Vice Explanations for Conspiracism, Fundamentalism, and Extremism

The paper asks whether empirical situationist findings undermine vice-based explanations of extreme behaviors and beliefs found in conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism. Given that vice explanations are common in these literatures and carry implications for moral and epistemic responsibility, the study assesses the empirical situationist challenge and its argumentative force. The paper motivates the importance of the issue by noting that, if situationism is correct, character-trait-based explanations are misguided and responsibility attributions become jeopardized. It outlines an analysis of empirical evidence and argumentation to determine if vice explanations remain viable, and under what conditions they are most appropriate relative to situational explanations.

The paper surveys vice explanations across studies of conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism. Moral vices (e.g., aggressiveness, hostility, vengefulness) are used to explain extreme actions (e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko on al-Zarqawi’s aggressiveness; Munson on hostility in Islamic fundamentalism). Cognitive vices (e.g., dogmatism, closed-mindedness, gullibility, black-and-white thinking, stigmatization/demonization) are used to explain extreme beliefs (e.g., Lawrie and Vorster on prejudice in fundamentalism; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins and Meloy on black-and-white thinking; Mahan & Griset on demonization in right-wing religions; Altemeyer & Hunsberger on dogmatism; Van Prooijen on gullibility, bullshit receptivity, and paranormal beliefs). The review also notes that some accounts imply vice concepts without explicit terminology (e.g., Abi-Hashem & Plante on rigidity). In parallel, the literature also includes situational explanations (poverty, marginalization, lack of control, low self-esteem, adverse childhood experiences, narcissism), echoing situationist themes that behavior and belief can be driven by external or non-conscious factors. The paper frames these two strands—vice and situational explanations—as partially competing and potentially complementary.

Conceptual and argumentative analysis combined with a critical synthesis of empirical findings from social psychology and related fields. The author reviews classic situationist experiments (Hartshorne & May on cheating; Isen & Levin on positive mood via cookies/dimes and helping; Darley & Batson’s Good Samaritan study on hurry; Matthews & Cannon on noise; Baron on odors; Weyant on mood and helping; Isen et al. on mood and creativity; Duncker on functional fixedness) and connects them to claims about the robustness of character traits. The paper also integrates measurement evidence from scales linked to vice and conspiracism (e.g., Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire; Altemeyer’s DOG scale; the Epistemic Vice Scale) and engages with debates about replicability (Many Labs projects) and conceptual distinctions (domain-specificity, degree-based traits, and low- vs high-fidelity vices). The approach does not present new empirical data; rather, it evaluates how existing evidence bears on the plausibility and limits of vice explanations and proposes refinements.

- Vice explanations are prevalent in accounts of extreme behavior (moral vices like aggressiveness/hostility) and extreme belief (cognitive vices like dogmatism, closed-mindedness, gullibility, black-and-white thinking, stigmatization). - The situationist challenge draws on experiments showing strong situational effects on behavior and cognition (e.g., helping behavior influenced by hurry, cookies/dimes, ambient noise/odors; creativity influenced by positive mood). These have been taken to undercut robust character traits. - Nevertheless, multiple considerations preserve the viability of vice explanations: (1) evidence such as the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire and the Epistemic Vice Scale indicates stable, measurable individual differences associated with conspiracist beliefs; (2) replication concerns (Many Labs) caution against overgeneralizing some situationist results; (3) an asymmetry exists between virtues and vices—vices may require less consistency than virtues; (4) virtues/vices may be rarer than assumed, which still aligns with the rarity of extreme beliefs; and (5) virtues and vices come in degrees, not all-or-nothing. - Specific data points: bystander effect meta-analyses indicate that only 10–31% help when impassive confederates are present versus 75–85% helping in baseline conditions, suggesting some stable virtuous dispositions exist in a minority. DOG (dogmatism) correlates .57–.78 with religious fundamentalism. The Epistemic Vice Scale shows medium to large associations with endorsement of misinformation and conspiracy theories and explains variance beyond demographics and related constructs. - Vice explanations should be refined to be domain-specific (e.g., dogmatism about religion or government actions rather than across-the-board), distinguish low-fidelity vices (e.g., gullibility) from high-fidelity ones (e.g., conformity/cowardice), and be framed as partial explanations that integrate situational and other factors. - Sometimes extreme beliefs may reflect the interaction of vices with certain cognitive virtues (e.g., perseverance, desire for truth), complicating simple vice-only accounts. - Different explananda require different levels of explanation: individual adoption of extreme beliefs may be explained partly by vices, whereas population-level prevalence at specific times/places needs socio-political and cultural explanations.

The analysis addresses the core question by showing that situationist findings do not invalidate vice explanations but reveal the need for precision about when and how they apply. Vice explanations remain appropriate for understanding many instances of conspiracist, fundamentalist, and extremist beliefs and actions, provided they: (a) specify the domains in which the relevant vices operate; (b) recognize that vices vary in fidelity and degree; (c) acknowledge that situational and structural factors can moderate or trigger vice expression. This nuanced view strengthens explanatory adequacy and avoids stereotyping, enhancing predictive traction where high-fidelity vices are involved while respecting the partial and conditional nature of these explanations. The findings also preserve room for responsibility and accountability by retaining a role for character while acknowledging situational influences. For broader social patterns (e.g., surges in QAnon), structural and political dynamics must supplement individual vice explanations.

Vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism are not discredited by situationist evidence; they should be fine-tuned. The paper contributes a framework emphasizing: (1) domain-specificity of vices; (2) differentiation between low- and high-fidelity vices; (3) degrees of virtue/vice; and (4) the partial, integrative nature of vice explanations alongside situational, structural, and motivational factors. Future research should (a) operationalize domain boundaries of key vices (dogmatism, closed-mindedness, gullibility); (b) quantify relative contributions of vice and situational variables to extreme beliefs/actions; (c) refine and validate measurement instruments (e.g., Epistemic Vice Scale) across cultures and contexts; and (d) investigate interactions between vices, virtues, and socio-political environments in longitudinal and multilevel designs.

- Dependence on established social psychology paradigms focused on limited domains (e.g., helping, creativity) may not generalize to all virtues/vices. - The replication crisis raises uncertainty about the robustness of some situationist effects; the paper proceeds for sake of argument but does not resolve replication debates. - No new empirical data are collected; conclusions rest on secondary analysis and conceptual argument. - Measurement of vices, though advancing (e.g., DOG, CMQ, Epistemic Vice Scale), remains an evolving area with potential construct and domain-boundary ambiguities. - Potential risk of pejorative framing is noted; careful domain-specific characterization is needed to avoid stereotyping.