Populism and the quest for political power: the pitfalls to populist electoral success in Canada

The politically astounding electoral breakthrough by radical populist political parties in Europe and other parts of the world has reignited the debate on the polarizing propensity of populist political parties and political actors. Polarization is not a relic of extraterrestrial collision that can be dissected and analyzed independently from the growing social, economic, and cultural cleavages within liberal democratic societies. Cultural and socio-economic chasms do not automatically lead to political polarization. Socio-economic cleavages by themselves are empty slots and houses of cards. They only generate demands for radical populist parties and populist actors who in turn appeal to the people and embark on the electrifying political consciousness of those cleavages, hence intensifying political polarization which is perceived as a threat to liberal democratic societies. In this paper, it will be argued that despite the existence of political grievances and socio-economic disgruntlement in Canadian society, the absence of a historically ingrained sense of nationalism, the consolidation of multiculturalism, constraints on class politics, and the inefficacy of resorting to Anti-Americanism as a mobilizing tactic has precluded the electoral success of both the radical left and right-wing populist political forces. This paper is divided into four parts. Part one reflects on the debate on the concept of populism. Part two discusses the interplay of socio-economic conditions and populism. Part three deals with the historical evolution of populism in Canada. Part four discusses countervailing forces to the success of populism in Canada. Finally, in the conclusion the main themes and findings will be recapitulated.

The paper reviews extensive scholarship on defining and interpreting populism. It highlights the persistence of definitional contestation (e.g., Hofstadter; Gidron and Bonikowski) and endorses a minimal definition that combines Cas Mudde’s thin-centered ideology (dividing society into pure people vs corrupt elite with an appeal to the general will) and Kurt Wayland’s view of populism as a political strategy used by outsider leaders to mobilize disgruntled segments. It distinguishes between exclusionary right-wing populism (often fused with nativist nationalism) and inclusionary left-wing populism (class-oriented), referencing Mudde and Bugaric. The review connects populism to socio-economic contexts: early farmer-worker populisms during industrialization; postwar Keynesian prosperity and welfare expansion dampening populist appeal; the 1970s crisis and neoliberal restructuring; and the 2008 financial crisis reigniting insecurity, distrust, and polarization. Cross-national studies are cited linking economic shocks to rising anti-immigrant attitudes and populist support (e.g., Algan et al.; Kwak and Wallace). The demand-supply framework (Rodrik) is used to explain how grievances (demand) are channeled by party narratives (supply) into right- or left-oriented populism. The paper also surveys arguments about institutions: proportional representation may advantage fringe/populist parties, while first-past-the-post can constrain them nationally but not necessarily at subnational levels or where support is regionally concentrated. The interplay with nationalism is theorized, distinguishing ethnic vs civic national identity and noting that right-populism aligns more with ethnic conceptions; Canada’s weak/fractured nationalism and entrenched multiculturalism complicate populist mobilization.

- Populism’s appeal grows during socio-economic downturns and periods of insecurity; however, its ideological direction depends on political entrepreneurs and narratives that frame grievances around either class/economic issues (left) or nativist-nationalist identity (right). - In Canada, populism has deep historical roots (farmer-labour movements; Progressive Party; Social Credit; CCF) and resurged with the Reform Party (late 1980s–1990s), which achieved Official Opposition status (1997) and influenced national policy discourse toward austerity before merging into a more moderate Conservative Party seeking broader national support. - The People’s Party of Canada (PPC) embodies contemporary right-wing populism, advocating immigration restrictions, ending multiculturalism funding, and fiscal austerity. In 2021 it won 4.94% of the national vote but no seats; under proportional representation it is estimated this share could translate to roughly 16 seats. The PPC also capitalized on COVID-19-related grievances (e.g., anti-mandate sentiment) to increase its vote share from 1.6% (2019) to 4.94% (2021). - Survey evidence suggests about 34% of Canadians hold a populist outlook, concentrated among older, less-educated, working-class voters, especially in western regions, with sympathies leaning to conservative forces. - Despite pockets of demand, several Canadian-specific factors constrain national-level populist breakthroughs: (1) weak/fractured national identity and the absence of a strong ethnic nationalism limit right-populist mobilization around national threat; (2) entrenched multiculturalism and the centrality of ethnic/minority votes in major metropolitan areas reduce incentives for anti-immigration platforms and help sustain cross-party support for high immigration; (3) class politics is muted nationally due to brokerage politics, the imperative of national unity (especially amid Canada–Quebec tensions), and the Liberal Party’s co-optation of progressive policies; (4) anti-Americanism as a mobilizing tool has declined with continental economic integration, reduced US ownership of key sectors, Canada’s emergence as a net outward investor, and growing support for international trade. - Institutional features interact with these forces: while FPTP can disadvantage smaller parties nationally, it does not preclude regional populist success (e.g., Reform Party historically) or provincial-level victories; conversely, PR would likely increase representation for fringe/populist parties but would not overturn the cultural/attitudinal constraints identified. - Net effect: Canada’s unique configuration of identity, multicultural norms, party strategies, and economic-integration realities has thus far prevented both right- and left-populist movements from achieving sustained national power, even amid periods of rising discontent.

The study’s central question is why Canada, despite sharing many economic and social conditions associated with rising populism elsewhere, has not seen comparable national-level electoral success by populist parties. The findings show that economic grievances alone are insufficient; successful radical right populism typically requires a salient ethnic-national identity and perceived threats to it. Canada’s weak and fragmented nationalism, combined with a civic, rights-based national narrative and institutionalized multiculturalism, blunts the appeal of exclusionary identity politics at the national level. Simultaneously, brokerage politics and the long-standing priority of national unity mute class-based appeals that could empower left populism, especially as the Liberal Party has historically absorbed or implemented many progressive policies, narrowing the left’s differentiating space. Declining anti-Americanism removes a once-usable mobilizing frame for left-nationalist populists. Electoral institutions further shape outcomes: FPTP can penalize small national parties but allows regionally concentrated movements to thrive; nonetheless, the deeper cultural and attitudinal landscape limits translation of grievances into a coherent national populist project. Together, these dynamics explain why populism in Canada tends to surface in provincial or regional arenas or influence mainstream party positioning, rather than delivering national breakthroughs.

Populism generally gains traction in contexts of socio-economic distress and insecurity, channeling grievances toward anti-elite and, on the right, anti-immigrant narratives. Canada exhibits many antecedents of populist demand, and surveys indicate a sizable minority with populist attitudes. Yet national populist success has been constrained by a combination of weak/fragmented nationalism, the consolidation and broad public embrace of multiculturalism, the marginalization of class politics in national discourse via brokerage strategies and the imperative of national unity, and the erosion of anti-Americanism as a mobilizing tool following deeper continental economic integration. While populist parties can achieve regional or provincial successes and shape policy debates, reproducing the national-level breakthroughs seen in parts of Europe has proven difficult. Given demographic realities and the electoral importance of immigrant and minority communities in urban centers, parties seeking national power tend to avoid overtly divisive identity appeals and maintain support for immigration and multiculturalism. Absent a shift in these structural-cultural factors, Canadian populism is likely to remain episodic and regionally concentrated, influencing mainstream parties at the margins rather than capturing federal power.