The development of children's autonomy and reasonable paternalistic intervention

Educational involution is very serious in China. This has led to a boom in the market for education and training institutions and a heavier burden on parents. In response to this phenomenon, the Ministry of Education issued a ‘double reduction’ policy in 2021, but parents are more anxious. The phenomenon of indoctrination and suppression of children is still common in traditional exam-oriented education, which makes students lose the opportunity to think rationally and critically, and seriously inhibits the development of children’s autonomy, and also causes children to have many psychological problems.

Whether children have the ability to be autonomous is related to the acquisition of children’s moral status and children’s rights, as well as how we treat children in education. Some scholars (for example, Rutherford, 2009; Ruyter and Schinkel, 2013; Hannan et al. (2019)) have discussed the current status and scope of children’s autonomy and how to enhance children’s autonomy from the perspective of psychology, sociology or law. However, few scholars in philosophy have explored the issue of children’s autonomy. This paper first puts forward a concept of autonomy that is suitable for children and analyzes the conditions required for autonomy, so as to demonstrate that children, even very young children, have autonomy according to these conditions from a philosophical point of view. The argument for children’s autonomy helps educators and practitioners to reconsider the place and role of children in education and society.

Children’s autonomous development is often subject to paternalistic intervention. Regarding paternalistic intervention for children, many scholars (for example, Giesinger, 2019a, 2019b; Bagattini, 2016; Mullin, 2014; Carey, 2017; Godwin, 2020; Drerup, 2017) have discussed it. The focus of debate mainly focuses on whether paternalistic intervention for children is reasonable or whether there are moral issues. However, few scholars have explored the impact of paternalistic intervention on children’s autonomy and the relationship between the two. Defending the compatibility of paternalistic intervention and children’s autonomy is the innovation and difficulty of this article. There is a conflict between paternalism and autonomy of children in education. The defense of compatibility between paternalism and children’s autonomy can guide us to correctly handle the relationship between authority and children’s autonomy in education, and better develop children’s autonomy. This article defends the compatibility of children’s autonomy and paternalism from the perspectives of children’s choice, respect for autonomy, and future-oriented education.

Since children’s autonomy is compatible with paternalism, what kind of paternalism can promote the development of children’s autonomy? How can we implement paternalism and develop children’s autonomy? Finally, this paper expounds the premise, principles and methods of reasonable paternalism through the main viewpoints of moral equality, child-centered, and child-participation.

The paper engages with a broad interdisciplinary literature. It notes that much prior work on children’s autonomy has come from psychology, sociology, and law (e.g., Rutherford 2009; Ruyter and Schinkel 2013; Hannan et al. 2019), with fewer philosophical treatments. Classical and contemporary philosophers often deny or limit children’s autonomy (Rawls 1971; Mill 2006; Dearden et al. 1976; Ross 2009), while Kantian notions of rationality and moral judgment are used to argue that rational capacity underlies autonomy and applies to children. Empirical and developmental findings support early moral judgment and reasoning in children (Damon 1990; Gasser and Keller 2009; Helwig et al. 2001; Gopnik 2009; Hardman 1973; Stipek et al. 1992). On paternalism, the paper adopts a broad, morally neutral definition (Gert and Culver 1976) and discusses concerns about paternalistic constraints on choice and respect (Vandeveer 1986; Kleinig 1983; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Educational theory highlights tensions between authority and autonomy (Dewey 1959; Gutmann 1999; Levinson 2002; Kühler and Jelinek 2013). The article also engages with work on future-oriented paternalism (Schleiermacher 2002; Bagattini 2016) and moral status and equality (Dwyer 2011; Wiesemann 2016), as well as interactive or participatory paternalism in education (Giesinger 2019a, 2019b). Jaworska’s account of minimal autonomy informs claims about very young children’s autonomy. The child participation literature (UNCRC 1989, 2009; Rajani 1999; Wall 2019; Abebe 2019; Biswas 2021; Chambers 1997) underpins the proposed method for realizing reasonable paternalism.

This is a philosophical and normative analysis. The author clarifies and tailors a concept of autonomy suitable for children, identifying core conditions (rational cognition and willpower) and drawing on philosophical accounts (Kant, Frankfurt) and developmental evidence to argue that children, including very young children, possess autonomy to varying degrees (including minimal autonomy per Jaworska). The paper then develops argumentative analyses to defend the compatibility of paternalistic intervention with children’s autonomy across three dimensions: children’s choices, respect for autonomy, and future-oriented education. Finally, it proposes a normative framework for “reasonable paternalism,” specifying its moral premise (moral equality), guiding principles (child-centeredness, obtaining consent where possible, recognizing adult limitations), and a practical mode of realization (children’s participation). No empirical data are collected or analyzed.

• Children possess autonomy to a meaningful degree, grounded in their capacities for rational judgment and willpower; very young children can exhibit minimal autonomy through caring attitudes that guide action.
• Paternalistic intervention can be compatible with, and sometimes supportive of, children’s autonomy. Intervening in irrational or harmful choices need not undermine autonomy; more choice is not inherently better for children; and individuals may judge their interests well but be poor implementers, justifying supportive adult guidance.
• Respect for children’s autonomy is not necessarily violated by paternalism: children’s values are inevitably shaped in families and schools; interventions often occur before stable values are formed; interactive, participatory forms of paternalism can respect children; aligning children’s actions with their second-order desires can support autonomy and self-esteem.
• Future-oriented educational paternalism is defensible when it balances present and future interests, promotes the development of rational choice and critical thinking, and avoids sacrificing significant present interests for speculative future gains. The critique based on non-identity is rejected.
• Reasonable paternalism requires the moral equality of children and adults, must be child-centered, seek children’s consent wherever feasible (except in cases of significant benefit or life-threatening risk), and be guided by adult self-reflection about their own limitations and avoidance of pseudo-paternalism (self-interested interventions).
• Children’s participation is the principal means to realize reasonable paternalism and further develop autonomy; children are competent social agents who can share in decision-making, contribute to knowledge and education, and gain self-esteem and social identity through participation.

The paper addresses the core tension between children’s autonomy and adult authority by arguing that autonomy in children is real yet developmental, and that carefully structured paternalism can nurture rather than suppress it. By analyzing choice, respect, and future-oriented aims, the author shows that paternalistic constraints can scaffold children’s rational agency, focus their attention on valuable pursuits, and protect self-esteem, provided interventions are dialogical and participatory. The proposed framework centers moral equality to counteract moral adultism and reframes authority as child-centered guidance aimed at cultivating autonomous persons. In educational and familial contexts, this yields practical guidance: limit and structure choices to reduce cognitive overload, intervene against clearly irrational or harmful actions, balance present and future interests, seek children’s informed assent, and recognize adult fallibility. Implementing children’s participation—through shared decision-making in family, school, and research—both respects children’s status and functions as the mechanism by which reasonable paternalism supports the development of autonomy.

The article concludes that children are autonomous persons and that, despite an apparent conflict, their autonomy is compatible with paternalistic intervention when such intervention is reasonable. More choice is not always better; interventions targeting irrational choices can support autonomy; adults inevitably influence children’s values but should avoid indoctrination and provide reasons; and paternalism must balance present and future interests. Reasonable paternalism is grounded in moral equality, follows child-centered principles, seeks children’s consent where possible, and acknowledges adult limitations. It should be realized through children’s participation, recognizing children as active social agents who can contribute to education, family, and society. The author notes that specific age-differentiated implementations of paternalistic interventions and concrete modes of participation are beyond the scope of this paper and warrant future study.

The paper is a philosophical analysis without empirical data. It does not detail how paternalistic interventions should be tailored to children of different ages or specify concrete mechanisms for children’s participation, noting these issues are beyond its scope and should be addressed in future research.