Global governance and the Global Green New Deal: the G7's role

The paper examines the Global Green New Deal (GGND) as a developing norm bundle intended to decarbonize and develop economies through coordinated domestic and international action. Following its re-emergence around 2019 and acceleration through calls to ‘build back better’ during COVID-19, the GGND remains poorly understood conceptually. The research question centers on how plurilateral summit institutions (PSIs)—notably the G7, G20, and BRICS—are shaping and being shaped by the GGND and whether these bodies are advancing a global green recovery consistent with a GGND. Adopting a global governance perspective with a practice–relationist approach, the study explores the GGND as: (1) a policy notion (its inception and elements), (2) an empirical condition (revealed in stimulus spending patterns during COVID-19), and (3) an analytical tool (considering norm entrepreneurship, especially by the G7). The paper aims to identify emerging trends in GGND norm entrepreneurship within PSIs and the opportunities and barriers to further diffusion.

The GGND term originated in 2007 (Friedman) and was operationalized by UNEP (2009) as a policy package comprising three elements: (1) state-led green stimulus to decarbonize key sectors (energy, transport, buildings, agriculture); (2) domestic regulatory reform (e.g., removing harmful subsidies, strengthening environmental legislation); and (3) international coordination (trade, aid, carbon markets, technology transfer). While uptake post-GFC was limited, recent policy proposals (EU, UK, South Korea) and legislative initiatives (US, UK, Australia) indicate normative resurgence, amplified by COVID-19 recovery agendas. The GGND is best conceived as a norm bundle, with fundamental norms (e.g., energy transition), organizing principles (e.g., aligning finance with net-zero), and standards/procedures (e.g., green finance taxonomies, cross-border carbon accounting). Constructivist norm theory frames development via emergence, cascade, and internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink), complicated by the presence of norm antipreneurs resisting change (Bloomfield & Scott). PSIs (G7, G20, BRICS) function as informal, club-based governance forums that both reflect member state practice and produce consensus positions, often at lowest common denominators, creating governance gaps but also offering platforms for norm entrepreneurship. Historically, the G7 has been an early leader on climate governance, though compliance and coordination challenges persist; the G20 and BRICS display greater heterogeneity and contestation over linking climate and economic policy.

The study employs a practice–relationist approach. Practice: The author conducts a novel aggregation and analysis of the Global Recovery Observatory (GRO) open-source database (releases May 24, 2021 and October 11, 2021), which classifies COVID-19 fiscal measures across 5 typologies, 40 archetypes, and 158 sub-archetypes, with Likert-based assessments of environmental, social, and economic impacts. Policy archetypes are categorized as ‘clean’ (e.g., renewables, clean transport) or ‘dirty’ (e.g., oil and gas operations, airline support), considering both short- and long-term GHG effects. The analysis summarizes the number of measures and archetypes by state and aggregates them to PSIs (G7, G20, BRICS), comparing proportions of clean versus dirty measures and tracking changes between May and October 2021. Relationism: Beyond quantifying practice, the study interprets how PSI internal relations (member domestic policies and rhetoric) and external relations (collective positions and inter-PSI interactions) constitute the GGND’s norm emergence and potential diffusion. It assesses the G7’s internal coherence on green recovery and its external initiatives (e.g., B3W, COP26 partnerships) as indicators of nascent norm entrepreneurship.

• As of October 11, 2021, all PSIs (G7, G20, BRICS) funded proportionally more clean than dirty stimulus measures, indicating positive movement toward green recovery practice.
• G7 members exhibit the strongest green orientation: clean measures exceed dirty by roughly 3:1, with clean archetypes accounting for about 78.85% of dirty+clean archetypes (up from 78.0% in May 2021). The G7 total clean archetypes rose from 156 to 179 between May and October 2021.
• The G20 is heterogeneous: some members (e.g., Russia, Indonesia) recorded zero clean archetypes, while the European Union was highly green-leaning (about 95% of dirty+clean archetypes clean in Oct 2021). Including the EU lifts the G20’s clean share from 70.03% (ex-EU) to 74.30% (in-EU) in October 2021.
• BRICS members, despite variation (e.g., Russia at 0 clean archetypes), overall funded more clean than dirty by October 2021, with clean comprising about 57.14% of dirty+clean archetypes (up from 50% in May). Growth in green recovery practice among BRICS is increasing, though from a lower base than the G7.
• The G7 demonstrates the most consistent internal and external relationality to the GGND, positioning it as a nascent norm entrepreneur through domestic green agendas and external initiatives (e.g., B3W; COP26 Green Grids Initiative; Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa).

Findings indicate that the GGND is in a norm emergence phase, with PSIs—especially the G7—acting as early norm entrepreneurs. The G7’s domestic policy packages (green stimulus, conditionalities, regulatory reforms) and collective commitments bolster internal relationality, while external initiatives (B3W, COP26 partnerships) begin translating entrepreneurship into diffusion pathways, including toward BRICS members. However, heterogeneity across the G20 and BRICS underscores contestation and the need for congruency between rhetoric and practice to avoid governance gaps. Three determinants for diffusion are highlighted: (1) congruency of practice—alignment between domestic measures and international actions, critical for legitimacy and resistance to antipreneurs; (2) local adaptation—ensuring the GGND bundle is tailored to varied development contexts to avoid perceptions of a developed-country-only agenda; and (3) barriers to diffusion—addressing finance and capacity constraints (e.g., climate finance, Paris Agreement market mechanisms) to enable implementation, especially where fiscal space is limited post-COVID-19. The G7’s success in operationalizing and globalizing the GGND will depend on sustained, coherent practice and partnerships across PSIs to bridge divergences and support just transitions.

The paper maps the GGND as a policy notion, presents preliminary empirical evidence of PSI green recovery practices, and analyzes the G7’s potential role as a norm entrepreneur within a global governance framework. It shows that while not all actors are ‘building back better’ uniformly, PSIs—particularly the G7—are pivotal for operationalizing and diffusing the GGND. Given the GGND’s current norm emergence stage, further diffusion will hinge on congruent practice, effective localization, and removal of financing and capacity barriers. The study calls for more PSI-focused empirical and normative research as datasets mature (e.g., final GRO releases with financial sizes) to capture evolving practices and their legal and governance implications. Future work should probe how PSI practices structure identities and sustain norm bundles over time, and how partnership models can accelerate transitions in diverse contexts.

The analysis is a time-bound snapshot (May–October 2021) in an ongoing policy environment; stimulus design and implementation are evolving, so final assessments will take years. The GRO dataset may not capture all measures and excludes significant international financing (e.g., World Bank, IMF, European Investment Bank) that could raise green shares, particularly in G7/G20 contexts. Focusing on counts and proportions of clean versus dirty archetypes can oversimplify complex policy matrices and does not systematically incorporate the financial magnitude of measures; while GRO contains some size data, comprehensive PSI-level financial comparisons await final datasets. Some national packages remained unsettled at the time (e.g., elements of US Build Back Better), and classification choices may shape outcomes. Consequently, results should be interpreted as preliminary indicators of PSI practice and relationality, not definitive evaluations of overall green recovery impact.