Illiberal Attitudes Among US State Legislative Candidates

The study investigates the extent to which illiberal attitudes are present among individuals seeking state legislative office in the United States. Motivated by heightened concerns about the health of American democracy after the 2016 and 2020 elections and documented instances of efforts to overturn certified results, the authors ask whether candidates—who wield or will soon wield authority over election administration and democratic institutions—support core liberal-democratic norms. The context emphasizes that state legislators play key roles in election regulation and certification, and that state legislative office is a common stepping stone to higher office. The purpose is to provide the first nationwide assessment of illiberal attitudes among both primary and general election state legislative candidates, thereby offering insights into potential future democratic backsliding originating from within political elites. The importance lies in identifying whether and where cracks in support for electoral democracy, nonviolence, and civil liberties exist among those who aspire to govern.

The authors situate their work within a growing literature documenting illiberal attitudes among the American public, including partisan hostility, acceptance of political violence, support for limiting civil liberties, and distrust of electoral institutions (e.g., Arceneaux & Truex 2023; Berlinski et al. 2023; Broockman et al. 2023; Cassese 2021; Graham & Svolik 2020; Kalmoe & Mason 2022). Prior studies find nominal but fragile support for democracy and increased politicization of democratic evaluations (e.g., Drutman et al. 2018; Carey et al. 2019; Flavin & Shufeldt 2022). The paper underscores that illiberal actions by public officials (e.g., efforts to overturn the 2020 election) may pose greater threats than mass protest, thus motivating examination of candidates’ attitudes. Existing surveys of state legislative candidates have focused on other topics or single-state primaries; this study fills a gap by surveying nearly all Democratic and Republican state legislative candidates nationwide in one cycle, including primaries.

Design: National online survey of state legislative candidates during the 2022 U.S. primary elections, covering both lower and upper chambers across states. Nebraska’s nonpartisan unicameral was included by emailing all primary-qualified candidates and collecting self-reported partisanship. Sampling and contact: Identified all Democratic and Republican primary candidates (including uncontested incumbents). Collected email addresses from state election agencies (when available) and via campaign, party, and social media searches. Coverage: 12,272 of 13,583 candidates (90.3%). Implemented a screening filter to ensure the candidate personally completed the survey. Fielding: Due to staggered primary dates (March–September 2022), invitations were sent on a rolling basis within 48 hours after each state’s primary; up to two reminders were sent to nonrespondents. Response: 1,173 candidates responded (overall 9.6% response rate). Party-specific response rates: Democrats 9.97% (of 5,366), Republicans 9.06% (of 6,533). Authors note response rates are comparable to similar elite surveys and discuss potential non-response bias in the supplementary materials. Instrument: Collected demographics and issue attitudes, and administered three batteries reflecting components of liberal democracy (per Dahl 2005): (1) electoral democracy (respecting outcomes; challenges to results; rule changes; and suffrage), (2) tolerance of political violence, and (3) views on restricting civil liberties (censorship/monitoring/punishment for political speech). Full question wording in supplementary materials. Analytic strategy: Constructed additive indices from each battery, rescaled to 0–1, with higher values indicating more illiberal views. Estimated linear regressions with standard errors clustered by state. Covariates included: Demographic factors (gender, race, education, age, religious affiliation and religiosity); Electoral factors (won primary, distance to advancement from primary threshold, incumbency, party); Candidate quality (prior elected experience; share of total primary donations, i.e., fraction of money). Additional models with state fixed effects and analyses for competitive states reported in supplements. Key model outputs (Table 1): Education negatively associated with illiberalism across all three indices (p<0.01). Republican partisanship associated with more illiberal views on electoral democracy (coef 0.125, p<0.01; model R2=0.28; party-only model R2=0.21) and political violence (0.028, p<0.01), but less illiberal views on free speech (-0.026, p<0.10). Winners of primaries showed slightly lower illiberalism on electoral democracy (-0.045, p<0.10). Distance to advancement positively associated with illiberalism on electoral democracy (0.029, p<0.10). Prior experience associated with lower acceptance of political violence (-0.021, p<0.05). Other factors (incumbency, financing) generally not significant.

• Electoral democracy norms: Over 90% of Democratic candidates and 73% of Republican candidates agreed it is important to respect election outcomes even when their party loses; about 12% of Republicans disagreed, more than twice the Democratic rate. On whether politicians have a responsibility to challenge election results when they lose, 27% of Democrats agreed; among Republicans, only 43% disagreed and 31% neither agreed nor disagreed, implying thousands of 2022 candidates endorsed challenges after losing. For the public challenging certified results, 5% of Democrats agreed versus 27% of Republicans; 29% of Republicans neither agreed nor disagreed (9% among Democrats), and only 44% of Republicans disagreed. Regarding changing election rules to help their party, 65% in both parties disagreed, yet about 35% were noncommittal or open. On whether the country would be better off if certain people did not vote, 79% of Democrats disagreed versus 55% of Republicans; 7% of Democrats agreed compared to 26% of Republicans.
• Political violence: Large majorities in both parties rejected political violence, though small minorities expressed acceptance of violent actions or intimidation, indicating nontrivial openness to anti-democratic tactics among some candidates.
• Civil liberties: Democrats were more supportive of restrictions on political speech and monitoring than Republicans. A large majority of Republican candidates agreed that there are too many extreme speakers of the other party invited to speak on college campuses, whereas only 27% of Democrats agreed; notable ambivalence existed (51% of Democrats, 23% of Republicans neither agreed nor disagreed). Candidates in both parties showed low willingness to limit newspaper criticism of their own side.
• Regression results: Education consistently reduced illiberal attitudes across all indices. Party was a strong predictor: Republicans were more illiberal on electoral democracy (coef 0.125, p<0.01; substantial explanatory power) and somewhat more illiberal on political violence (0.028, p<0.01), but less illiberal on free speech (-0.026, p<0.10). Candidate viability indicators (incumbency, fundraising share, closeness to threshold, winning primary) largely did not predict illiberal views, except small effects noted above; prior elected experience reduced acceptance of political violence.

The findings indicate that while most state legislative candidates support core democratic principles—rejecting political violence and affirming respect for electoral outcomes—there are meaningful partisan asymmetries and areas of concern. Republican candidates were more likely to countenance challenges to election results by both politicians and the public and to endorse limiting the franchise for some citizens, signaling vulnerabilities in electoral democracy norms. Democrats, by contrast, were more accepting of restrictions on political speech and monitoring, highlighting illiberal tendencies regarding civil liberties. Education emerged as a protective factor against illiberalism, and illiberal attitudes were not confined to fringe or unviable candidates. These patterns suggest that threats to democratic norms may come from different ideological directions: election-related norms are more fragile among Republicans, whereas support for free expression is more fragile among Democrats. The study underscores that both parties contain candidates whose attitudes could undermine different components of liberal democracy, with particular concern that a sizable share of Republican candidates express support for actions consistent with efforts to subvert certified election outcomes.

This study provides the first comprehensive national evidence on illiberal attitudes among candidates for U.S. state legislatures, encompassing primary and general election aspirants. It documents broad but imperfect support for democratic norms, with significant partisan differences: Republicans exhibit more illiberalism on electoral democracy and (to a lesser extent) political violence, while Democrats are more illiberal on civil liberties. Education is consistently associated with more liberal-democratic attitudes, and illiberalism is not limited to nonviable candidates. Overall, the results reveal both reasons for optimism and areas of concern about the resilience of democratic norms among future political leaders.

• Response rate was 9.6%, raising the possibility of non-response bias; authors provide state-by-state rates and discuss potential bias in supplementary materials.
• Email coverage was high but not complete (90.3% of candidates had identifiable email addresses); some candidates could not be contacted.
• Self-reported survey responses may be subject to social desirability or measurement error despite screening to ensure candidate completion.
• The study focuses on the 2022 cycle and on Democratic and Republican candidates, which may limit generalizability to other cycles or nonpartisan/third-party contexts.