Populist student organizations in Indonesia: an analysis of anti-establishment ideas

In recent decades, many skilled researchers in the social sciences have begun to study populism. It is said to be a social science field because researchers in various social science disciplines, including communication science (Amin and Ritonga, 2022; De Vreese et al., 2018; Gazali, 2018; Nasution et al., 2023; Ritonga and Adela, 2020), religion (DeHanas and Shterin, 2018; Kusumo and Hurriyah, 2018; Ritonga and Adela, 2020; Syarif and Hannan, 2020), sociology (Hadiz, 2019), security studies (Muradi, 2017) and the field of political science in both local and global studies (Ahmad 2020; Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017; Hadiz and Robison 2017; Pirro and Taggart, 2018; Pollock et al., 2015; Rahmah 2019), are interested in learning the topic. This list shows that populism is very interesting and provides evidence that its emergence intersects with several dimensions of human life today.

In many debates regarding the overall concept of populism, scholars view populism as a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004) that can be attached to thicker ideologies (Mietzner, 2020). In this research, the populism being studied is rooted in Islamism. According to Mietzner (2018), Islamic populism has always sought to Islamize the Indonesian state and society. Its anti-establishment agenda manifests in the form of efforts to oust and oppose the current democratic order and party system. These populists promise an ideal future under the banner of Islamic law and teachings.

Populism thrives in countries that adhere to a democratic system because democracy always runs with the logic of the majority. However, it often ignores the rights of the majority itself (Riedel, 2017). As a result, the majority feel uncomfortable, afraid, and as if it is in the shadow of another group's threat (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). One reason that the populism prevalent in European countries is right-wing and driven by groups from Christian parties is that the majority in those countries are members of Christian groups (Grant et al., 2019; Rooduijn, 2015; Taggart, 1996; Yilmaz and Morieson, 2021).

In the Indonesian context, Muslims are considered the majority. Therefore, the discussion of this topic in Indonesia is coloured more by right-wing populism, namely, Islamic populism (Hadiz and Robison, 2017; Mietzner, 2018). When discussing populism in Indonesia, experts have diverse views and arguments. Regarding its emergence, Hadiz (2019) claims that there are two reasons populism emerged in Indonesia. The first relates to social changes that are increasingly capitalist-neoliberal, thus causing social inequality. Second, the legacy of social conflicts from the Cold War era that came at the expense of Islamic political and social movements typically led to the disappearance or domestication of leftist and even liberal political forces. Mietzner (2020) says that the main constituents of the wave of populism in Indonesia are the remnants of past divisions, whether religious, racial, classist, or regional. Second, there are efforts to politicize unequal socioeconomic realities. Third, minority groups are targets for mobilization, and finally, there are established parties that capture and absorb populist groups to maintain political power. Mietzner (2020) categorizes populism in Indonesia into three competing forms, namely, chauvinist populism, Islamist populism, and technocratic populism. On the other hand, Hadiz and Robison (2017) claim that Indonesia is classified by two competing styles, namely, secular nationalist populism and Islamic populism. Ahmad (2020) looks at it slightly differently by reviewing parts of Indonesia's past political streams. For him, there are three streams of populism in Indonesian history: secular nationalist populism, which seeks to maintain state sovereignty and recognizes the existence of the state ideology, namely, Pancasila; second, Islamic populism, which is held by a group that supports Islamic populism but also accepts Pancasila as an ideology; and third, Islamist populism, which is held by groups who dream of Indonesia becoming a country that adheres to Islamic principles and ideology and who oppose pluralist and liberal views.

Regarding populism in the context of religion, Yilmaz and Morieson (2021) divide it into two forms: first, religious populism, which has a solid and thick religious and ideological basis and is explicitly programmed, and second, identitarian populism, which—in contrast to religious populism—does not have a political programme based on religious ideology and does not plan to enforce religion through the state because populism is only an identity, not a true religious agenda. When discussing religious populism in Indonesia, Barton et al. (2021) identify a form of populism that they call Islamist civilizational populism, which is represented by the Front Pembela Islam organization (the organization's activities have been banned since January 2021).

In this study, we see a style of populism that is unique and different from others. It is similar to the Islamic populism conveyed by Ahmad (2020, p. 8). However, suppose that Islamic populism creates antagonism among Muslims and solely fights for Muslim people/citizens. Populism developed within Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) in addition to accepting the state's existence and the Pancasila ideology. In that case, they also want to be involved in multiclass coalitions (Hadiz, 2019, p. 40) and adopt pluralist values where they advocate for Muslims and other oppressed people, even though they are not Muslim.

On the other hand, GEMA Liberation is an Islamic group that opposes the existing system and structure in Indonesia and calls for a return to total Islam. They are against not only the ideology of Pancasila and democracy but also the conception of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). They aspire to unite Muslims worldwide under the auspices of the Khilafah Islamiyah, a concept once realized by the prophet Muhammad PBUH in Medina.

This topic draws the interest of researchers because of the rise of populism, which has spread in almost all parts of the world. To establish the rise of populism, we can refer to the election of Trump in the United States and the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union (BREXIT) in 2016. These two cases are important events in the 21st century because they shocked the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost every researcher who studies populism starts their work by referencing these two historical moments. In Indonesia, populism discourse peaked during the 2014 presidential election. Mietzner (2015) said that the presidential election in 2014 in Indonesia was a battle between two populist figures, namely, Prabowo and Jokowi. It appeared that the Indonesian people preferred the technocratic populist character, as evidenced by Jokowi's election win. W. McCoy (2017) reinforced this by saying that Indonesia felt the impact of the wave of rising populism with the emergence of charismatic figures such as Prabowo Subianto.

In the Indonesian case, experts interested in studying the phenomenon of populism divide it into two parts. First, most studies focus on figurability (Djuyandi et al., 2019; Gazali, 2018; Mietzner, 2015; Rahmah, 2019; Ritonga and Adela, 2020). This is because such researchers consider populism to be very attached to populist political figures. Second, studies that focus their research at the organizational level are usually focused on elections in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, in 2017 (Hadiz, 2015; Kusumo and Hurriyah, 2018; Mudhoffir et al. 2017; Muhtadi, 2019). The current study falls into this second group.

However, merely identifying and discussing the phenomenon of populism in Indonesia is insufficient. None of the research done by the scholars above has touched on the student element. In Indonesia, students play an essential role in political escalation (Murdian S. and Dkk, 1999). Students have extreme power in politics. It is evident from the data released by Litbang Kompas on March 2, 2020, that the public considered the student movement to be the most influential source of civil movements (41.5%) at that time, followed by NGOs (18.7%), customary/kinency/tribal organizations (12.9%) and youth organizations (12.1%) (Afrianto, 2020).

Regarding Islamic students in Indonesia, there are at least five major Islamic student organizations in Indonesia, namely, HMI (Muslim Student Association), PMII (Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), IMM (Muhammadiyah Student Association), KAMMI (Koalisi Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union) and GEMA Liberation (Gerakan Mahasiswa Perubahan or Student Movement of Liberation) (Smith-Hefner, 2019). The five organizations are spread across every campus in Indonesia. They have strong cadre bases and extensive networks reaching almost all campuses in Indonesia.

This paper argues that populism—specifically Islamic populism—exists on campuses. Islamic student organizations are influential on campuses in Indonesia because more than 80% of Indonesian society is Muslim. This article examines two powerful and existing student organizations in Indonesia: the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or HMI) and GEMA Liberation. We believe that HMI is more populist when viewed from the perspective of the number of followers. However, when viewed from the compatibility of ideas and practical steps towards the desired change, GEMA Liberation is more populist. This article will further explain the practice of Islamic populism on campus, how a model can be formed, and which group is more popular among Islamic students in Indonesia. These issues are examined scientifically in this article to provide new information and perspectives for studying Islamic populism in Indonesia.

Populism as anti-establishment. One of the most challenging parts of generating a theory about populism is finding a single, superior concept. In other words, there are various explanations of populism among experts. However, having a large amount of literature that discusses populism is quite helpful in understanding this theory. We agree with Gidron and Bonikowski (2013), who say that the study of populism can be viewed from three perspectives: discursive style, political strategy, and ideational. The discursive style perspective assumes that populism is a rhetorical style of political actors who divide society into two parts: good, ordinary people and ruthless elites. The actors always identify as the spearhead of the ordinary people (Aslanidis, 2015; Hawkins, 2009). Therefore, research that uses a discursive approach will always use text, speech, and public discourse as its unit of analysis (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013; Hawkins, 2009; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Supporters of the political strategy perspective assume that populism is a strategy of a personalistic leader to gain direct support from the general public without intermediaries to gain and exercise government power (Barr, 2009; Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Weyland, 2001, 2017). Research taking this approach is characterized by a focus on strong and charismatic leaders who can attract people's attention with populist slogans (Weyland, 2001). This approach has at least three associated keywords: personalistic leaders, the general public (the masses), and political positions. Finally, there is the ideational perspective. This approach assumes that populism is not just a matter of discourse and political strategy but is far more substantive, namely, a matter of an ideal view of the political world. This approach emphasizes aspects of ideas held by various actors and organizations (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Compared with the two previous approaches, this approach is superior when a researcher is examining populism at the organizational level because not all cases of populism are motivated by a sole political actor. As in the case selected in this study, these organizational groups continue to push a populist-style movement even across leadership changes. We assume that the organization has institutionalized ideological values embedded in it.

One of the benefits of the ideational approach is that it accounts for the facts that not all populist forces are equal and that populist ideas can vary in intensity (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Recently, researchers such as Ellenbroek et al. (2021) have found that even populism and pluralism do not always have a negative relationship. In contrast, they see a positive relationship between the two. For these reasons, we chose an ideational approach in this study. Furthermore, student organizations are places where students learn to think about ideals when considering a given issue. Therefore, research taking an ideological approach will help focus on the populistic ideas contained in the ideology of each of these organizations and examining their programmatic aspects.

As populism is a thin ideology, there are three main ideas in studying it: first, anti-establishment beliefs; second, authoritarianism; and third, nativism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Mudde, 2007). Of these three common ideas for investigating cases and theories regarding populism, this research uses an ideological approach and takes anti-establishment beliefs as its focus. Barr (2009) states that anti-establishment beliefs generate opposition to the elite in power, calls for the democratic system to be controlled, and notes that the establishment is a proxy for the elite.

When discussing anti-establishment beliefs, there are some established views on the existence of elites and which side they support when there is a conflict between the elite and the people (Droste, 2021; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Regarding the current order, are the elite satisfied with or believe in the existing order? Is it ideal? Like populists in general, to what extent do the elite trust the current liberal democratic system (Barr, 2009; Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Urbinati, 2017)? From the most extreme side, what needs to be known is whether they want an alternative order in forming a new system and their conception of the ideal state (Akmaliah, 2019; Jati, 2017; Maarif, 2012; Syarif and Hannan, 2020)

In this article, populism is a thin ideology. This view is also commonly referred to as the ideational approach, which emphasizes the ideas espoused by actors and populist groups. Thus, if ideology is considered the ultimate motivator of populism, then its empirical study should direct researchers' attention to the programmatic statements delivered by key organizational actors and treat them as the primary unit of analysis (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). Therefore, this study employed a qualitative approach and took case studies as the research method (Miles et al., 2014). Case studies are an appropriate research method because the research subject is specific (Gerring, 2013), two Islamic student organizations in Indonesia: HMI and GEMA Liberation.

The choice of the two organizations was motivated by two factors: first, HMI and GEMA Liberation were reasonably prominent in the range of populist actions (Dwiastono, 2019; Rizky, 2019; Smith-Hefner, 2019; van Bruinessen, 2002). Second, due to the age of the organization, the history of HMI and the Student Movement of Liberation (GEMA Liberation) provided different momentum for their formation. HMI is the oldest surviving student organization, while GEMA Liberation is the youngest (Alfian, 2013; Kamil, 2005; Sitompul, 1986; Smith-Hefner, 2019; van Bruinessen, 2002). Therefore, by examining both, we can understand the extent to which historical factors influenced the development of populism among the student members of these groups.

The process of identifying informants was carried out by purposive sampling with predefined criteria (Devers and Frankel, 2000). Key informants were official national-level board members (elites): three from HMI and two from GEMA Liberation. To address the limitations of elite interviews, two triangulation techniques were used (Natow, 2020): (1) multiple data sources by selecting categories of informants beyond elites (two alumni representatives, ten HMI members, seven GEMA Liberation members; the lower GEMA count reflects recruitment difficulties after HTI was disbanded); and (2) multiple qualitative methods combining interviews with document analysis. Documents included organizational statutes and values, books, online news, and research journals.

In-depth interviews were conducted April–September 2020 in Indonesia, averaging one hour each, recorded via mobile app and transcribed. Coding used NVivo 12 (Welsh, 2002). A directed content analysis approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000) was applied. Steps: (1) review relevant theories and concepts; (2) prepare semistructured interview guidelines; (3) transcribe 24 interviews and import into NVivo; (4) repeatedly read transcripts for familiarity; (5) code according to predetermined and emergent codes focusing on elite, democracy, current system, and Islamic state, and use Case Classifications to group by organization; (6) extract themes from categories; (7) interpret results and draw conclusions.

• Two distinct populist organizational models were identified among Islamic student groups: HMI exhibits a moderate or thin Islamic populism, while GEMA Liberation shows a stronger, more assertive, thick Islamic populism.
• Views on elites: HMI judges elites pragmatically by actions and aligns with either elites or people based on "truth" and justice, remaining organizationally independent yet maintaining access to power to convey grassroots interests. It is critical of elite immorality and oligarchic tendencies but favors external oversight and engagement. GEMA Liberation views elites as likely to act unjustly due to and within a corrupt system; the primary adversary is the system itself, not elites as individuals, necessitating structural change.
• Views on the system and democracy: HMI accepts Indonesia’s current democratic system as the best available option, rejects system replacement, and advocates reform and patching deficiencies (e.g., electoral rules, free speech, ITE Law), including pro-democracy programs (e.g., democracy schools). GEMA Liberation rejects the capitalism–democracy system as tyrannical and incompatible with Islam, adopting a confrontational stance and advocating a divinely sourced alternative.
• Islamic state: HMI rejects establishing an Islamic state, emphasizing the practice of Islamic values within a secular state framework that ensures justice and welfare, aligning Islam with Indonesianness and Pancasila. GEMA Liberation aspires to an Islamic state (Khilafah Islamiyah) as the complete implementation of Islamic teachings, rejecting secularism and current Indonesian state conceptions.
• Degree of populism by two approaches: (1) Mass support: HMI is more populist, with broad acceptance and infrastructure—founded in 1947 with 202 branches nationwide and approximately 500,000 active members (29th Congress report). GEMA Liberation’s exact membership is uncertain post-HTI disbandment (July 19, 2017), with an estimated ~20,000 members nationwide, ongoing but more clandestine mobilization. (2) Ideational-programmatic radicalism: GEMA Liberation is more populist, displaying a more confrontational, anti-system stance seeking radical replacement (caliphate), whereas HMI pursues reform within the existing system.
• Historical context shapes populist style: HMI’s founding during Indonesia’s early independence embeds dual ideals (Islam and Indonesianness), tempering its populism; GEMA Liberation, emerging in 2004, prioritizes Islamic civilizational aims over Indonesian state priorities.

The study addresses the research questions on how Islamic populism manifests within student organizations and which organization is more populist by comparing HMI and GEMA Liberation across key ideational dimensions (elites, democracy, current system, Islamic state). Findings show HMI’s Islamic populism is integrated with Indonesianness and Pancasila, favoring reformist engagement, oversight of elites, and democratic improvement, thus a thinner form of populism. In contrast, GEMA Liberation embodies thick Islamic populism: antagonistic toward the liberal-democratic order, attributing injustice to systemic capitalism–democracy, rejecting compromise with perceived tyranny, and aiming to replace the system with a Khilafah.

These findings clarify that “populism among students” is neither uniform nor purely leader-centric; rather, it is organizationally institutionalized and historically contingent. Using the mass-support lens, HMI’s breadth and longevity indicate greater populist reach on campuses. Using the ideational–programmatic lens, GEMA Liberation’s radical anti-establishment agenda aligns more strongly with core populist antagonism and system replacement, marking it as ideationally thicker. The results contribute to Indonesian populism scholarship by introducing the student organizational layer and revealing divergent trajectories shaped by founding contexts and ideological commitments.

The cases of HMI and GEMA Liberation demonstrate that while both are populist, they diverge in goals and means of Islamic populism. HMI’s populism is softer/thinner, coupling Islamic ideals with Indonesianness and Pancasila, supporting the existing state framework and democratic reforms rather than system replacement or an Islamic state. GEMA Liberation’s populism is robust/thick, rejecting the current state system and ideology as unjust and advocating radical replacement with a Khilafah Islamiyah.

Historically rooted contexts help explain these differences: HMI’s early post-independence origins embed dual commitments to Islam and Indonesia, whereas GEMA Liberation’s later emergence foregrounds Islamic civilizational aims over Indonesian state priorities. Among students, HMI’s model remains more widely accepted (greater membership and campus presence), while GEMA Liberation represents a more radical, confrontational alternative whose appeal grew post-1998 reforms. Future research could expand to other Islamic student organizations (PMII, IMM, KAMMI), compare temporal dynamics pre-/post-key political events, and examine causal mechanisms linking organizational training, ideology internalization, and mobilization outcomes.