Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

The paper delves into the enduring mystery of consciousness, a phenomenon deeply familiar yet profoundly difficult to explain scientifically. While many aspects of the mind have yielded to scientific investigation, consciousness remains resistant to reductive explanations. The author aims to dissect the problem, isolating its core difficulty. He critiques reductive approaches used in cognitive science and neuroscience, arguing that these methods, while successful in explaining cognitive functions, inevitably fail to address the subjective aspect of consciousness – the 'hard problem'. This critique opens the path for a non-reductive explanation, presented later in the paper. This explanation centers on a naturalistic dualism, proposing that consciousness should be considered a fundamental aspect of reality, alongside physical properties, with bridging principles needed to explain how physical processes give rise to experience. The core of this approach involves integrating the fundamental notion of information into the explanation of consciousness.

The paper reviews several prominent theories of consciousness, such as Crick and Koch's neurobiological theory focusing on neural oscillations and Baars' global workspace theory which explains consciousness through informational accessibility. However, Chalmers argues that these approaches, despite their value in addressing 'easy' problems of consciousness (like binding and reportability), fail to grapple with the hard problem of subjective experience. He notes that explanations often inadvertently switch focus from the hard problem of qualia to easily explainable functional aspects of consciousness. Theories that deny the phenomenon of subjective experience, such as some eliminativist perspectives, are also critiqued. Attempts to explain experience fully through functionalism are seen as incomplete, leaving the crucial link between physical processes and experience unexplained.

The paper employs a primarily philosophical methodology. It begins with a conceptual analysis, distinguishing between easy and hard problems of consciousness. This distinction helps clarify the scope of the problem, focusing on the unique challenges posed by subjective experience. The author critically examines existing literature on consciousness from cognitive science and neuroscience, analyzing their strengths and limitations in addressing the hard problem. Thought experiments, particularly focusing on the principle of organizational invariance, are used to argue against the possibility of functionally equivalent systems having different subjective experiences. The central argumentative strategy involves showing the inadequacy of reductive explanations and then proposing an alternative non-reductive framework. This framework involves proposing and defending psychophysical principles that connect the physical and phenomenal aspects of the world. These principles are not derived empirically but rather build upon philosophical analyses and intuitions about the nature of experience and information processing. A key component is the reliance on introspective data and intuitions, which, while subjective, form the basis for constructing a theory of consciousness.

The paper's central claim is that reductive explanations, prevalent in cognitive science and neuroscience, are fundamentally inadequate for explaining conscious experience. This inadequacy stems from the fact that reductive methods excel at explaining cognitive functions and physical structures, but subjective experience cannot be deduced from purely physical descriptions. The 'explanatory gap' highlights this limitation. To address the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers proposes a non-reductive approach, suggesting three key principles: 1. The principle of structural coherence posits a close relationship between the structure of consciousness and the structure of information processing. This principle explains the relationship between the structure of experience and the structure of awareness, which is the information directly accessible for global control. 2. The principle of organizational invariance states that any two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences, meaning the specific physical substrate is less important than the pattern of causal interactions. This is supported by thought experiments demonstrating the absurdity of functionally identical systems having different subjective experiences. 3. The double-aspect theory of information argues that information possesses both physical and phenomenal aspects. This suggests a fundamental connection between information processing and experience, with experience emerging as a fundamental aspect of information itself. This principle offers a potential explanation for structural coherence and organizational invariance, positing that experience is directly linked to information structures, both physical and phenomenal. This approach, termed 'naturalistic dualism', involves expanding the basic ontology of science to include phenomenal properties alongside physical properties, recognizing consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality.

Chalmers's framework directly addresses the limitations of reductive approaches in consciousness studies by proposing a non-reductive model. This model, acknowledging the explanatory gap, provides an alternative perspective on the mind-body problem. The proposed principles – structural coherence, organizational invariance, and the double-aspect theory of information – provide a framework for constructing a theory of consciousness. The thought experiments presented aim to strengthen the plausibility of the organizational invariance principle by highlighting the implausibility of scenarios where functionally identical systems have different subjective experiences. This framework shifts the focus from explaining consciousness solely through physical processes to recognizing consciousness as a fundamental aspect of reality with a close yet non-reducible relationship to physical processes. The success of this approach depends on the acceptance of a dualistic ontology that includes both physical and phenomenal properties. While this remains controversial, the paper establishes a foundation for addressing the hard problem of consciousness.

This paper presents a compelling argument for the inadequacy of reductive methods in explaining conscious experience. By proposing a non-reductive, naturalistic dualistic framework based on the principles of structural coherence, organizational invariance, and the double-aspect theory of information, Chalmers offers a novel approach to understanding the hard problem of consciousness. Further research should focus on refining these principles and developing a more comprehensive theory that integrates the physical and phenomenal aspects of information. Exploring the implications of the double-aspect theory, particularly the extent to which information has phenomenal aspects, could lead to significant advancements in the field.

While the paper provides a robust philosophical framework, it acknowledges limitations inherent in studying subjective experience. Direct empirical testing of the proposed principles is challenging given the difficulties in objectively measuring subjective experience. The double-aspect theory of information remains largely speculative, requiring further elaboration and empirical support. The paper relies heavily on philosophical analysis and thought experiments, which, while valuable, may not satisfy those seeking solely empirical evidence. The naturalistic dualism proposed, while compatible with a scientific worldview, remains a departure from purely materialistic views.