Pricing Power in the Context of Competition Between Platform Sales and Live Streaming Sales

The rapid rise of live-streaming selling and the increasing diversity of e-commerce channels have sparked ongoing debates regarding product pricing power. This price competition behaviour of online dual channels triggered by the supply-side pricing dilemma is a topic of significant research interest and forms the focal point of this paper. Therefore, we leverage the principles of game theory to construct a three-party evolutionary game model consisting of a brand, a steamer, and a traditional e-commerce platform. Within this framework, the brand holds the primary pricing authority. Our analysis examines the equilibrium strategies adopted by the various players under diverse scenarios and explores how the evolving behaviours of these parties impact the overall game system. Additionally, we employ the "people-goods-scene" perspective to deconstruct the intricate dynamics within this complex supply chain ecosystem. Our findings reveal two distinct evolutionary stable strategies: one in which brands maintain a stance against low-price negotiation, streamers avoid bargaining, and platforms avoid providing subsidies; the other in which brands are open to negotiating low prices, streamers engage in bargaining, and platforms provide subsidies. Notably, in most cases, brands tend to avoid explicitly stating their opposition to low-price negotiation. However, if a brand's strategy shifts towards rejecting such negotiation, the negative implications of price wars across channels become a critical consideration. Conversely, when a brand opts for a more concessive pricing strategy, we need to consider the potential positive impacts of low-price competition.

Shizhen Bai, Yun Xu, Hao He, Dingyao Yu