Two conceptions of consciousness and why only the neo-Aristotelian one enables us to construct evolutionary explanations

The paper focuses on the fundamental differences between two prominent conceptions of the mind: the Cartesian and the neo-Aristotelian. It posits that only the neo-Aristotelian perspective is logically sound and can be successfully integrated with evolutionary theory to provide meaningful explanations and testable hypotheses. Conversely, it argues that the inherent inconsistencies within the Cartesian framework render its integration with evolutionary theory problematic, explaining the lack of successful evolutionary explanations based on it. Descartes's dualism establishes a clear separation between the physical and mental realms, characterizing the mind as an independent immaterial substance whose essence is thought. This dualism is further linked to the distinction between humans and other animals, with only humans possessing a mind, while other animals are considered mere machines. In contrast, Aristotle's biological perspective on the mind views the *psuche* (mind/soul) as encompassing vegetative, sensitive, and rational capacities. The *psuche* is not separate from the body but is rather its form, the principle that organizes it to exhibit life. Aristotle distinguishes human beings from other animals through their capacities or what they are able to do. The paper proposes that understanding the evolution of consciousness necessitates an expansion of Aristotle's view, incorporating the understanding that living organisms are open thermodynamic systems with inherited properties. This evolutionary transition led to the development of complex thermodynamic systems, such as cells with organelles and multicellular organisms with organs. The authors aim to demonstrate how this integrated framework can be used to explain the evolutionary development of four different forms of consciousness.

The authors engage with various philosophical and neuroscientific perspectives on consciousness. They critique the Cartesian view, highlighting the difficulties of reconciling subjective experience with objective physical processes. The 'hard problem of consciousness'—how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—is discussed in relation to the work of Nagel (1974) and Chalmers (1996). The authors also address alternative accounts that view the brain as an information-processing system, comparing such computational models with the neo-Aristotelian approach. The review includes a discussion of functionalism's limitations in providing a complete account of the mind, contrasting it with the neo-Aristotelian focus on capacities and powers.

The paper's methodology is primarily philosophical and conceptual. The authors employ conceptual analysis to examine the concepts of mind, consciousness, and their relationship to the body and brain. They analyze the logical implications of different philosophical conceptions of consciousness, particularly the Cartesian and neo-Aristotelian accounts, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. They draw on existing philosophical literature and neuroscientific findings to support their arguments. Their approach is comparative, contrasting the Cartesian conception of consciousness, characterized by the notion of apperception (or introspection), with the neo-Aristotelian view, focusing on capacities and powers. The authors critique the use of information-processing metaphors in cognitive neuroscience, distinguishing between Shannon information (used in the context of information theory) and ordinary information (knowledge acquired through perception and language use). They use examples (e.g., the flashing fuel tank light in a car) to illustrate the differences in how these two perspectives account for conscious experience. Their approach to integrating the neo-Aristotelian conception with evolutionary theory involves demonstrating how different forms of consciousness—intransitive, perceptual, somatic, and self-consciousness—can be understood as gradual evolutionary developments of capacities and powers, rather than as emergent properties of the brain.

The paper's central finding is that the neo-Aristotelian conception of the mind, when combined with evolutionary theory, provides a more coherent and explanatory framework for understanding consciousness than the Cartesian approach. Key arguments supporting this conclusion include: 1. **Incoherence of Cartesian Dualism:** The authors argue that the Cartesian concept of an immaterial, thinking substance is logically incoherent due to the lack of criteria for identifying such a substance. The inability to identify this substance also renders the proposed causal interaction between mind and body nonsensical. 2. **The Neo-Aristotelian Alternative:** The authors propose that defining the mind in terms of capacities or powers resolves the problems inherent in the Cartesian view. This is because powers can gradually evolve during the course of evolution, unlike immaterial substances. The *psuche* (mind/soul) is presented not as a separate entity, but as the form of the living body, inextricably linked to its capacities and functions. 3. **Evolutionary Transitions and Consciousness:** The authors highlight the importance of evolutionary transitions, particularly the shift from unicellular to multicellular organisms, in the development of consciousness. They propose that the evolution of consciousness is tied to the evolution of sense organs and increasing brain complexity, leading to enhanced sensitivity to the environment and the development of attentional mechanisms. The four forms of consciousness—intransitive, perceptual, somatic, and self-consciousness—are discussed as stages in this evolutionary process. 4. **Critique of Information-Processing Metaphors:** The authors critique the prevalent use of information-processing metaphors in neuroscience, arguing that conflating Shannon information (information theory) and ordinary information (meaningful knowledge) leads to misunderstandings of how the brain processes information and generates conscious experience. 5. **The Nature of First-Person Reports:** The paper challenges the idea that our first-person reports of conscious experiences ('I have a pain') are grounded in a form of privileged, introspective access to an inner mental world. They argue that such reports are not cognitive statements, but rather non-cognitive avowals or expressions, lacking epistemic grounds or justification. The authors contend that the certainty associated with these reports is not epistemic but conceptual: it is simply not coherent to doubt one's own experiences.

The paper's findings challenge the dominant approaches to consciousness in philosophy of mind and neuroscience. By demonstrating the limitations of the Cartesian framework, it advocates for a shift towards the neo-Aristotelian perspective. The integration of this perspective with evolutionary biology offers a more robust and explanatory framework for understanding the gradual development of consciousness across different organisms. This approach avoids the inherent difficulties posed by the 'hard problem of consciousness' by focusing on the evolution of capacities and powers rather than on the emergence of subjective experience from physical processes. The authors suggest that future research should focus on generating and testing hypotheses within this neo-Aristotelian evolutionary framework, leading to a more nuanced and integrated understanding of consciousness.

This paper argues convincingly that a neo-Aristotelian understanding of consciousness, integrated with evolutionary theory, provides a more coherent framework than the traditional Cartesian approach. By focusing on the evolution of capacities and powers, this perspective avoids the pitfalls of dualism and offers a pathway to generate testable hypotheses about the development of consciousness. The authors' critique of information-processing metaphors and the nature of first-person reports further solidifies their position. Future research should explore the empirical implications of this framework, testing predictions about the development and expression of consciousness across different species and throughout ontogeny.

The paper is primarily a philosophical analysis, and does not offer experimental data to directly test its claims. The authors acknowledge this limitation, focusing instead on conceptual clarity and the logical implications of different philosophical perspectives. The focus on conceptual analysis might also limit the detailed exploration of specific neurological mechanisms underlying consciousness. Further, the paper's scope primarily centers on the human and animal realms, leaving room for exploration of potential applications to other areas of consciousness studies, such as artificial intelligence.