The wellbeing economy in practice: sustainable and inclusive growth? Or a post-growth breakthrough?

The paper investigates whether the ascendance of the wellbeing economy (WE) concept signals a substantive shift beyond the pursuit of GDP growth in high-income countries. It situates WE in relation to post-growth perspectives (e.g., degrowth, steady-state, and doughnut economics) and critiques of “green growth,” noting evidence that absolute decoupling is insufficient to meet ecological targets in time. The author highlights how WE has gained traction with actors such as the OECD and via the WEGo network, raising hopes among some post-growth advocates that WE could mainstream sufficiency-oriented policy. The research questions ask: (1) Does growing support for WE constitute a breakthrough for a post-growth agenda in practice? (2) If not, what steps could move WE implementation further toward post-growth? The study focuses on whether WE adoption alters policy priorities, especially the orientation toward economic growth, and examines the role of sufficiency at both macro (beyond GDP) and sectoral/policy levels.

The literature reviewed spans: (a) post-growth traditions (degrowth, steady-state economy, doughnut economics) that challenge growth primacy and argue for ecological limits and social floors; (b) critiques of green/sustainable growth and the empirical difficulty of achieving sufficient decoupling of environmental pressures from GDP; (c) wellbeing approaches promoted by international organizations (e.g., OECD) that broaden measures of progress; (d) WEAll’s advocacy positioning WE as placing human and planetary needs at the center and deprioritizing GDP growth; and (e) analyses of WEGo’s narratives and practice showing gaps between normative post-growth rhetoric and reformist government implementation. Prior work suggests that governments tend to retain growth due to fiscal and political dependencies, while wellbeing frameworks risk being co-opted unless accompanied by structural policy change and institutional safeguards.

The study employs qualitative case studies of three WEGo-related countries: Finland and Wales (joined WEGo in 2020) and Canada (participates in WEGo events but is not a formal member). Data sources include government programs, parliamentary statements, budget and fiscal documents, ministerial speeches, policy papers, ministry websites, media releases, and relevant academic and grey literature; media reporting (via NexisUni) and organizational websites supplement the analysis. Documents were deductively coded for predefined themes (e.g., growth orientation, beyond-GDP metrics, sufficiency policies, institutional changes) and inductively for emergent themes. The analysis assesses whether WE engagement shifted policy priorities away from growth, identifies sufficiency-oriented measures, and notes obstacles to post-growth orientation. The study relies primarily on English-language documents, with some French for Canada; key Finnish documents were available in English translation. Assessment of the adequacy or impacts of policies is beyond scope.

- Overall: Across cases, governments retain a commitment to economic growth while introducing beyond-GDP measurement and selective sufficiency policies. WE practice amounts, at most, to a “weak post-growth approach,” with notable variation among countries. - Canada: Not a formal WEGo member; developed a Quality of Life (QOL) Framework (84 indicators in nine domains, with cross-cutting fairness/inclusion and sustainability/resilience lenses) and began embedding it in budget processes. However, major budget speeches and documents emphasize growth (e.g., Budget 2021: “A Recovery Plan for Jobs, Growth, and Resilience”) and avoid framing as a wellbeing budget. Official statements reaffirm GDP growth as “crucial.” Some limited sufficiency elements exist (public transit support, a luxury tax on high-end vehicles/boats/planes, a ban on foreign housing ownership). The framework lacks indicators capturing global environmental impacts of Canadian consumption (e.g., consumption-based emissions, material footprints). - Finland: Advanced engagement with an “economy of wellbeing” through the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, an Action Plan (2023–2025), and international leadership (e.g., OECD collaborations). Core framing emphasizes mutual reinforcement of wellbeing and “sustainable” economic growth; wellbeing investments are conceived as boosting productivity and fiscal sustainability amid aging demographics. Policies include ambitious climate goals (carbon neutrality by 2035), family leave reform, healthcare/social welfare reforms, anti-homelessness commitments, and promotion of active travel and climate-friendly food procurement. Finland plans WE indicators but had not finalized them at the time of study. Sufficiency appears in selective sectoral policies, but macro-level emphasis remains pro-growth. - Wales: The Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 institutionalizes long-term, preventative, and integrative policymaking with seven national wellbeing goals, 50 national indicators, and national milestones (e.g., “Wales will use only its fair share of the world’s resources by 2050”). Wales measures consumption-based environmental impacts and ecological footprint, going beyond other WEGo cases. Policy language in key documents often avoids explicit growth terminology, emphasizing a “stronger, greener, fairer” economy; nonetheless, leaders affirm support for economic growth. Wales has implemented substantial sufficiency-oriented measures, notably: default 20 mph urban speed limit (projected £92m annual savings via reduced collisions), a new transport strategy prioritizing reduced travel demand, modal shift, and shared mobility; and a 2023 decision to cancel all major road-building projects, with strict criteria for any future projects. Additional measures include discouraging second homes through tax policy, support for reuse/repair/sharing initiatives (e.g., libraries of things), promotion of employee ownership, and exploring reduced work time and basic income pilots. - Variation: Wales stands out for deeper sufficiency policies and institutional anchoring of future generations, though it still pursues growth. Finland is strongly growth-oriented while deepening wellbeing framing. Canada shows minimal public-facing WE orientation despite a new QOL framework.

The findings indicate that WE’s mainstreaming has not delivered a decisive post-growth breakthrough. Governments’ fiscal and political growth dependencies persist, with growth framed as necessary for welfare-state sustainability, particularly in Finland. Nevertheless, beyond-GDP measurement and selective sufficiency policies (especially in Wales) demonstrate pathways for reorienting priorities and reducing pressure for growth by preventing social and environmental harms and addressing distribution more directly. Wales’s institutional architecture—the Future Generations Act and Commissioner—appears pivotal in enabling decisions that constrain high-impact infrastructure (e.g., road building), illuminating how governance design can shift practice toward sufficiency. However, tensions remain between growth-led economic development agendas (e.g., regional Growth Deals) and statutory wellbeing goals. The analysis underscores obstacles identified in prior literature: vested interests, dominant economic training paradigms, short-termism, siloed policymaking, and political attacks branding post-growth as “anti-growth.”

The paper confirms that WEGo countries have largely retained growth-oriented priorities, amounting to a “weak post-growth approach,” while highlighting meaningful variation: Wales has implemented more ambitious sufficiency policies within an institutional framework centered on future generations. To strengthen the post-growth character of WE practice, the article proposes: (1) expanding sufficiency-oriented policies targeting the most environmentally damaging activities (e.g., reducing car dependence, speed limits, active travel investments, reuse/repair/sharing initiatives); (2) adopting legislative and institutional frameworks akin to Wales’s Future Generations Act and Commissioner, defining long-term wellbeing and ecological goals rather than GDP growth; (3) directly confronting growth dependency through prevention-first social policy (to reduce fiscal pressures), promoting alternative ownership models (employee/community/public/cooperative) that can distribute wealth without relying on expansion, and exploring work-time reduction, basic income/services, and job guarantees to sustain employment and security without growth; and (4) developing compelling narratives and political coalitions capable of withstanding “anti-growth” critiques.

- Reliance primarily on English-language sources, with limited Finnish media coverage in English; however, key Finnish government documents were available in translation. - Media sources serve as supplementary rather than primary evidence; government documents are prioritized. - The study does not evaluate the effectiveness or sufficiency of specific policies; it focuses on orientation and implementation signals. - Case selection is limited to Finland, Wales, and Canada (to complement earlier analysis of New Zealand, Scotland, and Iceland); generalizability is constrained. - Document analysis and coding capture stated priorities and designs, which may diverge from on-the-ground outcomes.