The European approach to online disinformation: geopolitical and regulatory dissonance

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU adopted sanctions that included suspending the broadcasting of Russian state-controlled outlets (RT, Sputnik), framing Kremlin-backed disinformation as a direct threat to Union public order and security. Earlier, in 2020, the Commission moved beyond purely voluntary approaches by requiring platforms to remove certain disinformation. Disinformation is treated by the EU as a multifaceted, transnational phenomenon warranting public regulatory intervention rather than a market self-correction. The paper asks: what struggles to define an EU regulatory response to the new ‘disinformation order’ are taking place in European communication? It argues that EU policy reveals a tension between a geopolitical logic (securitization, exceptional measures against hostile state-led operations) and a regulatory logic (soft-law, co-/self-regulation of platforms addressing systemic risks). The study is conceptual and multidisciplinary (Journalism, Digital Communication, Geopolitics), focusing on how COVID-19 and Russia’s aggression shaped EU policy debates and instruments.

The paper reviews scholarship positioning disinformation within propaganda’s evolution and the disruptive changes after 2016 (Brexit, Trump), emphasizing social media affordances, eroding trust in mainstream media, post-truth polarization, selective exposure, and AI-enabled manipulation (bots, deepfakes). It highlights systemic threats to democracies from rapid technological, political, and sociological shifts, and the role of crisis moments (pandemics, war) in accelerating falsehood circulation. In EU-specific literature, tensions arise between the Union’s civilian/normative power self-image and security-oriented responses, risking censorship narratives and complicating public diplomacy. Applying Kingdon’s multiple streams, the review notes how problem, policy, and politics converged via Russia’s aggressiveness and COVID-19 disruptions, while stressing the underexplored policy tensions created when geopolitical securitization and market/regulatory tools coexist. It also discusses policy options debated in EU fora: strategic communication, censorship/visibility reduction, media literacy, and media pluralism.

Conceptual, multidisciplinary inquiry combining Journalism/Digital Communication with Geopolitics. The study conducts a critical analysis of EU-produced documents on disinformation from 2018 to 2022, including reports, Communications, Joint Communications, statements, press releases, Codes of Practice, and legislative texts (e.g., Action Plan against Disinformation, European Democracy Action Plan, Digital Services Act). It examines three strands of EU concern and response: (1) intensified news consumption and disinformation circulation during COVID-19; (2) soft-law practices and platform self-/co-regulation; and (3) securitization processes by EU institutions and Member States. The approach is theoretical and conceptual (non-empirical), synthesizing policy texts and academic debates to interpret EU policy logics.

• EU anti-disinformation policy is shaped by two competing logics: (a) securitization viewing disinformation as a threat to democracy justifying exceptional measures and security-led responses (e.g., RT/Sputnik suspension); and (b) platform-centered self-/co-regulation emphasizing soft law, voluntarism, and minimal intervention, now partly formalized under the DSA’s co-regulatory framework. - The Digital Services Act introduces mandatory transparency, risk assessment (including systemic risks linked to disinformation), and potential sanctions, but operational action remains co-regulatory via Codes of Practice rather than fully prescriptive hard law. - COVID-19 amplified disinformation circulation and policy salience: IFCN identified 21,018 misleading COVID-19-related items globally between January and October 2022; WHO termed it an ‘infodemic’. - Russia’s information operations escalated with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The EU counted over 1,200 separate Russian disinformation cases in 2022; research documents at least 2,500 pieces across seven languages and 300+ platforms during 2014–2020. - EU security-oriented instruments expanded (EEAS East StratCom, Rapid Alert System, EUvsDisinfo; sanctions against Kremlin-linked media), signaling a geopolitical turn and exceptional framing linking propaganda to public order and security. - Soft-law and collaborative measures also expanded (fact-checking alliances, media literacy, EDMO network), but these have medium/long-term horizons and face challenges like confirmation bias and limited impact on platform incentives. - The coexistence of hard security discourse and soft, voluntary platform governance creates internal contradictions and policy dissonance, potentially undermining coherence and effectiveness until more aligned frameworks emerge.

The findings address the research question by demonstrating that EU counter-disinformation policy has evolved through the convergence of crisis-driven problem streams (COVID-19, Russian aggression) and policy tools from distinct institutional logics. The geopolitical/securitization logic empowers security actors and exceptional measures against state-linked information warfare. The regulatory logic frames disinformation as a market/public sphere dysfunction addressed through co-/self-regulation, transparency, demonetization, media literacy, and fact-checking. Their simultaneous application yields tensions: state-linked foreign propaganda is treated as a security threat, while platform-driven amplification is governed via soft instruments, risking fragmented responses and uneven effectiveness. This duality affects democratic public spheres (risk of overreach vs. under-regulation), narrows space for pluralism-focused communities, and shapes EU identity-building around shared external threats. The DSA begins to bridge the gap by imposing obligations on Very Large Online Platforms, yet it preserves co-regulation, leaving core contradictions unresolved. Coordinated, coherent alignment between security measures and platform governance is crucial to avoid undermining media freedom while ensuring resilience against manipulation.

Disinformation has risen sharply on the EU agenda since 2018, accelerated by the 2019 EP elections, COVID-19, and Russia’s war against Ukraine. EU action has combined soft-law, collaborative and literacy/fact-checking initiatives with a geopolitical turn that securitizes disinformation and justifies exceptional measures against hostile state-linked outlets. The central contribution is identifying the coexistence and competition of two logics—securitization (hard power/exceptionality) and self-/co-regulation (soft law/minimal intervention)—which generate internal contradictions. The DSA introduces mandatory transparency, risk assessment, and sanctions, but retains a co-regulatory approach for operational responses. Resolving the dissonance between these logics will be decisive for the future effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of EU policies against disinformation.

The study is theoretical and conceptual rather than empirical, relying on critical analysis of EU documents. Its evidence base is limited to EU policy texts and initiatives primarily from 2018 to 2022, which may constrain generalizability and omit subsequent developments.