Governance mechanism of quality and safety of imported agricultural products in China based on grounded theory

China has maintained a deficit in agricultural trade since 2004, with imports remaining high (US$236.06 billion in imports vs. US$98.26 billion in exports in 2022; trade deficit US$137.80 billion). As living standards improve, consumer focus has shifted from quantity to both quantity and quality safety of imported agricultural products. Given perishability, uncertainties in production/transportation, and repeated incidents of imported cold-chain products carrying pathogens, ensuring quality and safety is a priority. While policy documents emphasize enhanced food safety supervision and traceability, effective governance cannot rely on government alone; collaborative governance among multiple entities is necessary. Chinese laws assign producers/operators primary responsibility for imported food quality and recognize consumers’ rights to participate and supervise. This study explores how government, importers, and consumers jointly influence the quality and safety of imported agricultural products, using Grounded Theory to build a model and structural equation modeling (SEM) for empirical validation, with the aim of informing optimization of China’s governance mechanisms.

The literature reveals no uniform definition of agricultural product quality and safety. Quality comprises objective attributes (physical/chemical properties) and subjective attributes (meeting consumer expectations), with consumer evaluations often relying more on subjective cues. Consumers assess packaging, labeling, price, origin, appearance, taste, health, nutrition, and safety. Problems in agricultural product quality and safety arise from market failure (information asymmetry and externalities) and government failure (regulatory system flaws, inadequate enforcement, legal gaps). Factors affecting the quality of imported agricultural products include trade liberalization, tariffs, exchange rates, FTAs, exporting-country status, regulatory levels, MRLs/pesticide residues, and food safety regulations. Governance studies emphasize the government’s leading/supervisory role (information disclosure, penalties, standards, risk management, regulatory systems) but highlight limitations due to imperfect systems and insufficient enforcement, prompting calls for collaborative governance across multiple subjects. Importers act as a bridge between overseas producers, regulators, and consumers, responsible for supplier reviews, record-keeping, recalls, information disclosure, and credit evaluation. Consumers bear cost increases for safer imports and should be active participants; however, risk perceptions can be skewed, suggesting a need for better awareness and traceability adoption. Evidence indicates willingness to pay for traceable products and that consumer knowledge and platform/government regulation improve satisfaction with food safety oversight. Conceptualization clarifies agricultural products (HS Chapters 1–24) and defines quality and safety as encompassing both subjective attributes (appearance, taste, freshness) and objective safety (additives, heavy metals, residues, biological toxins) meeting legal standards.

The study employs Grounded Theory (open, axial, selective coding) to construct a theoretical model, followed by SEM to empirically test hypothesized relationships. Data sources for GT included: 86 Chinese-language articles, 12 foreign-language articles, 1 policy document, and 25 cases (published 2018–2022). Two-thirds of the sample were coded using NVivo 11.0 Plus; the remaining one-third were used for theoretical saturation testing (no new categories emerged). Open coding produced 115 concepts and 43 initial categories; axial coding aggregated them into 8 main categories: (1) objective quality dimension, (2) subjective quality dimension, (3) level of government regulation, (4) level of importer regulation, (5) level of consumer supervision, (6) government governance pathway, (7) importer governance pathway, and (8) consumer governance pathway. Selective coding yielded three core areas: quality and safety, influencing factors, and governance pathway, and integrated them into a theoretical model. Based on this model, a survey instrument was designed with four parts (personal info; purchasing behavior; current safety situation; current regulation situation), using a 5-point Likert scale. Latent variables: subjective quality (S1–S5), objective quality (R1–R4), government regulation (G1–G11), importer regulation (I1–I7), consumer supervision (C1–C8). An online survey (wj.qq.com) conducted Sep–Oct 2022 collected 644 responses; after exclusions (<100 s completion, straightlining, non-buyers), 535 valid responses remained. Descriptive statistics indicate balanced gender and age distributions, high education levels, and strong spending power. Reliability (SPSS 26.0): overall Cronbach’s alpha >0.9; all scales showed good to excellent reliability; item S5 was considered for deletion due to slightly higher deleted reliability. Validity: KMO=0.945; Bartlett’s test p<0.001, supporting factor analysis suitability. SEM (AMOS 26.0): an initial model was estimated and then modified by removing non-significant paths. Model fit improved post-modification: χ²/df≈3.115, RMSEA=0.063, CFI=0.906, IFI=0.906, PNFI=0.806, PCFI=0.841, with reduced AIC/CAIC, indicating acceptable-to-good fit.

• Government regulation positively and significantly affects both subjective and objective quality dimensions (standardized coefficients: to subjective 0.117; to objective 0.156). The subjective dimension positively affects the objective dimension (0.24), indicating subjective cues can reflect objective safety to some extent.
• Importer regulation and consumer supervision do not directly affect quality dimensions but significantly and positively affect government regulation (importers → government 0.794; consumers → government 0.171). Consumer supervision significantly increases importer regulation (0.549).
• Mediation (Bootstrap, 5000 resamples; all noted CIs exclude 0): • Government → Subjective → Objective: indirect 0.037 (supports H4). • Importers → Government → Subjective: indirect 0.084 (H12 supported). • Consumers → Government → Subjective: indirect 0.059 (H13 supported). • Importers → Government → Objective: indirect 0.186 (H14 supported). • Consumers → Government → Objective: indirect 0.131 (H15 supported).
• Non-supported direct effects in final model: importer regulation → subjective/objective quality; consumer supervision → subjective/objective quality.
• Indicator contributions: Subjective quality—broken packaging contributed most, followed by spoilage and physical discomfort; missing Chinese labels/traceability contributed least. Objective quality—concern about illegal additives contributed most; counterfeiting contributed less. Government regulation—strongest contributions from joint governance capacity, accessibility of reporting channels, and digital governability. Importer regulation—highest contributions from actively disclosing product testing information, applying for certification and operating in good faith, and disclosing staff health information. Consumer supervision—high contributions from reporting illegal practices, actively defending rights, attention to safety information, learning about safety, and willingness to participate in governance.
• Model fit metrics indicated acceptable-to-good fit (e.g., CFI=0.906; RMSEA=0.063; χ²/df≈3.115).

Findings demonstrate that government regulation is the pivotal mechanism ensuring the quality and safety of imported agricultural products, directly improving both subjective and objective quality and mediating the influence of importers and consumers on quality outcomes. Consumers’ and importers’ behaviors shape the regulatory environment: active consumer supervision pressures both importers and government, while importer compliance and self-regulation reduce enforcement burdens and strengthen governmental oversight. The significant path from subjective to objective quality implies that while consumers rely on observable cues, robust government regulation is necessary to ensure that intrinsic safety attributes are met, especially where information asymmetry prevails. The validated mediating pathways underscore a collaborative governance framework in which government acts as the key conduit translating stakeholder actions into quality and safety improvements. These results align with the literature on market and government failures and the need for multi-actor coordination, confirming that effective governance must integrate government leadership with importer accountability and consumer participation.

The study constructs, via Grounded Theory, a comprehensive theoretical model of the governance mechanism for the quality and safety of imported agricultural products and validates it through SEM with consumer survey data. Main contributions include: (1) identifying government regulation as the primary direct driver of both subjective and objective quality dimensions; (2) establishing the indirect roles of importers and consumers through government mediation; and (3) detailing governance pathways for each stakeholder. Policy recommendations: the government should institutionalize collaborative governance (define roles, strengthen cross-sector cooperation, enhance digital governance, improve reporting accessibility), importers should fulfill primary responsibilities (supplier qualification checks, transparent testing disclosures, compliance, staff health information, recalls), and consumers should enhance safety awareness, purchase via formal channels, attend to labels/traceability, and actively report and defend rights. Future research can expand datasets, explore longitudinal and regional heterogeneity, and integrate additional actors (e.g., third-party platforms) and technologies (e.g., blockchain traceability) to further refine collaborative governance models.