Interventions promoting collective action have been used to prevent domestic violence, but their mechanisms remain unclear. This paper formalizes feminist theoretical approaches to domestic violence into a game-theoretic model of women's collective action to change gendered social norms and outcomes. It shows that social norms create a social dilemma where individual rationality leads women to abstain from action, but collective action benefits all. Promoting altruism among women can overcome this dilemma. Discouraging tolerance of violence, external punishments for perpetrators, or lowering action costs may not work or backfire. The authors invite researchers to use this framework to understand collective action in domestic violence prevention.
Publisher
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS
Published On
Mar 01, 2021
Authors
Lu Gram, Rolando Granados, Eva M. Krockow, Nayreen Daruwalla, David Osrin
Tags
collective action
domestic violence
social norms
game-theoretic model
gender equality
altruism
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