The complexity of pluralistic ignorance in Republican climate change policy support in the United States

Recent surveys indicate broad American—and notable Republican—support for climate mitigation policies such as power plant emissions restrictions and tax incentives for carbon capture. Yet Americans, particularly Republicans, substantially underestimate actual levels of support, a population-level misperception known as pluralistic ignorance. Such misperceptions can suppress expression and action due to fear of isolation when one believes one’s views are an outlier. The media and interpersonal information environment, especially right-leaning outlets and party messaging, may overrepresent opposition to climate policies, contributing to these misperceptions. Correcting perceived opinion climates alone often fails to spur expression or action, suggesting additional mechanisms—such as anticipated social conflict within the Republican in‑group—may deter speaking out. The authors hypothesize that underestimation of in‑group support may be concentrated among Republicans who oppose climate policies (a numerical minority), while Republican supporters may already recognize majority support but still self-censor due to an information environment dominated by minority opposition. The study investigates whether highlighting consensus encourages action among supporters and how perceived information environments shape anticipated social conflict and willingness to speak out.

Design and sample: An online survey was conducted with a nationally representative sample of registered Republican voters in the United States, recruited by YouGov. Data collection occurred December 7–14, 2022. From 1026 respondents, YouGov matched down to N=1000 (margin of error ±3.7%). Demographics: Mage=53.5 (SD=17), 52.1% female; 87% White, 1.3% Black, 7.1% Hispanic/Latino. The sampling frame was based on the 2020 CCES and matched on gender, age, race, and education; post-stratification weights were applied. The study received exempt IRB status (Ohio State University). Procedure and measures: After screening for age and Republican affiliation and obtaining consent, participants reported support for five climate mitigation policies—carbon taxation, tougher restrictions on power plants, more solar farms, more wind turbine farms, and tax credits for carbon capture—on a 6-point scale (1=strongly support to 6=strongly opposed). For descriptive support rates, each item was dichotomized (Support: strongly/ support/somewhat support vs Oppose: somewhat/oppose/strongly oppose). For modeling, the five items were averaged into a continuous climate policy support scale (M=3.57, SD=1.34, Cronbach’s α=0.89). Public opinion estimates: Participants estimated the percent of Republican voters who support each of the five policies. Estimates were examined overall and by respondents’ own support vs opposition. For moderated mediation, perceived Republican public opinion was the average of the five estimates (M=46.78, SD=24.93, α=0.92). Perceived information environment: Respondents rated whether information encountered across sources (social media, TV/news, friends/family/colleagues, etc.) suggested Republicans support or oppose each policy (1=strongly support to 6=strongly oppose); items averaged (M=3.57, SD=1.16, α=0.89). Willingness to speak out: Two items assessed willingness to speak to other Republicans about renewable energy and climate policies (1=very willing to 6=very unwilling); items averaged (M=2.25, SD=1.13, r=0.87, p<0.001). Higher scores indicate greater unwillingness to speak out. Past information sharing: Four items measured frequency of sharing views face-to-face and on social media (1=Almost always to 5=Never); averaged (M=3.3, SD=1.15, α=0.87). Lower values indicate more frequent sharing. Anticipated social conflict: Six items adapted from Matthes’ conflict avoidance scale assessed whether speaking out would elicit social conflict (1=strongly agree to 6=strongly disagree); averaged (M=4.79, SD=1.11, α=0.97). Lower scores indicate greater anticipated conflict. Analytic approach: Descriptive comparisons contrasted actual Republican support proportions with respondents’ estimates, overall and by respondents’ own support vs opposition. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression examined associations between climate policy support and past information sharing (SPSS v27). A moderated mediation analysis using PROCESS Macro v3.5 (conditional process analysis; Table 2) tested whether perceived information environment influences willingness to speak out indirectly via anticipated social conflict, conditional on level of climate policy support. Bootstrapping with 5000 samples produced percentile bootstrap confidence intervals.

- Republican support levels: In a representative sample of Republican voters (N=1000), support for four of five climate mitigation policies exceeded 50% (including tax credits for carbon capture, tougher power plant CO2 restrictions, more solar farms, and more wind turbine farms). - Pluralistic ignorance overall: Respondents significantly underestimated Republican support for all but one policy (Fig. 1), though underestimation magnitudes were smaller than in prior work assessing the general public. - Asymmetry by own stance: Underestimation was mainly among respondents personally opposed to a policy. Supporters’ estimates were at or slightly above actual support. This pattern indicates that minority view holders (opponents) exhibit a false consensus effect—believing other Republicans share their opposition (Fig. 2). - Minority overrepresentation in information environments: OLS regression showed a significant negative association between policy support and past information sharing (b=-0.15, p<0.001), indicating that opposition was associated with greater sharing presence in face-to-face and social media contexts (Table 1). Additional covariate effects included age (b=0.006, p<0.01) and gender (female b=-0.22, p<0.01). Model fit: R2=0.04; F(4,995)=11.37, p<0.001. - Moderated mediation via anticipated social conflict: The interaction between perceived information environment and climate policy support predicting anticipated social conflict was significant (b=0.11, p<0.001; Table 2). Among Republican supporters (16th percentile of support scale), perceiving the environment as more opposed was associated with greater anticipated conflict (simple slope b=-0.17, p=0.002). Among Republican opponents (84th percentile), perceiving the environment as more opposed was associated with less anticipated conflict (b=0.17, p=0.004). Anticipated social conflict negatively predicted willingness to speak out (b=-0.11, p<0.001), where higher values on the willingness scale indicate greater unwillingness. - Indirect effects conditioned by support: Index of moderated mediation = -0.012, 95% CI [-0.024, -0.004]. For supporters (16th percentile), the indirect effect of perceived environment on willingness to speak out via anticipated conflict was significant (b=0.02, 95% CI [0.001, 0.05]), consistent with reduced willingness to speak out in minority‑dominated environments. For opponents (84th percentile), the indirect effect was significant and negative (b=-0.02, 95% CI [-0.05, -0.004]), indicating greater willingness to speak out when the perceived environment is opposed to mitigation.

Findings reveal that pluralistic ignorance within the Republican in‑group is concentrated among those who oppose climate mitigation policies, who exhibit a false consensus bias, while supporters estimate in‑group opinion relatively accurately. Consequently, interventions that merely correct perceived opinion climates may not increase expression or action among Republican supporters. Instead, a minority-dominated, oppositional information environment appears to increase anticipated social conflict for supporters and decrease it for opponents, thereby suppressing supporters’ willingness to speak out and encouraging opponents to do so. Addressing this asymmetry may require strategies that bolster supporters’ resilience to hostile opinion climates (e.g., self-affirmation interventions) and value-congruent messaging to engage opponents without triggering reactance or motivated reasoning.

The study clarifies that misperceptions of Republican opinion on climate policies vary by individuals’ own stance: pluralistic ignorance is largely confined to Republican opponents, while supporters tend to recognize majority support. However, an information environment dominated by minority opposition can still suppress supporters’ public expression by elevating anticipated social conflict, limiting the efficacy of consensus-focused interventions. Future work should test interventions that enhance supporters’ resilience to hostile opinion environments (e.g., self-affirmation) and develop value-aligned messaging to reduce false consensus and improve openness to climate policy among opponents. Researchers should assess misperceptions separately for supporters and opponents when designing mobilization strategies to avoid limited or counterproductive effects.