Lifting the smokescreen of science diplomacy: comparing the political instrumentation of science and innovation centres

The paper addresses the ambiguity and limited empirical grounding of science diplomacy (SD), a concept often used as a catch-all with loose boundaries. It outlines common SD dimensions (science in diplomacy; diplomacy for science; science for diplomacy/soft power) and highlights two key challenges: conceptual overstretch and a paucity of empirical evidence. To mitigate these, the study adopts a policy instrumentation lens, arguing instruments are social institutions that shape policy and can reveal hidden political rationales. The research question centers on how science and innovation centres (SIC) have developed and been politically instrumentalized in Germany and Switzerland, and what this reveals about SD objectives. The purpose is to unpack SD’s black box by tracing the trajectories, actor constellations, and evolving goals attached to SIC, showing the importance and national interest-driven nature of these instruments.

The study engages two strands of literature/theory as its conceptual framework rather than a traditional narrative review. First, policy instrumentation scholarship (Lascoumes & Le Galès; Hood; Capano & Howlett) reconceptualizes instruments as socio-technical institutions that carry meanings, shape interactions, and can produce aggregation, representation/problematisation, and appropriation effects over time. Second, to identify political rationales and decision logics, the study draws on actor-centred institutionalism (Mayntz & Scharpf) and the bureaucratic politics model (Allison; Bendor & Hammond), emphasizing ministerial interests, bargaining, and intra-/inter-bureaucratic conflicts. The SD literature is positioned as often normative and under-evidenced, with prior typologies (e.g., Flink & Schreiterer’s access, promotion, influence) providing a heuristic to categorize objectives.

Qualitative, comparative case study of two national SIC systems (Germany’s DWIH and Switzerland’s swissnex). Case selection: both federal, highly innovative countries with strong HE/research systems and long-running SIC (approx. 10–19 years), but differing in themes, governance, and funding. Data: (1) 20 publicly available policy documents (government strategies, annual reports, speeches); (2) 13 purposively sampled semi-structured expert interviews (current/former officials in foreign and sectoral ministries; representatives of research/science organizations). Most interviews 40–95 minutes, primarily face-to-face; some by phone. Additional oral communications and site visits complement data. Analysis: thematic analysis to distil political rationales and trace instrument trajectories; triangulation across documents and interviews. Limitations acknowledged for document availability/completeness/quality and interview method constraints.

- Definition and role of SIC: Distinct government-established units abroad at the nexus of higher education, research, innovation, and diplomacy; networked presence; close ties to foreign ministries; serve promotion, networking, expertise, and platform functions for international cooperation and visibility. - Germany (DWIH): Launched 2009 within a new Research and Academic Relations Policy (RARP) under the Federal Foreign Office (FFO); five official locations (New York 2010; Tokyo 2010; Moscow 2011; New Delhi 2012; São Paulo 2012); Cairo (2012–2016) closed post-evaluation. Coordinated by DAAD; institutional funding ~€2.5 million total for five locations; governance includes FFO, sectoral ministries, science alliance, and industry. Two phases: (1) 2008–2016 conceptualization/early struggles with tug-of-war among FFO, BMBF, and science organizations, concerns over visibility and control; (2) post-2017 reorganization with stronger top-down management and shift to institutional funding; stable objectives emphasizing access, promotion, influence/soft power and foreign policy linkage. - Switzerland (swissnex): Began with SHARE Boston (2000), San Francisco (2003); later Shanghai (2007), Singapore (2005; closed 2015), Bangalore (2011), Rio de Janeiro (2014), with outposts (e.g., Guangzhou, New York, São Paulo). Co-governed by FDFA and SERI; about CHF 5.5 million public funding; public–private partnership financing at locations; CEOs often with diplomatic status; complemented by Science Counsellors in ~20 countries. Developed in phases: (1) addressing brain drain and internationalisation, networking and visibility; (2) expansion and facilitation of bilateral cooperation programmes; (3) since 2018, explicit alignment with SD and soft power/influence narratives. - Similarities: Overlapping geographies (major tech hubs/emerging markets); closure events (Singapore 2015; Cairo 2016); audit/evaluation scrutiny; strong role of policy entrepreneurs; ministerial struggles over competence and visibility; convergence toward demonstrating governmental impact. - Differences: Bottom-up, incremental, PPP model and low actor involvement (swissnex) vs. top-down, simultaneous rollout, publicly funded, and high actor involvement (DWIH). Swiss instrument initially outside explicit SD framing; German instrument embedded ab initio in SD/foreign policy. - Political rationales: Objectives extend beyond soft power to include access to resources/capabilities, promotion/branding, internationalisation, economic competitiveness (knowledge society), bilateral cooperation, and addressing global challenges. Swiss explicit “influence”/soft power framing appears only in 2018; German DWIH framed for influence from inception. Overall, SD objectives are clearly nationally motivated. - Instrumentation effects: Evidence of aggregation effects (bringing heterogeneous actors together leading to inertia), representation/problematisation effects (stable SD framings and explanatory systems shaping cognition), and appropriation effects (ministries asserting competences; instruments serving evolving governmental interests). These effects often reinforce each other, generating institutional inertia and longevity despite external pressures (e.g., audits).

The instrument-centred analysis reveals that SIC, as policy instruments, structure the field of international research/innovation engagement and make visible the political rationales underpinning SD. Findings show SD practices are driven primarily by national interests—access, promotion, and influence—rather than transcending them. The comparative trajectories illuminate how initial conditions (bottom-up pilot vs. top-down strategy), governance, and funding shape institutionalisation, actor bargaining, and subsequent stability or adaptability. Instrumentation effects (aggregation, representation, appropriation) interact to produce inertia and resilience, explaining continuity amid audits and reorganisations. The study thereby addresses SD’s conceptual overstretch by grounding it in actual instrument design, use, and effects, demonstrating when SD represents relabelling of existing practices (swissnex) versus a new policy initiative (DWIH), and highlighting implications for foreign policy, higher education internationalisation, and science policy coordination.

The study lifts the smokescreen around SD by tracing the political instrumentation of SIC in Germany and Switzerland. It shows that national objectives—access to knowledge and talent, promotion/branding, economic competitiveness, and influence—dominate, challenging assumptions that SD transcends national interests. Contributions include: (1) an empirically grounded account of SIC histories, governance, and funding; (2) application of policy instrumentation theory to reveal aggregation, representation, and appropriation effects and their reinforcing nature; (3) clarification of how SD can be either relabelling of old practices (swissnex, explicitly linked to SD since 2018) or the product of a new policy paradigm (DWIH). Future research could examine: how relabelling as SD benefits domestic actors; how different ministerial leadership would alter SIC design and effects; the ongoing institutionalisation of DWIH; and the generalizability of instrumentation effects across other SD instruments.

Acknowledged constraints include limited availability, completeness, and quality of public documents; typical limitations of interviews (e.g., recall, bias, and access); and the sensitive nature of data preventing sharing of interview materials. The policy instrumentation approach may have limited explanatory power for factors like concerns over international visibility and geopolitical signaling associated with opening/closing locations.