The influence of Antarctic governance on marine protected areas in the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement negotiations

Areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) cover most of the global ocean and are governed under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Recognizing governance and regulatory gaps for conserving biodiversity in ABNJ, the UN initiated negotiations for a new implementing agreement under UNCLOS, culminating in the BBNJ Agreement. A core pillar concerns area-based management tools (ABMTs), including marine protected areas (MPAs). CCAMLR, part of the Antarctic Treaty System, has designated high seas MPAs (e.g., South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf MPA in 2009; Ross Sea region MPA in 2016) under a consensus-based regime, offering a potential model and lessons for BBNJ. This study asks whether and how CCAMLR influenced the BBNJ negotiations and how it may shape the Agreement’s future architecture, particularly around ABMTs/MPAs.

The paper situates BBNJ within longstanding ABNJ governance gaps identified by UN processes, including the need for global principles (precautionary and ecosystem-based approaches) and tools for biodiversity conservation. It reviews definitions and objectives distinguishing MPAs from broader ABMTs and summarizes demonstrated benefits of MPAs for biodiversity, resilience, and connectivity. Existing high seas MPAs (OSPAR network; CCAMLR’s SOISS and Ross Sea region) illustrate fragmented governance arrangements. The literature on CCAMLR highlights its conservation mandate allowing rational use, the legal basis for MPAs (Article IX), and consensus decision-making codified via Conservation Measures. Scholarship questions the efficacy of consensus in complex decisions (e.g., MPAs), noting geopolitical influences and potential strategic obstruction. Debates over time-bound MPAs and the meaning of "long-term" in MPA definitions (IUCN vs. practice) are reviewed, alongside evidence that MPA effectiveness relates to duration, size, and location. Prior work anticipates various interaction modes between BBNJ and IFBs like CCAMLR (competence, complementarity, congruence, competition).

The study employed mixed qualitative methods with data triangulation across: (1) participant observation and ethnographic note-taking at BBNJ Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC-2 to IGC-5, including the extended session in 2023), prioritizing ABMT discussions; (2) Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) daily reports and final summaries; (3) additional public UN BBNJ negotiation documents (submitted statements, conference room papers, drafting and textual proposals); and (4) semi-structured interviews with participants active in both CCAMLR and BBNJ processes. The lead author, an experienced BBNJ attendee since the Preparatory Committee, recorded 182 pages of ethnographic notes. ENB reporting totaling 106 pages was coded. Additional UN BBNJ documents amounting to 1,277 pages were screened and coded for direct Antarctic regime references. Cross-referencing participant lists for IGC-4, IGC-5, and CCAMLR 2020/2021 identified 20 overlapping individuals; of these, 10 (50% response rate) completed ~1-hour Zoom interviews (3 government, 7 NGO) between October and December 2022. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Qualitative analysis proceeded in two coding cycles: open coding followed by focused coding, supplemented by sentiment analysis (positive, negative, neutral). Analytical memos tracked emergent patterns. A codebook synthesized themes and categories (e.g., influence via precedent setting and lesson learning; exclusivity via insider knowledge and delegation relationships). Ethical approval was secured through the CU Boulder IRB; data are not publicly available due to sensitivity.

Three primary themes emerged: - Influence of CCAMLR via precedent setting: CCAMLR was frequently cited in BBNJ debates on (a) time-bound MPAs (the Ross Sea region MPA’s 35-year duration set a visible precedent); (b) consensus decision-making; and (c) CCAMLR’s competency as a relevant IFB. Most interviewees viewed time-boundness as a negative precedent for MPAs, though a minority emphasized adaptive management and review provisions as reasons to allow durations. Consensus was broadly perceived as problematic for BBNJ, given risks of obstruction, large party numbers, and politicization; some delegations nevertheless advocated consensus or opt-out clauses analogous to CCAMLR. - Influence via lesson learning: CCAMLR’s organizational architecture (Secretariat, Scientific Committee and working groups, compliance and finance committees) offers templates for BBNJ’s COP, Scientific and Technical Body (STB), compliance and financial mechanisms. CCAMLR’s Conservation Measures on MPAs (e.g., CM 91-04 general framework; CM 91-05 Ross Sea; CM 91-03 SOISS) provide concrete processes for designation, management, and periodic review that could inform BBNJ MPA procedures. Persistent challenges in adopting MPA research and monitoring plans under consensus demonstrate pitfalls to avoid. - Exclusivity of CCAMLR: A perceived insularity and insider knowledge in the Antarctic regime influenced BBNJ through hidden red lines (often tied to sovereignty issues) and uneven understanding among BBNJ negotiators unfamiliar with CCAMLR. Close-knit relationships and the remote meeting location (Hobart) shape dynamics—facilitating trust and informal problem-solving for some, but also potentially hindering transparency and inclusive debate. Supporting data points: - 20 individuals overlapped between CCAMLR and BBNJ participant lists; 10 interviews conducted (50% response rate; 3 government, 7 NGO). - 182 pages of ethnographic notes; 106 pages of ENB reports coded; 1,277 pages of additional UN BBNJ documents screened/coded. - CCAMLR MPAs: SOISS (2009) and Ross Sea region (2016; 35-year duration). Longstanding MPA proposals (East Antarctic, Weddell Sea, western Antarctic Peninsula) remain blocked under consensus. - The adopted BBNJ Agreement provides that Parties strive for consensus, then three-fourths majority, then two-thirds majority if needed, and does not require fixed-duration MPAs.

The findings show CCAMLR influenced BBNJ primarily as a source of precedents and lessons, while its structural features (notably strict consensus and perceived exclusivity) also galvanized pushback in the BBNJ context. The Ross Sea MPA’s time-bound designation became a touchstone in debates over MPA duration; many viewed it as a concessionary precedent to avoid replicating. CCAMLR’s consensus rule—while fostering collaboration in a small, specialized forum—was widely seen as impractical for a global BBNJ COP and vulnerable to politicized obstruction. Consequently, the adopted BBNJ decision-making departs from strict consensus, aiming to reduce gridlock. On interactions with IFBs, stakeholders anticipated competence-focused relations, but concerns about CCAMLR’s functional effectiveness (given stalemates) supported arguments for BBNJ to provide pathways when regional bodies cannot act in a timely manner. CCAMLR’s operational architecture remains valuable to emulate (e.g., scientific review, compliance, financing), but the politicization of science, resource constraints, and stakeholder engagement gaps are cautionary lessons. The exclusivity and insider culture around Antarctic governance affected BBNJ negotiations through hidden sovereignty red lines and limited cross-forum understanding; increased transparency and broader engagement in BBNJ processes aim to mitigate such effects. Overall, the study addresses the research question by detailing where CCAMLR’s influence is constructive (organizational templates, technical procedures) and where it is counterproductive (norms around time-limits and strict consensus), shaping BBNJ’s final architecture.

CCAMLR shaped BBNJ negotiations by setting precedents on MPA duration and consensus and by providing transferable organizational models and technical procedures for high seas MPAs. However, much of CCAMLR’s debated influence is not hard-wired into the final BBNJ text: the Agreement does not mandate time-bound MPAs and does not require strict consensus, instead providing majority-vote fallbacks. With entry into force pending ratifications, CCAMLR has the opportunity to engage proactively with BBNJ’s COP and STB, sharing lessons on scientific assessment, compliance, financing, and MPA monitoring while addressing its own challenges (politicization, consensus deadlock, limited stakeholder outreach). Future research could examine: operationalization of BBNJ’s STB to guard against politicization; effective coordination mechanisms with IFBs (competence vs. complementarity); design and implementation of BBNJ MPA research and monitoring plans; and approaches to improve transparency and inclusivity across regimes with differing cultures and geographies.

The study relies on qualitative data subject to inherent constraints: a small overlap of cross-forum participants (20 identified; 10 interviewed) limits representativeness; interviewees skewed toward NGOs (7 of 10), potentially biasing perspectives. Chatham House Rule constraints precluded attribution of specific delegation statements. Ethnographic observations were conducted by a single researcher prioritizing ABMT sessions, which may omit dynamics in parallel tracks. Coded ENB and UN documents focused on explicit Antarctic references, potentially overlooking implicit influences. Sensitive data cannot be shared, limiting external validation.