The economic dimension of migration: Kosovo from 2015 to 2020

The study examines how economic development, labour market conditions, education-to-employment mismatches, and the Kosovo–EU political relationship shape emigration from Kosovo (2015–2020). It situates Kosovo’s migration within global migration trends and definitions, emphasizing push factors such as unemployment, poverty, and human rights concerns, alongside pull factors including higher wages and education opportunities. The authors probe the extent to which migration decisions in Kosovo have shifted from family/household strategies toward more individual-level choices, particularly among youth and highly educated individuals, and assess the brain drain’s interaction with Kosovo’s economic stability. The work’s importance lies in clarifying how persistent labour market weaknesses and stalled EU visa liberalization collectively intensify outflows, with significant implications for development and human capital retention.

The paper reviews major migration theories and contextual literature. Neoclassical theory (Harris–Todaro) frames migration as an individual decision driven by wage and employment differentials and rational utility maximization in relatively frictionless markets. In contrast, the New Economics of Labour Migration (Stark, Taylor) emphasizes migration as a household strategy to diversify income and manage risk in imperfect markets, with social units (families/households) conditioning behavior. Critiques (e.g., Kurekova) note neoclassical models’ neglect of market imperfections, heterogeneity, history, and social dynamics; de Haas highlights limits of generic push–pull framings that overlook structural inequality and social processes. Historically, Kosovo’s migration has been shaped by human rights violations, ethnic discrimination, conflict, and displacement during and after Yugoslavia’s breakup and the 1998–1999 war, followed by sustained economic push factors and remittance-driven dynamics. Recent Western Balkan–EU integration processes and visa policies further influence patterns, including skill-selective migration and brain drain.

The study employs a mixed-method approach combining: (1) quantitative analysis of official statistics on labour markets and migration for 2015–Q1 2020 (notably Kosovo Agency of Statistics Labour Force Surveys; KAS Statistical Yearbooks; Employment Agency of the Republic of Kosovo/EARK administrative data on jobseekers and vacancies; Ministry of Internal Affairs migration data; EUROSTAT on permits and asylum; World Bank, UN DESA/IOM global migration indicators; Central Bank of Kosovo remittances); and (2) qualitative synthesis of prior research on Kosovo’s socio-political history, EU integration processes (SAA and visa liberalization dialogue), and brain drain trends. The authors process and visualize indicators (e.g., unemployment, inactivity by gender/age, migration and repatriation flows, destination shares, remittances, job vacancies by qualification) to interpret how economic and policy factors relate to emigration.

• High and persistent labour market slack: Between 2015 and Q1 2020, about 66.76% of working-age Kosovars were unemployed or inactive; roughly 37% were outside the labour market.
• Youth disadvantage: Average youth (15–24) unemployment from 2015–2019 was 53.5%; in Q3 2020 youth unemployment was 46.9%, far above the EU rate.
• Pronounced gender gaps: In Q1 2020, 44% of men were employed versus 14.1% of women; female inactivity remained extremely high (around 79–82% during 2016–2020), declining only ~1.5 percentage points over that period.
• Pandemic shock: From March–October 2020, 81,911 first-time jobseekers registered with EARK, highlighting COVID-19 impacts.
• Migration volumes and trends: Roughly 220,000 Kosovars emigrated over the last decade; 2015 saw a peak of ~75,000 departures, with another spike in 2018 (~28,000). In 2019, an estimated 1.96% of residents emigrated; 2011–2017 recorded over 180,000 emigrants; 2013–2017 ~170,000 emigrated (regular and irregular). Asylum applications to the EU rose from ~38,000 (2014) to ~73,000 (2015), followed by increased returns (about 17,000 per EC; ~24,000 per KAS).
• Destinations: Germany (39%), Switzerland (23%), Italy (7%), Austria (7%), Sweden (7%), and others (17%).
• EU policy linkage: Signing the SAA (2015) raised expectations for visa liberalization; subsequent EU reluctance coincided with increased irregular migration among youth.
• Remittances: Key macro stabilizer and household income source—EUR 759.2m (2017), EUR 800.5m (2018, +5.4%), 2019 up 6.4% vs 2018, and EUR 980.1m in 2020 (+15.1%), despite COVID-19 impacts in main remittance-origin countries (Germany, Switzerland).
• Education–labour market mismatch: Jobseekers vastly outnumbered degree-level vacancies; in 2020, jobseekers exceeded 1,978 degree-requiring vacancies by 178.9%. A surplus of graduates in economics/law and shortages in IT exacerbate graduate unemployment; the paper notes over 20% of unemployed from managerial/professional backgrounds and asserts very high unemployment among degree holders.
• Brain drain, especially in health: With only ~3,555 doctors (~2.5 per 1,000 people), emigration rates of about one doctor every two days and two nurses daily strain the health system, leading to staffing gaps and even closures in some centers; training-cost losses are substantial (estimated ~EUR 100,000 per doctor).
• Structural drivers: Unemployment, low wages, corruption/nepotism, weak services, and stalled EU visa liberalization remain core push factors; legal family/education channels and destination labour demand act as pulls.

Findings show that Kosovo’s emigration between 2015–2020 is tightly linked to labour market weakness, especially youth unemployment, gendered inactivity, and mismatches between education output and employer demand. Limited quality job creation, coupled with corruption and weak services, sustains push pressures. The anticipated benefits of EU integration created expectations that were not met by visa liberalization, coinciding with surges in irregular outflows; at the same time, selective legal channels in destination countries for high-demand occupations, notably health and IT, incentivized skilled emigration and exacerbated domestic brain drain. Rising remittances mitigate household vulnerability and support consumption, but do not resolve structural employment gaps and may entrench the emigration–development feedback loop. The shift from household-driven to more individual migration motives is visible among educated youth seeking to align their skills with better labour market valuations abroad. Overall, the evidence supports the proposition that economic development constraints and policy frictions (particularly EU mobility restrictions alongside skill-selective openness) co-produce sustained emigration and human capital depletion, especially in critical sectors like health.

Migration from Kosovo is shaped by both structural push factors (high unemployment and inactivity, gender disparities, poverty, governance shortcomings) and pull factors (higher wages, education opportunities, and targeted demand in EU economies). Peaks in 2015 and 2017/2018 align with domestic economic shortfalls and EU policy dynamics around SAA/visa liberalization. While remittances provide important financial inflows, selective openness in EU labour markets intensifies brain drain—most acutely in healthcare—undermining service provision and development prospects. The persistent disconnect between education outputs and labour market needs (excess in economics/law, shortages in IT and key professions) further propels graduate emigration. As long as Kosovo’s youth face limited job prospects and mobility restrictions remain uneven, emigration pressures—legal and irregular—are likely to continue, with significant implications for economic stability and human capital.