The rapid growth of the online food delivery industry, driven by the "Internet Plus" economic model, has significantly impacted the food consumption market. Platforms like Meituan in China have become dominant players, connecting restaurants and consumers. While offering convenience, this model raises concerns about food safety risks due to factors like third-party handling, packaging, and delivery. The platforms also wield significant power through data analysis and potential manipulation of information. Existing government regulations struggle to effectively address these challenges due to information asymmetry and market fragmentation. This study focuses on the interplay between the profit-seeking behavior of capital-monopolized online food delivery platforms, the actions of restaurants, and government regulation strategies in the context of food safety. The primary research questions are: (1) How does the commission and promotion fee strategy of online food delivery platforms affect the production strategies of restaurants, and consequently, food safety risks? (2) What are the interactions among government regulation, platform profit strategy, and restaurant behavior? The study utilizes China’s online food delivery market as a case study, given its rapid growth and the prominence of platforms like Meituan. Despite the unique characteristics of China's social system, the profit-seeking nature of capital and the general challenges faced by governments in regulating online food delivery platforms are globally relevant. Therefore, findings from this study hold broader international implications.

Existing literature highlights the transformative impact of platform economies on various sectors, including food delivery. Studies showcase the benefits of platform models, such as increased consumer convenience, reduced operating costs, and expanded market reach for restaurants. However, research also emphasizes the information asymmetry inherent in online transactions, where consumers lack direct access to food entities and preparation processes, leading to increased food safety risks. The literature discusses the challenges of regulating these platforms, given their use of information technology to control economic behavior and create monopolies. The tendency of large technology platforms to leverage data and market dominance to squeeze smaller businesses is also discussed. Studies examine the rise of ghost kitchens and their impact on food safety. Previous research on online food delivery has mostly focused on descriptive studies and theoretical elaboration with limited quantitative analysis and mathematical modeling. This study addresses this gap by employing an evolutionary game model to analyze the dynamic interactions between platforms and restaurants, considering the impact of profit-seeking behavior and the role of government regulation.

This study employs an evolutionary game model to analyze the interactions between online food delivery platforms and restaurants, focusing on the impact of platform strategies on food safety risks. The model involves two main players: the platform and restaurants. The platform can adopt two strategies: low commission or high commission. Restaurants can choose safe production or illegal production. The model incorporates variables such as commission rate, promotion fees, revenue for restaurants with and without promotion, costs of safe and illegal production, and government regulation level (probability of detecting illegal production). The model hypotheses include: (1) Characterization of platform and restaurant strategies and their probabilities; (2) Definition of variables representing commissions, promotion fees, revenue, costs, and government intervention; (3) Assumptions regarding restaurant adoption of promotion services based on platform commission strategy; (4) Incorporation of the probability of government detection of illegal production and associated penalties for both platform and restaurants. The payoff matrix is constructed based on these hypotheses, depicting the payoffs for both the platform and restaurants under various strategy combinations. The model then examines equilibrium situations using replicator dynamic equations. Stability analysis is performed to determine evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). Five equilibrium points are obtained, and their stability is analyzed based on Jacobian matrix properties. The four stable equilibrium situations are interpreted based on the levels of government regulation and platform promotion fees. The model examines how platform strategies, government regulation, and restaurant behavior interact to shape food safety outcomes. Finally, the model's findings are validated through case analysis using data from China's online food delivery market and specifically focusing on Meituan, a prominent platform, to examine real-world implications. Data on market share, transaction volume, and consumer complaints were analyzed to support the model's conclusions.

The evolutionary game model revealed four stable equilibrium points, each characterized by a specific combination of platform strategy (low vs. high commission) and restaurant strategy (safe vs. illegal production). The key findings are summarized below: 1. **Consistent Profit Maximization:** Regardless of the equilibrium situation, the platform consistently adopts profit-maximizing strategies. This demonstrates the inherent profit-seeking nature of capital in this market. 2. **Impact on Restaurant Behavior:** Government regulation level significantly impacts restaurant production strategies. Stronger regulations incentivize safe production, while weaker regulations lead to a higher likelihood of illegal production by restaurants aiming to maximize profit despite the risks involved. 3. **Platform Strategy Inflexibility:** Government regulations aimed at curbing restaurant's illegal activities do not affect the platform's profit-maximizing behavior. The platform, having a dominant market position, can often absorb losses stemming from restaurant penalties without compromising overall profits. 4. **Influence of Promotion Fees:** Higher promotion fees increase the likelihood of restaurants engaging in illegal production in order to compensate for the perceived loss. Stronger government regulation is then necessary to offset this effect. 5. **Case Study Validation:** The analysis of Meituan's market data in China supported the model's findings. A strong positive correlation was observed between Meituan's operating income and the number of consumer complaints related to food quality and safety, indicating a direct link between profit-seeking and food safety risks. 6. **The impact of COVID-19:** The study also notes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the industry, highlighting the refusal of Meituan to reduce its commission rates even during a period of hardship for restaurants. This reinforces the primacy of profit-seeking behaviour for the platform over social responsibility. 7. **Government Policy Changes:** The increase in consumer complaints following an expansion of small and micro-businesses in 2021 highlights the importance of adapting government regulatory strategies to account for changes in market dynamics.

The findings highlight the critical tension between the profit-maximizing behavior of capital-monopolized online food delivery platforms and the need for ensuring food safety. The model's robustness is supported by the analysis of real-world data from the Chinese market. The inability of government regulation alone to alter the platform's profit-seeking behavior underscores the necessity of developing more comprehensive regulatory strategies that consider the platform's economic incentives. The study suggests that focusing solely on restaurants through regulation is insufficient. Rather, policies should target both platforms and restaurants, emphasizing the creation of a balanced ecosystem that prioritizes food safety without unduly harming platform profitability. The finding about the impact of promotion fees on restaurant behavior highlights the importance of considering the nuanced relationship between platform pricing strategies and food safety risks. By understanding and addressing the drivers of opportunistic behavior among restaurants, the government can develop more effective and efficient regulatory interventions. The findings emphasize the need for a multi-pronged approach that involves market mechanisms, government oversight, and collaborative governance among stakeholders to improve food safety in the online food delivery sector.

This study demonstrates that the profit-seeking behavior of capital-monopolized online food delivery platforms significantly contributes to food safety risks. Government regulations, while impactful on restaurant behavior, fail to effectively constrain platform strategies. The study reveals the crucial role of platform pricing strategies, particularly the proportion of promotion fees, in influencing restaurant actions. Future research should explore alternative regulatory mechanisms that leverage information technology to improve efficiency and reduce costs while maintaining platform profitability. Exploring the development of co-governance models involving the government, platforms, and restaurants is also recommended.

The study focuses primarily on the Chinese market, potentially limiting the generalizability of findings to other contexts. The evolutionary game model relies on simplifying assumptions, which may not fully capture the complexities of real-world interactions. Further research using data from other countries and platforms is needed to validate and extend these findings. The study assumes a relatively static regulatory environment; changes in policies and enforcement efforts may alter the outcomes. Future research could incorporate dynamic elements to reflect changing regulatory landscapes.