Two conceptions of consciousness and why only the neo-Aristotelian one enables us to construct evolutionary explanations

The paper contrasts Cartesian dualism with a neo-Aristotelian conception of mind and argues that only the latter is coherent and integrable with evolutionary theory. Descartes defines mind as an immaterial substance whose essence is thinking and links consciousness to a private inner realm causally connected to the brain. The authors contend that this framework generates insoluble problems and fails to yield evolutionary explanations. In its place, they advance a neo-Aristotelian view that identifies mind with capacities (especially rational powers) of living organisms. By combining Aristotle’s vegetative, sensitive, and rational psuchē with the modern understanding of organisms as open thermodynamic systems with heredity, they aim to explain the evolutionary emergence of different forms of consciousness, avoiding Cartesian puzzles and enabling testable hypotheses.

The paper engages historical and contemporary literature: Descartes’ dualism and redefinition of thought as consciousness; subsequent introspectionist traditions (Locke, Hume, James); and modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology that retain Cartesian assumptions (Crick, Dehaene, Gazzaniga; Tooby & Cosmides; Ginsburg & Jablonka). It critiques representational and computational models (Dennett’s ‘Cartesian theatre’, global workspace, IIT by Tononi, metacognitive introspection) for conflating ordinary information with Shannon information and for reifying experiences as internal objects. The authors draw on neo-Aristotelian analyses (Bennett & Hacker) and Wittgensteinian philosophy to argue against introspective ‘inner sense’. Evolutionary biology sources include major transitions (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry), inclusive fitness (Hamilton), organismal development and plasticity (Kirschner & Gerhart; Sanes & Yamagata), evolution of vision (Gehring), and selection at the organismal level (Michod).

Conceptual and philosophical analysis integrated with evolutionary theory. The authors: (1) analyze key concepts (mind, consciousness, information, representation) to uncover category mistakes and mereological errors; (2) articulate a neo-Aristotelian framework that treats mind as powers of living beings (vegetative, sensitive, rational) rather than as an entity or inner realm; (3) synthesize evolutionary principles—organisms as open thermodynamic systems with heredity, major transitions, inclusive fitness, organ differentiation, sensory evolution, neural plasticity—to explain the emergence of capacities; (4) develop case-based reasoning (e.g., seeing a red apple; driver noticing a fuel light; gazelle–predator dynamics; pain behavior; language acquisition and first-person mastery) to illustrate how different forms of consciousness function and could be selected for. No empirical experiments are conducted; the approach is normative-conceptual with evolutionary grounding that is intended to guide future empirical testing.

• The Cartesian conception (mind as immaterial substance; consciousness as inner experiences) is incoherent due to lack of identity criteria for an immaterial substance and leads to unsolvable interaction and epistemic puzzles.
• Consciousness, properly understood, is not an inner object or state in the brain; the brain is not the organ of consciousness in the way eyes are organs of seeing. Consciousness is a capacity of the whole, behaving organism.
• Ordinary information (knowledge-bearing, linguistic/perceptual) must be distinguished from Shannon information; conflating them underwrites mistaken claims that brains ‘access’ or ‘gain’ information in the ordinary sense. Shannon information is quantified as h(x) = −log2 p(x) and is meaning-independent, unlike ordinary information.
• Neural firings may indicate but do not represent their causes; talk of internal ‘representations’ reifies correlations into representational content without justification.
• Four forms of consciousness can be explained evolutionarily as capacities of organisms:
  1. Intransitive consciousness (wakefulness vs. unconsciousness) relates to sleep–wake cycles and organismal responsiveness.
  2. Transitive perceptual consciousness (awareness/notice/realize) is a passive, receptive power enabling peripheral attention and rapid adaptive responses; illustrated by predator–prey scenarios (e.g., gazelle vigilance).
  3. Somatic consciousness (feeling pain/itch/tickle) has clear adaptive value in injury avoidance and in eliciting aid via communicative behavior (inclusive fitness effects).
  4. Reflective self-consciousness requires language mastery (first- and third-person psychological predicates) and develops in children alongside pronoun and tense use.
• First-person avowals (e.g., “I am in pain”) are non-cognitive, groundless expressions not subject to doubt/certainty in the epistemic sense; thus, the supposed ‘epistemic certainty’ of being conscious is a conceptual, not evidential, matter.
• Psychological predicates should be attributed to the organism as a whole, not to its parts (avoidance of the mereological fallacy).

By reframing mind as capacities of living organisms, the authors dissolve the Cartesian ‘hard problem’ that arises from positing inner experiences as entities requiring neural realization. The neo-Aristotelian view integrates smoothly with evolutionary theory: capacities can be selected for and elaborated through major transitions, organ differentiation, sensory evolution, and organism-level selection. Distinguishing ordinary from Shannon information removes confusions in computational/information-processing accounts of consciousness. The evolutionary stories for intransitive, perceptual, somatic, and reflective consciousness show how these capacities confer fitness advantages (enhanced vigilance, injury avoidance, social aid, and the broader benefits of language-enabled self-reflection). This reorientation directs research toward studying the development and evolution of capacities and their behavioral expressions, rather than seeking neural ‘codes’ of experiences as inner objects.

The paper concludes that the (neo)Cartesian conception of consciousness as an inner realm populated by mental objects/events is incoherent and explanatorily sterile. A neo-Aristotelian monism that conceives mind as powers of living organisms, combined with modern evolutionary biology (organisms as open thermodynamic systems with heredity), offers a coherent framework for explaining the evolution of consciousness. The authors outline evolutionary accounts of intransitive, perceptual, somatic, and reflective consciousness and argue that focusing on the emergence of rational powers and linguistic practices will generate testable hypotheses in future research.

The work is conceptual and does not provide empirical tests or specific experimental predictions; proposed evolutionary explanations are programmatic and illustrative. The account relies on philosophical analysis of concepts (e.g., information, representation, consciousness), which may be contested, and it does not develop quantitative models or present new data. Future work is needed to derive operationalizable hypotheses and empirical measures aligned with the proposed capacity-based framework.