Scientific Value Relativism

The paper introduces Arnold Brecht’s life and intellectual trajectory, highlighting his exile from Nazi Germany and his later contributions in the United States, especially his 1959 work Political Theory: the Foundation of Twentieth-Century Thought. Brecht treated politics as an eminently scientific discipline and addressed justice and values through scientific value relativism. He argued that justice is an empirical problem and that political analysis should apply scientific methods while recognizing that science can establish universality but not absolute value. The introduction frames the research aim: to examine Brecht’s account of a factual, intersubjectively transmissible link between “is” and “ought,” and to explore whether universal elements of justice rooted in human feeling can be identified and used to mitigate relativist defeatism in political and legal theory.

The paper surveys twentieth-century debates on relativism in legal and political philosophy. It traces the is–ought separation to Hume and Kant, transmitted via Windelband and Rickert, and reinforced by positivists like Kelsen and Weber, with significant influence from H. L. A. Hart. It contrasts these with non-positivist and natural-law–related revivals over the last 70 years (e.g., Fuller, Dworkin, Alexy, MacIntyre, Finnis, as noted), seeking meeting points between morality and law. It references discussions on civil disobedience and shifts after WWII that began bridging the is–ought divide. Additional authors cited include Pound on the need for a workable measure of values; Ogien on the fact–value dichotomy; Tammelo (Tammels) on logic of is and ought; and Werthlermer on comparative meanings of justice across times and cultures. This literature sets the context for Brecht’s attempt to ground universal elements of justice that are empirically or intersubjectively accessible.

This is a conceptual-analytical study of Brecht’s scientific value relativism. The approach: (1) Clarify meanings of value interpretations and (2) analyze their implications—two methods Brecht holds are available to scientific inquiry into values. The paper examines the alleged logical separation of “is” and “ought” and argues for a factual, inductively supported linkage accessible to intersubjective validation. It employs two analytical vantage points: proof from “without” (demonstrating impossibility or impracticability of proposed political arrangements) and proof from “within” (identifying universal, necessary elements of human feeling and thought that condemn or approve actions). It uses illustrative examples (e.g., the impossibility of ensuring a dictator will always use power well; the unfairness of punishing when compliance is impossible) to show how impossibility and universality function as criteria. It then reconstructs Brecht’s five universal postulates of justice—beginning with the primacy of truth—derived through inductive observation of widespread human reactions and conceptual analysis of consistency within accepted value systems.

• There exists a factual (not purely logical) link between “is” and “ought” that can be observed across cases and supported inductively; this undermines a strict, practically decisive separation between facts and values.
• Intersubjectively transmissible proof can be pursued: from “without,” by demonstrating the impossibility or impracticability of achieving stated political ends with proposed means; and from “within,” by appealing to necessary, near-universal elements of human feeling (e.g., the felt unfairness of knowingly false accusations or punishing the innocent).
• Brecht identifies universal postulates present in any idea of justice:
  1. Truth: Justice requires agreement with truth (objectively) and with what is believed true (subjectively). This postulate anchors and constrains value interpretations through factual scrutiny and rational reflection.
  2. Generality of the applied value system: It is unjust to apply different value systems arbitrarily to similar cases.
  3. Equal treatment of equals: What is equal according to the accepted system of values must be treated equally.
  4. Freedom not to be restricted beyond the system’s requirements: Restrictions must not exceed what the accepted value system justifies.
  5. Impossibility principle: It is unjust to punish or demand compliance when compliance is objectively impossible.
• These postulates provide intersubjectively testable criteria that can correct false factual assumptions, expose weak reasoning, reassess risks and sacrifices, and evaluate consequences of value commitments.
• The universal demand for truth in justice has profound implications for political judgment, where falsehoods frequently mask partisan interests; insisting on truth reshapes ethical and legal evaluations on contemporary issues (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, divorce policy, adoption).

By foregrounding intersubjectively accessible elements—especially the postulate of truth and criteria like generality, equality of treatment, proportional restriction of freedom, and impossibility—the paper shows how scientific inquiry can constrain and guide value judgments without claiming access to absolute metaphysical truths. This directly addresses the research problem of whether and how “ought” can be informed by “is”: factual realities (what humans necessarily feel and what is practically possible or impossible) bridge the divide and enable scientific analysis of justice claims. The significance is twofold: it counters relativist defeatism by offering shared standards for critique and improvement of political-legal decisions, and it provides a framework for evaluating contested policies by clarifying meanings, examining consequences, and testing factual assumptions. This contributes to a workable, cross-perspective measure of values, fostering more objective public reasoning about justice while acknowledging fallibility and pluralism.

The paper concurs with Brecht that, through five universal postulates anchored in truth, we can articulate a minimal, yet substantive, definition of justice amid divergent value systems. Scientific value relativism, properly understood, accepts that absolute truth is beyond full reach but maintains that universal, objective elements can be identified and used to approach it. Science should distinguish what is truly variable from what remains constant in justice, a vital task for politics given its aim to do justice. While Brecht rejects a timeless natural law, his concern that relativism has swung too far invites renewed attention to foundational values. Public moral engagement, though unlikely to yield unanimity, is a promising basis for a just society; knowledge should be held fallibly, open to future refutation. This framework supports reconstructing moral discourse in contemporary societies by marrying rigorous analysis to intersubjective standards.

The study is theoretical and conceptual rather than empirical; it does not provide quantitative tests or datasets. It focuses on reconstructing Brecht’s arguments and illustrative examples rather than exhaustively resolving the is–ought problem or surveying all non-positivist contributions (which the author notes are beyond the paper’s scope). The enumeration of universal postulates is presented at a general level, with their precise operationalization and empirical boundaries left for further research.