“What about building 7?” A social psychological study of online discussion of 9/11 conspiracy theories

The study investigates how belief systems shape persuasive communication about 9/11 on mainstream news websites. Building on proposals that a conspiracist worldview centers on generalized mistrust and opposition to official narratives rather than endorsement of specific alternatives, the authors examine whether conspiracist commenters focus more on refuting the official account than advocating an alternative, whereas conventionalists do the opposite. They also assess correlates known from prior research (e.g., mistrust, intercorrelation among conspiracy beliefs), explore whether the label "conspiracy theory" is stigmatized (i.e., avoided or contested by conspiracists), and compare the hostility of conspiracist versus conventionalist persuasive comments, with the expectation that majority influence dynamics may render conventionalist discourse more norm-enforcing and hostile.

Prior work links conspiracy belief to mistrust of people and authorities, feelings of powerlessness, low self-esteem, paranormal beliefs, schizotypy, perceived lack of control, and Machiavellianism. Ideological orientations and broader belief systems influence acceptance of specific theories, including rejection of climate science associated with free-market ideology. Conspiracy beliefs tend to form a monological belief system: endorsements of unrelated—and even contradictory—conspiracy theories intercorrelate, suggesting higher-order beliefs (e.g., mistrust of officialdom) bind them. Commentators have noted that many conspiracy arguments emphasize rejection of official narratives and can be vague, especially online. Research on online discourse shows it reflects public concerns and emotional climates and offers access to fringe or stigmatized views due to anonymity. Social projection implies persuaders generate arguments they themselves find convincing, potentially revealing their belief structures in anonymous online contexts. Social influence theory suggests majority defenders (conventionalists) may engage in more normative, hostile enforcement of orthodoxy, whereas conspiracists may portray conventionalists as gullible or complicit.

Design: Archival content analysis of persuasive online comments on 9/11-related news articles. Data sources: Four mainstream news sites—ABC News, CNN, the Independent, and the Daily Mail. Timeframe: July 1–December 31, 2011 (surrounding the 10th anniversary of 9/11). Article selection: Site searches (and Google News where needed) using terms: "9/11," "11/9," "September 11th," "11th September," "world trade center/centre," "wtc," "al-qaeda," "shanksville," "building 7." Comment inclusion: Only persuasive, original-content comments. Exclusions: (1) comments consisting solely of insults/ridicule/threats; (2) comments consisting solely of meta-discussion; (3) comments that were only links or links with minimal description; (4) comments copied verbatim from external sources (only the original portion coded if mixed). Coding variables:

• Tone: conspiracist vs. conventionalist.
• References to other (non-9/11) conspiracy theories: counts of favorable and unfavorable mentions (excluding superconspiracies orchestrating 9/11).
• Expressions of mistrust; expressions of powerlessness.
• Argument structure: advocacy of own explanation (positive argument), derogation of opposing explanation (negative argument), and whether a direct explanation of what happened was stated.
• Use of the term "conspiracy theory" (and variants): none; applied to opposing view; applied to own view; both; disputed applicability.
• Hostility: rated 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) toward holders of opposing views. Procedure: Authors recorded commenter identity, article URL, and reply status. A total of 2,174 comments were extracted from 135 threads (65 ABC in 15 threads; 632 CNN in 29; 1,006 Daily Mail in 64; 471 Independent in 27). There were 1,156 unique authors (321 posted more than once). Analyses were conducted at the comment level; parallel author-level analyses (averaged per author) produced consistent results (not reported in detail). Inter-rater reliability: A random 10% of comments were double-coded. Cohen’s kappa for tone κ=0.84. On comments with agreed tone: advocacy κ=0.64; derogation κ=0.61; term usage κ=0.70; mistrust κ=0.49; direct explanation κ=0.55. Hostility reliability ICC=0.72. Powerlessness was too rare to assess. Hypotheses: (1) Conspiracist comments would reference other conspiracy theories more favorably and less unfavorably; (2) express more mistrust (and potentially powerlessness); (3) focus more on derogating the official (opposing) explanation and less on advocating their own than conventionalists; (4) conspiracists would avoid self-applying or contest the label "conspiracy theory"; (5) conventionalist comments would be more hostile, consistent with majority influence dynamics.

• Sample composition: 2,174 comments (1,459 conspiracist; 715 conventionalist). Each site showed roughly twice as many conspiracist as conventionalist comments; site proportions did not differ significantly (χ²(3)=1.514, p=0.68).
• Interconspiracy references: Conspiracist comments mentioned more unrelated conspiracy theories favorably (M=0.12 vs. 0.02; t(2172)=3.82, p<0.001) and fewer unfavorably (M=0.02 vs. 0.18; t(2172)=-7.51, p<0.001) than conventionalist comments.
• Mistrust/powerlessness: Conspiracist comments more often expressed mistrust (10.6% vs. 1.4%; χ²(1)=57.22, p<0.001). Powerlessness was extremely rare (2 comments), preventing analysis.
• Argument structure: Conspiracists were less likely to advocate their own explanation (31% vs. 56%; χ²(1)=121.69, p<0.001) and more likely to derogate the opposing explanation (64% vs. 44%; χ²(1)=80.13, p<0.001). Surprisingly, conspiracists more often directly stated an explanation (e.g., “inside job”; 52% vs. 19%; χ²(1)=53.56, p<0.001).
• Hostility: Conventionalist comments were more hostile (M=2.08, SD=1.02) than conspiracist comments (M=1.44, SD=0.79), t(2172)=16.22, p<0.001.
• Use of "conspiracy theory": Conspiracists rarely self-applied the label (2.1% of comments) and sometimes disputed its use (4.5%); they more often applied it to the official narrative (4.3%). Conventionalists frequently labeled opposing views as conspiracy theories (23.2%), almost never self-applied (0.1%) or disputed (0.1%). Raw counts noted: conspiracist (self=31; opposing=63; both=4; dispute=65); conventionalist (self=1; opposing=166; both=0; dispute=1).

Findings align with the view that conspiracist persuasion emphasizes opposition to official narratives more than endorsement of specific alternatives, reflecting a broader mistrustful worldview in which disbelief in official accounts organizes beliefs across topics. The observed positive references to other conspiracy theories replicate the monological nature of conspiracist ideation, and higher mistrust in conspiracist comments corroborates established correlates of conspiracy belief. The paradox that conspiracists more often directly state an explanation while less frequently advocating with supportive evidence likely reflects slogan-like assertions (e.g., “inside job”) and argument structures that infer conspiracy from perceived anomalies. Greater hostility among conventionalists is consistent with normative social influence processes by majority defenders enforcing orthodoxy. Usage patterns of the term "conspiracy theory" suggest it is stigmatized; conspiracists avoid self-labeling and often contest the term’s applicability, sometimes reframing the official account as a "conspiracy theory." Alternative interpretations (e.g., rhetorical congruence or analogy use) may partially explain references to other conspiracies, and strategic self-presentation may shape argument selection, but the overall pattern supports the hypothesized belief-structure differences.

This study shows that in online persuasion about 9/11, conspiracist commenters predominantly derogate official explanations, express greater mistrust, and reference other conspiracies favorably, while conventionalists more often advocate the mainstream account and display higher hostility. The results support the notion that conspiracism is rooted in higher-order disbelief in official narratives rather than committed endorsement of detailed alternatives and that the label "conspiracy theory" carries social stigma among believers. Future work should test these dynamics experimentally (e.g., whether framing evidence as refutation of official accounts versus support for specific conspiracies differentially persuades conspiracists) and assess the impact of applying the "conspiracy theory" label on perceived plausibility. Additional methods (e.g., controlled experiments, surveys) can further validate these archival findings and explore causal mechanisms.

• External validity: Data derive from self-selected online commenters on four news sites; commenters may not represent the broader population.
• Internal validity: Persuasive comments may reflect strategic rhetoric tailored to the audience/venue rather than authentic internal cognition; self-presentation and analogy use could influence content.
• Measurement constraints: Some variables showed only moderate inter-rater reliability (e.g., mistrust κ=0.49; direct explanation κ=0.55). Powerlessness was too rare to analyze.
• Sampling/coding exclusions: Comments consisting solely of insults, threats, meta-discussion, or copied content were excluded; this may underrepresent extreme hostility and certain discourse types.
• Context dependence: Many arguments drew from external materials (websites, documentaries); choices among abundant sources may still reveal beliefs but complicate attribution to original reasoning.
• Generalizability across topics/times: Focus on 9/11 during a specific 2011 window may limit applicability to other conspiracy topics or periods.