Exploring motivated reasoning in polarization over the unfolding 2023 judicial reform in Israel

The study examines how Israelis polarized over the 2023 judicial reform, a policy initiative shifting power from the judiciary to the executive. The authors argue that polarization on this emergent issue reflects motivated reasoning: people’s pre-existing beliefs and identities (e.g., institutional trust patterns, patriotism types, civic vs. ethno‑religious identity) drive their conclusions about whether the reform threatens democracy (issue-based polarization) and their negative affect toward opponents (affective polarization). They also posit that polarization shapes immediate downstream attitudes (e.g., protest methods, protest control, conflict management, delegitimization) and that each camp prioritizes democratic principles consistent with its motivated stance (e.g., majority rule vs. minority rights and checks and balances). The work addresses four questions: (Q1) how institutional trust and patriotism relate to views on the reform; (Q2) how pro- vs. anti-reform camps differ (e.g., in polarization and prioritization of democratic features); (Q3) how institutional trust and patriotism predict different polarization types; and (Q4) how polarization types predict immediate downstream consequences amid the unfolding conflict.

The paper situates the Israeli judicial reform within global democratic backsliding and mass polarization. Prior research shows motivated reasoning leads people to protect desired beliefs and ingroup identities rather than seek accuracy, exacerbating polarization and undermining processing of contradictory information. Institutional trust is linked to polarization in a negative feedback loop and can itself be politicized; in Israel, pre-existing trust/distrust in government and judiciary predated the reform, making these likely drivers of initial polarized responses. Patriotism is differentiated into blind (uncritical, exclusive, often linked to ethno‑religious identity) and constructive (inclusive, accepting criticism), with evidence that appeals to national identity can polarize views (e.g., on immigration). The authors also note roles for civic vs. ethno‑religious identities, generalized trust (negatively related to polarization), and universalism/benevolence values (associated with liberal attitudes), anticipating they may shape polarization over a reform perceived as anti‑liberal. The study extends literature by examining how these pre-existing factors motivate multiple polarization types and immediate downstream attitudes during a live political conflict.

Design: Two-wave survey of Israeli Jews during the unfolding reform. T1: March 9–12, 2023; T2: May 8–11, 2023 (pre-registered follow-up: https://aspredicted.org/JMP_QKT). Sampling: 822 recruited via Midgam Project Web Panel (representative on age and gender for majority population). T2 invitations sent to 709 T1 completers who passed attention checks; 584 responded. Exclusions: 30 for completing in <4 minutes; 56 with incomplete data. Final N=498 Israeli Jews (249 women, 249 men), ages 18–64 (M=42.27, SD=12.10). Majority secular (61.04%); political orientation: 7.23% left (1–3), 55.62% center (4–6), 37.15% right (7–9). Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinian citizens of Israel were not sampled. Ethics/compensation: Approved by Bar-Ilan University Psychology Department ERB (#2023/49/1; #2023/30). Informed consent obtained; participants compensated per panel guidelines. Measures (see Table 1 for items/scales, reliabilities):

• Institutional trust (judiciary, government, parliament, media; T1,T2)
• Patriotism: blind (α≈0.77), constructive (α≈0.74) (T1)
• Identities: civic (Israeli; 1 item, T1), ethno‑religious (Jewish; 1 item, T1)
• Universalism/benevolence values (α≈0.81, T1)
• Generalized trust (α≈0.69, T2)
• Reform-as-threat to democracy (1 item; T1,T2)
• Issue-based polarization: absolute deviation from scale midpoint for reform-as-threat (0–3; T1,T2)
• Affective polarization toward opposing camp (8 items; α≈0.88; T2)
• Perceived societal polarization (1 item; T2)
• Motivated perceptions: false consensus (% pro/anti/no opinion summing to 100; T2); importance of democratic features (majority rule; separation of powers; minority rights; free media; free elections; equal human rights; T2)
• Downstream consequences from EFA-derived scales: protest methods (3 items, α≈0.87); protest control (3 items, α≈0.81); conflict management strategies (7 items, α≈0.84); delegitimization of political opponents (6 items, α≈0.83) (T2). For affective/delegitimization, responses toward the opposing camp were used. Analytic strategy: Pre-registered hierarchical/multilevel linear regressions. Additional analyses: hierarchical clustering (factoextra), Welch’s t-tests, mixed ANOVAs, and EFA for downstream consequences. Mixed models with participant random intercepts for repeated outcomes (views, issue-based polarization). Predictors were mean-centered; demographic controls included gender, age, education, SES, religiosity; psychological controls: universalism/benevolence and generalized trust. Software: R 4.3.0 (RStudio 2023.03.1).

Q1 (views on reform as threat):

• Distribution of reform-as-threat responses was bimodal (T1, T2; Shapiro-Wilk W≈0.83, p<0.001), indicating polarization. Mean perceived threat slightly decreased from T1 (M=4.43, SD=2.40) to T2 (M=4.19, SD=2.41), driven by a minority; 56.22% gave identical ratings across waves.
• LMM (Adjusted R²≈0.63) showed: higher trust in judiciary and media associated with greater perceived threat; higher trust in government associated with lower perceived threat. Constructive patriotism and civic identity associated with higher perceived threat; blind patriotism associated with lower perceived threat. More left-leaning orientation associated with higher perceived threat. Wave (T2 vs. T1) predicted a small decrease; wave×institutional trust interactions were non-significant. Q2 (camp characterization):
• Cluster analysis yielded two camps: Anti-reform (N=262): viewed reform as threatening (M=6.14, SD=1.03), politically centrist on average (M=4.99, SD=1.22). Pro-reform (N=236): viewed reform as not threatening (M=2.29, SD=1.44), right-leaning (M=6.91, SD=1.07).
• Shifts by cluster: pro-reform participants decreased perceived threat from T1 to T2 (MT1=2.48, SD=1.84; MT2=2.09, SD=1.48; p<0.001); anti-reform change not significant.
• Pre-existing differences: Pro-reform showed stronger ethno‑religious identity (notably high; ≈6.33/7) and stronger civic identity; anti-reform showed more constructive patriotism and less blind patriotism. Anti-reform trusted judiciary and media more, but government and parliament less, than pro-reform.
• Polarization and downstream outcomes: Anti-reform had greater issue-based polarization and perceived societal polarization. Anti-reform simultaneously endorsed conflict management strategies more and endorsed extreme protest methods more; pro-reform endorsed protest control more.
• Democratic features: Anti-reform rated separation of powers, minority rights, free media, free elections, and equal human rights as more important (ps≤0.001, ds≈0.30–0.68). Pro-reform rated majority rule as more important (p<0.001, d≈0.38).
• False consensus: Both camps overestimated the size of their own camp (pro: support≈50.8%, oppose≈32.3%; anti: oppose≈53.5%, support≈31.1%); neutrality seen as uncommon (~15–17%). False consensus increased with issue-based extremity (significant three-way interaction of cluster × extremity × estimated camp). Q3 (predictors of polarization types):
• Issue-based polarization: In anti-reform camp, higher civic identity and constructive patriotism predicted more extremity; higher trust in government predicted less extremity; higher trust in media predicted more. In pro-reform camp, higher ethno‑religious identity predicted more extremity; higher constructive patriotism and higher trust in judiciary predicted less; higher trust in government predicted more.
• Affective polarization: Universalism/benevolence predicted less across camps. In anti-reform camp, constructive patriotism predicted more. Trust patterns mirrored issue-based results (e.g., trust in government increased affective polarization in pro-reform but decreased it in anti-reform).
• Perceived societal polarization: Higher universalism/benevolence and lower generalized trust predicted higher perceived polarization across camps; identities, patriotism, institutional trust, and interactions with cluster were largely non-significant. Q4 (downstream consequences):
• Protest methods: Higher perceived societal polarization predicted greater endorsement across camps. Issue-based polarization interacted with camp: anti-reform—more extremity → more endorsement; pro-reform—more extremity → less endorsement.
• Protest control: Issue-based and affective polarization interacted with camp: anti-reform—more extremity → less support for protest control; pro-reform—more extremity and more negative affect → more support for protest control.
• Conflict management strategies: Both issue-based and affective polarization were associated with less favorable views of compromise/dialogue across camps.
• Delegitimization: Both issue-based and affective polarization predicted greater delegitimization. Perceived societal polarization interacted with camp: in anti-reform, higher perceived polarization → more delegitimization.

Findings show rapid polarization over the judicial reform into pro- and anti-reform camps with distinct pre-existing profiles. Trust in competing institutions (government vs. judiciary), types of patriotism, and national identities aligned with motivated reasoning: they predicted both the direction and extremity of views (issue-based) and negative affect toward opponents (affective). Pro-reform participants privileged majority rule, consistent with being represented by the governing majority, whereas anti-reform participants emphasized liberal-democratic safeguards (checks and balances, minority and equal rights, free media, free elections). Motivated perceptions emerged: strong false consensus (amplified among the most extreme) and motivated prioritization of democratic features. Polarization translated into immediate behavioral and attitudinal consequences in opposing directions for the two camps: anti-reform extremity increased endorsement of protest and reduced support for protest control; pro-reform extremity did the reverse. Across camps, greater issue-based and affective polarization reduced willingness to engage in conflict management and increased delegitimization, suggesting polarization can hinder near-term conflict resolution. The results underscore how motivated cognition can facilitate democratic backsliding by shaping citizens’ understanding and prioritization of core democratic principles.

Polarization over the judicial reform emerged quickly from pre-existing, ideologically aligned positions in institutional trust, patriotism, and identity. These positions motivated issue-based and affective polarization, self-serving perceptions (false consensus), and selective prioritization of democratic principles, with immediate downstream effects on protest-related attitudes, conflict management, and delegitimization. The study highlights the role of motivated reasoning in contemporary democratic backsliding. Future research should test causality with designs that rule out alternative explanations, broaden samples to include excluded minority groups, and examine how socialization contexts (e.g., segregated education systems) shape identities, institutional trust, and patriotism that predispose societies to polarization.

• Sampling limited to majority Israeli Jewish population; Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinian citizens of Israel were not included. Camp size estimates cannot be generalized to the population, limiting conclusions about which side overestimated its size.
• Correlational design precludes strong causal inference; while temporal ordering (pre-existing factors before reform; reform before downstream outcomes) supports precedence, alternative explanations remain possible.
• Study conducted soon after reform introduction; underlying causes of group differences (e.g., effects of segregated education) were not measured. Future work should include more representative samples and designs capable of establishing causality and probing socialization mechanisms.