The epistemic foundations of injustice: lessons from the Young Marx

The article begins by establishing the centrality of freedom in modern practical philosophy, tracing its evolution from Hobbes, Locke, and Kant to Hegel's more nuanced understanding of freedom as intertwined with social reality. Hegel's concept of freedom requires social recognition and mutual dependence, a concept Marx builds upon. Marx, influenced by Rousseau, recognized the hidden dictatorship of society and the apparent freedom of choice that masks our dependence on social approval. Rousseau's "Social Contract" is highlighted for its exploration of strategies to repair damaged social bonds and promote a common good, transcending instrumental relationships. Hegel's concept of *Entzweiung* (rift) and alienation is discussed; the alienated subject is unable to recognize themselves in the products of their actions, highlighting the bidirectional movement required for overcoming alienation – allowing oneself to be constituted while simultaneously recognizing one's constitutive activity towards the world. The article posits that the young Marx's categories can illuminate current forms of epistemic injustice, showcasing the transformative role of the excluded in shaping new social realities. The introduction outlines the structure of the paper, detailing the exploration of alienation, the proletariat, a contemporary example, and the concept of epistemic injustice.

The paper draws extensively from the works of early Marx, including *On the Jewish Question*, *The German Ideology*, and *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. It also engages with Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and Rousseau's *Second Discourse* and *The Social Contract*. Contemporary scholarship on epistemic injustice, particularly the work of Miranda Fricker, is integrated into the analysis. The literature review implicitly connects these classical and contemporary perspectives, showing how Marx's insights resonate with and enrich modern understandings of social injustice and the role of knowledge in perpetuating it. Hegel's concept of the rabble (*Pöbel*) and its relation to Marx's concept of the proletariat are central to the discussion, providing a historical and philosophical framework for understanding social exclusion.

The methodology is primarily conceptual and analytical. The author employs a close reading of key texts by Marx, Hegel, and Rousseau to develop an understanding of alienation, freedom, and social justice. The analysis is then extended to contemporary discussions of epistemic injustice, specifically Fricker's work. The approach is comparative, drawing parallels and contrasts between the classical philosophical concepts and contemporary sociological frameworks. The author uses a contemporary example of a mining conflict to illustrate the application of Marxian and epistemic injustice theories, demonstrating their practical relevance in understanding social issues. The methodology is interpretive and theoretically driven, focusing on the conceptual connections between different bodies of work rather than empirical research.

The paper's key findings center on the interconnectedness of Marx's early work and contemporary epistemic injustice theory. Marx's concept of alienation, particularly its fourfold manifestation (regarding the product, the self, one's generic being, and others), serves as a framework for understanding the experience of those who are epistemically marginalized. The analysis of the proletariat distinguishes between "liberal" emancipation (focused on existing rights) and "human" emancipation (transforming social structures). The contemporary example of a mining conflict highlights how existing institutions fail to address the situated knowledge and experiences of marginalized communities, demonstrating the need for a more transformative understanding of justice. The concept of epistemic injustice, with its testimonial and hermeneutical dimensions, is shown to be congruent with Marx's critique of ideology and alienation. The paper argues that the excluded have a constitutive role in creating new social realities and that their demands, while seemingly particular, possess a universal character capable of revealing and correcting broader social injustices. The author demonstrates how a Marxist framework complements and extends epistemic injustice theory by emphasizing the importance of understanding the social and historical contexts shaping knowledge and power dynamics. The critical function of the proletariat and the need for knowledge production to overcome epistemic injustice are highlighted as pivotal in achieving emancipation.

The discussion section synthesizes the paper's findings, emphasizing the synergistic relationship between Marx's theory and the concept of epistemic injustice. The author demonstrates how the seemingly disparate concepts illuminate each other, offering a more comprehensive understanding of social justice. The article highlights the limitations of applying pre-existing social categories and norms to understand the experiences of those who are marginalized. It emphasizes the need for social transformation to address the structural causes of epistemic injustice and proposes the involvement of those affected in the creation of new categories and social realities. The discussion emphasizes the importance of recognising the transformative and constitutive function of the excluded in challenging existing power structures and promoting social change. The author argues that this approach enhances both Marxian and epistemic injustice frameworks, enriching our understanding of how power operates through the production and control of knowledge.

The paper concludes by summarizing its central argument: the powerful synergy between early Marxian concepts and contemporary epistemic injustice theory. Marx's ideas on alienation, ideology, and the proletariat offer valuable insights into the experience of epistemic injustice and the need for transformative social change. The study emphasizes the active role of the marginalized in challenging existing power dynamics and creating new realities. Future research could explore the practical implications of this integrated framework for addressing various forms of social injustice, further bridging the gap between classical social theory and contemporary epistemological discussions.

The paper's focus on the early Marxian writings limits the scope of the analysis. While the contemporary examples are insightful, a more extensive empirical study could further strengthen the arguments presented. The focus on conceptual analysis might be seen as a limitation by those seeking more empirical evidence. The reliance on a select number of philosophers might neglect alternative perspectives. The paper's reliance on specific historical cases limits the generalizability to diverse social contexts.