Scientific Value Relativism

Arnold Brecht (1884-1977), a German political scientist who fled Nazi Germany in 1933, made significant contributions to political theory in the United States. His work, particularly *Political Theory: The Foundation of Twentieth-Century Thought*, grappled with the issue of justice and values from the perspective of scientific value relativism. Brecht argued that the study of politics is a scientific discipline. He maintained that while the practice of politics is inherently subjective, its study can and should utilize the scientific method. He acknowledged the existence of non-scientific political theories but believed that science could analyze and establish the universality of certain values, even if it couldn't determine their absolute worth. This paper focuses on Brecht's arguments against the strict separation of 'is' and 'ought' in value judgments and the possibility of demonstrating universally held values through scientific research. His work remains highly relevant in contemporary political discourse which continues to search for objective criteria in decisions with moral implications.

The paper reviews the historical context of scientific relativism in legal philosophy and political science, tracing the influence of thinkers like David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Hans Kelsen, Max Weber, and H.L.A. Hart. It highlights the common relativist argument that no logical conclusion about “ought” can be derived from statements about “is.” However, the paper also discusses the counterarguments made by natural law theorists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, who attempted to bridge the gap between “is” and “ought” by establishing a link between human nature and moral obligations. The work of various philosophers attempting to identify invariable elements in human thought and feeling regarding justice is also examined, including the criteria proposed by Brecht himself for discovering such elements.

The paper employs a primarily analytical methodology, examining and evaluating the arguments of Arnold Brecht and his contemporaries concerning scientific value relativism. It scrutinizes Brecht's counterarguments to the strict “is-ought” dichotomy, focusing on two key objections: Firstly, that nature itself imposes external limits on achievable objectives and appropriate means; and secondly, that inherently human feelings and thoughts contain deeply rooted elements of “ought.” The paper analyzes Brecht’s concept of “intersubjectively transmissible proof” which emphasizes the importance of verifiable evidence and shared experience in establishing the universality of values. The methodology relies heavily on textual analysis of Brecht's writings and relevant philosophical literature. The analysis further explores the concept of intersubjectively transmissible proof by examining two approaches to evaluating political proposals: “from without” (evaluating practicality and feasibility) and “from within” (examining ethical considerations rooted in universal human feelings). The paper investigates Brecht's five postulates of justice: the need for truth, the generality of applied values, equal treatment of equals, the unrestricted nature of freedom, and limitations imposed by the nature of things. It also explores different levels of justice (traditional and transtraditional) and their relative and absolute components.

The paper highlights Brecht's central argument that while ultimate values might not be scientifically provable in an absolute sense, the universality of certain elements within value systems can be scientifically demonstrated through intersubjective evidence. Brecht proposes two methods for evaluating values: clarifying the meaning of interpretations and analyzing their implications. The paper argues that these methods, combined with an examination of universally held feelings, contribute substantially to establishing demonstrable elements of value. The analysis of Brecht’s work reveals five empirically verifiable postulates of justice which are held to be invariable across different value systems: (1) the necessity of truth, (2) the generality of the system of values, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) the unrestricted nature of freedom, and (5) the limits imposed by the very nature of things. The paper stresses that a focus on truth is central, impacting both factual aspects of a case and the consequences of actions. This emphasis on truth directly challenges the foundations of relativism because it allows for the verification and correction of interpretations based on flawed assumptions or reasoning. It demonstrates that even in the face of different systems of values and subjective ideas of justice, certain universal elements remain, significantly reducing the scope of relativistic claims. Furthermore, Brecht's argument suggests that scientific inquiry can play a role in determining the justice or injustice of ethically challenging decisions in contemporary society, specifically citing examples like abortion, euthanasia, and issues surrounding family law.

The paper’s findings support Brecht’s contention that scientific value relativism, while acknowledging the limitations of accessing absolute truth, can make substantial progress in identifying objective and universal elements within value systems. The identification of five universal postulates of justice – centered on the necessity of truth – provides a framework for analyzing and evaluating moral and political decisions. The demonstrated possibility of intersubjectively verifying the universality of certain values undermines the strict separation between “is” and “ought” at the heart of extreme relativism. The paper's analysis contributes to ongoing discussions on the nature of justice and the role of science in addressing complex moral and political questions. By showing the possibility of identifying universal elements within ethical and political discourse, the paper provides a nuanced perspective that avoids both relativistic defeatism and claims of absolute certainty. The discussion connects Brecht’s work to contemporary political philosophy, suggesting that a focus on identifying shared values and evaluating their implications is crucial for fostering just societies.

This paper concludes that Brecht's scientific value relativism offers a valuable framework for navigating complex ethical and political dilemmas. By highlighting the potential for demonstrating universal elements within value systems through empirical evidence and shared human experience, Brecht’s work provides a pathway toward greater objectivity and consensus in moral and political judgment. Future research could further explore the practical application of Brecht’s five postulates of justice in specific contexts and delve deeper into the interplay between subjective interpretations and objective truth in value judgments. Additionally, examining the implications of Brecht’s work for contemporary political and legal theory could yield fruitful insights.

The paper's primary limitation is its reliance on textual analysis of existing scholarship and a lack of empirical research to support or expand on Brecht's claims. Future work could enhance the paper by integrating empirical data to examine the prevalence and universality of the five postulates of justice across different cultures and societies. Furthermore, the paper's focus on Brecht’s work might benefit from a broader comparative analysis of different approaches to bridging the is-ought gap in moral and political philosophy.