Performance evaluation in China's local governments, while intending to promote performance-oriented governmental behavior (POGB), often leads to non-performance-oriented governmental behavior (NPOGB). This study uses game theory to model the causes of NPOGB, focusing on inter-jurisdictional competition. The findings indicate that NPOGBs, despite being suboptimal, are rational choices for risk-averse officials under information scarcity, driven by the need to imitate competitors to avoid being outperformed in the promotion system.
Publisher
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS
Published On
May 13, 2024
Authors
Huping Shang, Hongmei Liu, Wei Liu
Tags
performance evaluation
local governments
non-performance-oriented behavior
game theory
inter-jurisdictional competition
risk aversion
information scarcity
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