend analyses to urban settings, refine measures of residential mobility and informal control suited to rural China, and unpack heterogeneity across specific order-maintenance activities versus composite indices.

- The village sample, while broad and diverse, was not randomly selected; findings are not statistically generalizable to all Chinese villages. - The study focuses on rural areas; results may not generalize to urban contexts. - Residential mobility was not directly measured; a proxy based on village proximity to urban areas showed no significant effects and may be an imprecise indicator. - Measures of informal control reflect rural Chinese realities and differ from common Western instruments, limiting direct cross-context comparability.