Mobilization of science advice by the Canadian federal government to support the COVID-19 pandemic response

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has placed significant pressures on the science-policy interface due to its rapidly changing trajectory, considerable health, social, and economic impacts, and constantly evolving evidence base. The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a public health emergency of international concern on January 30, 2020 and a global pandemic on March 11, 2020. In Canada, the first case was confirmed on January 25, 2020. By December 2021, Canada had entered a fifth wave, with nearly 2 million cases and over 30,000 deaths. While Canada’s mortality rate has been lower than some comparable nations, the burden fell disproportionately on low income, racialized, migrant, and long-term care populations. Canada relied on a range of public health measures and began vaccination in December 2020, reaching by December 2021 about 83% of eligible individuals (aged ≥25 years) with at least one dose and 77% with at least two doses. Canada’s federal science advice landscape for public health emergencies has been shaped by the 2003 SARS and 2009 H1N1 outbreaks, which prompted creation of PHAC (2004), intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, and pandemic plans. Despite reforms, inquiries after H1N1 noted persistent challenges regarding expertise availability, surge capacity, and rapid evidence for decision-making. As a decentralized federation, Canada presents an informative case for mobilizing science advice: the federal government develops technical guidance while subnational governments implement measures. Research purpose: This case study identifies opportunities to strengthen federal science advice for public health emergencies in Canada by (i) describing the pre-COVID-19 federal science advice ecosystem (the “playbook”), and (ii) analyzing how it evolved and mobilized during the first two years of COVID-19.

Background literature referenced shows that Canada’s advisory system was reshaped by SARS (2003) and tested by H1N1 (2009), leading to the creation of PHAC, the CPHO role, the PHN and its Special Advisory Committee (SAC), and pandemic plans (Naylor 2003; PHAC 2011). Post-H1N1 assessments highlighted ongoing issues in expert availability, surge capacity, and rapid evidence generation. The Science Portfolio underwent reforms from the Office of the National Science Advisor (2003–2008), to STIC (ended 2018), to establishment of the Office of the Chief Science Advisor (OCSA) in 2018. Prior analyses noted fragmented horizontal coordination for science advice across federal departments and called for institutionalized mechanisms to strengthen governance of science advice, independence, and intergovernmental collaboration.

Jurisdictional descriptive case study of Canada’s federal science advice ecosystem. Data sources: publicly accessible primary Government of Canada documents (technical reports, guidance, policies) and secondary peer-reviewed literature up to December 2021. Search approach: iterative snowballing from SARS (2003) through December 2021. Validation: local public health experts consulted to verify completeness. Inclusion: advisory bodies were included if an advisory relationship with the federal government could be established; bodies involved in evidence generation, brokerage, communication, and decision-making were mapped. Synthesis: first, documented pre-COVID-19 ecosystem; second, examined mobilization and evolution during COVID-19; then interpreted findings against broader science advice literature. Conducted within the ESCAPE international case series.

- Pre-pandemic ecosystem: - Health Portfolio: PHAC (created 2004) led federal public health, with the Chief Public Health Officer (CPHO) as lead expert and communicator; National Microbiology Laboratory (NML); Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (CEPR) with Health Portfolio Operations Centre (HPOC); Centre for Immunization and Respiratory Infectious Diseases (CIRID); National Collaborating Centres (NCCs); National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI). - Pan-Canadian Public Health Network (PHN, est. 2005) as FPT mechanism; during emergencies, SAC is activated to advise FPT Deputy Ministers, with Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), Logistics Advisory Committee (LAC), and PHN Communication Group. - Science Portfolio: ISED leads; includes NRC, NSERC, SSHRC, Statistics Canada; Office of the Chief Science Advisor (OCSA, est. 2018) and Departmental Science Advisors (DSA) Network for cross-department coordination. - Federal emergency management: all-hazards framework under Public Safety; Health Portfolio is primary institution for public health emergencies; FPT Public Health Response Plan for Biological Events (2018) and Canadian Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (CPIP, 2018) outline governance and emphasize evidence-informed decision-making. - COVID-19 mobilization of pre-existing bodies (Jan 2020 onward): - HPOC and FPT plans triggered mid-January 2020; SAC on COVID-19 and Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health activated Jan 28, 2020. - NML led assay development, testing scale-up, CPHLN coordination, and VOC-related work; wastewater surveillance program established with Statistics Canada. - SAC issued 14+ public statements by Dec 2021, including endorsements of NACI vaccination guidance. - Cross-department collaborations: PHAC engaged the Impact and Innovation Unit for behavioral insights; wastewater surveillance supported targeted outbreak detection and VOC monitoring. - Interim FPT plan for ongoing COVID-19 management released Aug 2020 (revised Apr 2021), prioritizing modeling, social/behavioral sciences, serology, wastewater, and genomics. - New expert advisory groups (examples with activity/output): - PHAC External COVID-19 Modeling Expert Group (Feb 2020–): 33 external academics + 43 FPT members (as of Apr 2021); 22 monthly modeling updates by Dec 2021; first technical briefing Apr 2020. - Pan-Canadian Health Data Strategy Expert Advisory Group (Dec 2020–): 10 meetings through Dec 2021; 2 public reports (June, Nov 2021) with recommendations to modernize health data. - Ad-hoc COVID-19 Clinical Pharmacology Task Group (Jun 2020–Mar 2021): recommendations on remdesivir, hydroxychloroquine, dexamethasone, monoclonal antibodies (now not publicly accessible). - Health Canada COVID-19 Testing and Screening Expert Advisory Panel (Nov 2020–): 24 meetings (Nov 2020–Apr 2021); 5 reports covering optimization strategies, self-testing, long-term care, schools, and border testing. - Industry Advisory Roundtable on Testing, Screening, Tracing, Data (Oct 2020–): 4 reports on workplace testing and balancing border flows. - OCSA COVID-19 Expert Panel (Mar 2020–) and subgroups: produced reports on children, long-term care, ventilation/aerosols (Sept 2020), vaccine certificates (Mar 2021), vaccine-associated myocarditis/pericarditis (July 2021); Expert Groups on Health Systems and on Modeling Approaches convened. - NRC/ISED Task Forces: COVID-19 Therapeutics Task Force (Jul 2020–Feb 2021) and Vaccine Task Force (Aug 2020–), advising on procurement/manufacturing/prioritization; advice cited in Aug 2020 federal procurement announcements for Pfizer/Moderna and investment in trials; registries of interests published post public pressure. - COVID-19 Exposure Notification App Advisory Council (Aug 2020–): 15 meetings by May 26, 2021; interim report (Feb 2021) on determinants of app adoption/use. - New evidence-generation partnerships: - Federal VOC Strategy (Feb 2021): $53M investment for VOC surveillance/sequencing. - CanCOGeN (launched Apr 2020; funded via VOC Strategy): VirusSeq and HostSeq for coordinated viral/host genomics; building national data infrastructure. - CoVaRR-Net (Mar 2021): interdisciplinary network (with NML, CanCOGeN, PT labs) to rapidly study VOCs (biobank, wastewater, resource-sharing); long-term aim to become a Pandemic Preparedness Network. - COVID-19 Immunity Task Force (CITF, Apr 2020): coordinates seroprevalence, vaccine effectiveness/safety/immunogenicity; supported SeroTracker; Vaccine Surveillance Reference Group reports to PHAC President/NACI and is supported by CITF Secretariat. - Evidence synthesis capacity: NCCs and CCA leveraged; CanCOVID (OCSA/ISED, Apr 2020) created a platform for rapid reviews and researcher-decision-maker linkage; COVID-END (CIHR-funded, Apr 2020) coordinated 50+ synthesis groups producing rapid and living reviews. - Contextual statistics: By Dec 2021, Canada had nearly 2 million COVID-19 cases and over 30,000 deaths; vaccination coverage reached ~83% (≥1 dose) and 77% (≥2 doses) among eligible individuals (aged ≥25 years).

The study’s research aim—to describe and assess mobilization and evolution of Canada’s federal science advice ecosystem during COVID-19—is addressed by documenting the activation of pre-existing mechanisms (PHN/SAC, HPOC, NML/NACI) and the rapid proliferation of time-limited advisory groups across Health and Science Portfolios. Findings indicate an ad hoc and complex advisory landscape with unclear horizontal coordination across federal departments, raising risks of duplication (e.g., parallel modeling groups) and gaps in logistics-oriented advice that prompted new structures (e.g., Vaccine Task Force). The pandemic, a complex intergovernmental problem, highlighted strengths in vertical FPT coordination via PHN/SAC but exposed limited formal horizontal mechanisms. The DSA Network offers a potential cross-departmental channel, but institutionalization is needed to routinize engagement between Health and Science Portfolios. Comparative insights suggest that countries often created inter-ministerial bodies but struggled with coordination; standing, independent authorities for health security advice appear beneficial. The discussion emphasizes the importance of governance of science advice (structures spanning science-policy boundaries), independence and transparency (including COI management), and recognition of subnational advisory roles and “shadow” advisory bodies. Strengthening institutionalization would enhance preparedness, ensure rapid, well-coordinated, independent advice, and improve the actionability of evidence during emergencies.

Canada largely followed its post-SARS/H1N1 “playbook” for COVID-19, activating PHN/SAC and Health Portfolio structures, while rapidly creating numerous time-limited advisory bodies across Health and Science Portfolios to meet emerging needs (modeling, testing/screening, vaccines/therapeutics, data, behavioral insights, genomics). However, horizontal coordination remained limited and mechanisms for collaboration were often unclear. The experience underscores the need to institutionalize science advice for public health—clarifying roles between Health and Science Portfolios, strengthening governance structures, ensuring independence and transparency (including COI policies), and integrating subnational advisory inputs—to improve preparedness and responsiveness in future emergencies. Future research should evaluate independence of advisory actors, effectiveness of COI mitigation strategies, and the interactions between federal and subnational science advisory bodies, including the role and impact of “shadow” groups.

- Reliance on publicly available documents may miss informal or short-lived advisory pathways and international exchanges, introducing possible “false saturation” or survivorship bias. - Focus limited to federal-level science advice; does not evaluate mobilization within subnational structures. - The pandemic was ongoing during the study period; analysis is descriptive rather than evaluative (e.g., cannot assess translation of advice into policy or adherence to the precautionary principle). - Difficulty inferring evidence use in federal policies from public information suggests need for primary qualitative research. - Did not provide in-depth assessment of content of advice for disproportionately affected populations (elderly, low-income, racialized, migrant groups).