Financial professionals and climate experts have diverging perspectives on climate action

The climate crisis poses major societal, health, economic, and political challenges, requiring a rapid transformation of the economy to curb greenhouse gas emissions. The finance industry occupies a central position in this transition, given its role in facilitating sustainable investment and lending and in linking finance to ESG targets. How the finance industry fulfills this role depends on the behavior and attitudes of financial professionals, while climate experts’ knowledge and attitudes shape public policy and regulation. Despite the importance of both groups and likely increased interactions, scientific evidence on differences in their preferences, attitudes, and second-order beliefs regarding climate action is lacking. Differences may arise due to distinct professional priorities (returns and risk management for financial professionals vs. minimizing climate damage for climate experts) and political ideology, especially attitudes toward market interventions. This paper measures differences in financial professionals’ and climate experts’ preferences, opinions, and beliefs about the climate crisis and stakeholders’ roles. The pre-registered approach is threefold: (1) an incentivized choice experiment with externalities to elicit willingness to mitigate climate change via valuation of a 10-ton carbon offset; (2) a survey of attitudes, motives, and priorities; and (3) elicitation of second-order beliefs about the other group’s views.

The study positions itself against prior work on public attitudes toward climate change and policy that primarily explores cross-country and temporal heterogeneity, with limited focus on experts or key stakeholder groups. Prior research has surveyed expert views on carbon pricing or climate negotiations and contrasted policymakers’ and public attitudes, but empirical evidence on revealed preferences and beliefs of financial professionals has been absent. This paper contributes by providing comparative evidence between financial professionals and climate experts on valuation of carbon offsets, motives, priorities, and policy support, including second-order beliefs.

Design: A pre-registered experimental survey with three main components: (i) an incentivized choice task to elicit respondents’ valuation (indifference point) for purchasing a 10-ton CO2 offset versus receiving a monetary payment, (ii) a questionnaire on attitudes, motives, priorities, and policy support regarding climate change, and (iii) socio-demographics and professional background.

Incentivized choice task: Respondents made 19 choices between a personal payment (€0–€360 in €20 increments) and purchasing a 10-ton carbon offset (South Pole; reference price €170). Software enforced a single switching point; indifference valuation was the switching amount. Always taking payment or offset was coded as €0 and €360, respectively. Higher valuations indicate greater willingness to forgo personal payoff to mitigate climate change. One decision was randomly selected for payment with a 10% chance; payments were processed by an external provider to ensure anonymity. Beliefs about the other group’s average switching point were elicited and incentivized (additional €25 if exact match; 10% chance of selection).

Survey modules (6-point Likert scales from -3 to +3, excluding 0):

• Module 1 (General views): Perceived seriousness of climate change; perceived likelihood of negative long-term impact on global economic growth.
• Module 2 (Motives): Importance of financial, reputational, environmental, and intergenerational-justice motives for mitigation; plus second-order beliefs about the other group’s responses.
• Module 3 (Priorities): Importance of economic, ecological, social, health, and governance aspects for mitigation; plus second-order beliefs. Responses asked with respect to peers in one’s own group to reduce social desirability bias.
• Module 4 (Policy support): Support for soft vs hard measures by governments and corporations; specific items on carbon tax (hard) and carbon labels (soft); order of soft/hard questions counterbalanced; second-order beliefs elicited.

Sampling and procedures: Participants included financial professionals (fund/portfolio managers, traders, private bankers, advisors) recruited via a proprietary pool (BEFORE) and professional organizations across the EU; climate experts identified from recent corresponding authors in climate-related journals; and an exploratory sample of financial regulators from European central banks and regulatory authorities. Invitations were emailed in two waves in May 2021; the study remained open for two weeks, with data collection capped at 300 completes per main group due to budget constraints. In total, 697 completed (305 climate experts, 300 financial professionals, 92 regulators). Consent was obtained; IRB approval (University of Innsbruck No. 11/2021). Carbon offsets were purchased through South Pole (Lacandon Forests for Life; €17/ton); a certificate is publicly available.

Statistical analysis: For Likert data, non-parametric Mann–Whitney U tests were used. Valuations and belief differences were tested with two-sided, two-sample t-tests. Interval regressions with robust standard errors assessed determinants of indifference valuations, including controls (age, gender, political orientation, perceived seriousness and impact probability). A multiverse/specification-curve analysis (3,360 specifications) assessed robustness. Significance thresholds emphasized p<0.005 to indirectly address multiple testing.

General views and valuations:

• Both groups are concerned about climate change; medians: financial professionals (F) +2, climate experts (C) +3 on seriousness and on likelihood of negative long-term economic impact. F rate climate change as less serious (Mann–Whitney U: z=7.596, p<0.005) and less likely to harm long-run growth (z=5.029, p<0.005).
• Indifference valuations for 10-ton offset: F €144.30 vs C €191.90; difference significant (Table 1 model (1): coeff −58.84, p<0.005). With controls (age, gender, political orientation, climate views), difference remains (model (3): coeff −26.20, p<0.05). Valuation is positively associated with age, female, and higher perceived seriousness of the climate crisis.
• Multiverse analysis (3,360 specifications): 42.9% yield p<0.05; all pre-registered interval regression specifications are significant, supporting robustness.
• Second-order beliefs about valuations: Climate experts accurately estimate F’s average valuation (F actual €144.30 vs C→F €139.21; t=−0.62, p=0.54). Financial professionals overestimate C’s valuation (C actual €191.90 vs F→C €212.43; t=2.21, p=0.03). F hold distorted views of C’s preferences, perceiving them as more extreme.

Motives:

• F rate financial and reputational motives as more important than C (economic: z=6.526, p<0.005; reputational: z=9.318, p<0.005).
• C rate environmental and intergenerational-justice motives higher than F (environment: z=−10.723, p<0.005; intergenerational justice: z=−6.614, p<0.005).
• Both groups’ second-order beliefs about others’ motives often overestimate extremity; beliefs show heterogeneity, with some accurate medians for reputational motives.

Priorities:

• All priority areas are rated important (medians generally ≥+2). Economic aspects are similarly prioritized (z=0.961, p=0.336). F rate ecological, governance, health, and social aspects lower than C (ecological: z=−7.833; governance: z=−4.537; health: z=−3.847; social: z=−6.971; all p<0.005).
• Second-order beliefs: Both groups are relatively accurate on economic priorities; beliefs for other areas often differ from actuals and are more dispersed.

Policy support:

• C are much more supportive of hard measures (government and corporate) and carbon taxes than F (government hard: z=18.550, p<0.005; corporate hard: z=15.689, p<0.005; carbon tax: z=17.748, p<0.0001). Differences for soft measures point in same direction but are smaller (government soft: z=6.612; corporate soft: z=4.163; carbon labels: z=10.749; all p<0.0001).
• Second-order beliefs: F underestimate C’s support for both hard and soft policies (e.g., carbon tax and labels), indicating misperceptions.

Addendum: financial regulators (exploratory):

• Indifference valuations: Regulators (R) €207 do not differ from C (€192; t=1.016, p=0.31) but exceed F (€144; t=4.786, p<0.005).
• Hard measures: R > F but R < C (significance in Supplementary Fig. 3). Carbon tax support: C > R (z=6.558, p<0.005); R > F (z=9.113, p<0.005).
• Soft measures: R and C similar; both > F. For carbon labels: C vs R not significant (z=1.662, p=0.105); F vs R significant (z=−6.355, p<0.005).

Overall: Financial professionals are less concerned about climate change, assign lower valuations to carbon offsets, prioritize economic and reputational motives, and show lower support for both hard and soft mitigation policies than climate experts. Both groups hold biased second-order beliefs, with F especially underestimating C’s support for hard measures like carbon taxes.

The study addresses the research question by demonstrating systematic differences between financial professionals and climate experts in concern about climate change, willingness to forgo personal income for carbon offsets, motives for mitigation, prioritization of impact domains, and policy support. Differences plausibly reflect professional roles and, partly, political ideology—financial professionals lean center-right on average (mean political orientation: F 0.066 vs C −0.320; p<0.0001), consistent with greater skepticism toward market interventions. However, even controlling for political views, lower indifference valuations among financial professionals persist. Misperceptions between groups are substantial: climate experts tend to be too pessimistic about financial professionals, whereas financial professionals underestimate climate experts’ support for hard measures (e.g., carbon taxes). These misperceptions can hinder constructive dialogue and coordinated action. The results suggest that framing climate action around financial and reputational risk management may resonate better with financial professionals, while educational and communication interventions—such as carbon literacy workshops, perspective-taking exercises, and structured cross-group interactions—could correct misperceptions, reduce polarization, and align incentives, potentially accelerating green financial innovation and support for effective policies.

This paper contributes novel experimental and survey evidence on key stakeholder groups’ preferences and beliefs regarding climate action. Financial professionals exhibit lower carbon offset valuations, emphasize financial and reputational motives, and show less support for hard and soft mitigation policies than climate experts, who prioritize environmental and social considerations. Second-order beliefs are biased on both sides, particularly among financial professionals regarding climate policy support. Exploratory analyses place financial regulators between the two groups, aligning more closely with climate experts on valuations and soft measures. Future research should develop and test interventions to improve cross-group communication, reduce misperceptions, and incorporate climate knowledge within the finance industry. Additional work could extend to other stakeholders (politicians, executives), assess causal mechanisms linking ideology and policy support, and evaluate how incentive structures and reputational frameworks can effectively mobilize the finance sector for climate mitigation.

• Focus on comparing financial professionals and climate experts (and, exploratorily, regulators) limits generalizability to other stakeholders.
• The choice list elicitation, while standard and identical across groups, may have methodological weaknesses and does not capture all dimensions of climate action preferences.
• Asking respondents to report opinions of their peers reduces social desirability but may introduce biases in perceptions of peers.
• The study does not experimentally test communication or educational interventions, leaving open the best methods to reduce misperceptions and shift preferences.
• Beliefs about offset effectiveness could influence valuations; while prior evidence suggests limited sensitivity, it remains a potential source of heterogeneity not fully controlled for.