India's Afghanistan policy: a quest for strategic space post the US withdrawal

The study investigates how India’s Afghanistan policy evolved in the post-9/11 era, asking whether New Delhi’s assistance-driven, soft-power approach enabled it to secure durable strategic space, and to what extent the 2021 Taliban takeover exposed shortcomings in that strategy. It situates the inquiry within Afghanistan’s protracted conflict, the regional role of Pakistan, and the transformation of Afghanistan into a central theatre of the US-led Global War on Terror. The purpose is to assess the rationale, trajectory, and outcomes of India’s choices—eschewing military involvement while investing heavily in development—and to consider their implications for India’s interests and regional stability.

The paper embeds its analysis within historical and scholarly accounts of Afghanistan’s conflict and India’s policy responses. It reviews Afghanistan’s external entanglements and regional rivalries, including Pakistan’s selective counterterrorism posture and its strategic use of the Taliban. The authors discuss India’s oscillation during the Soviet era between Non-Alignment principles and geopolitical calculus, including India’s abstentions on UN resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal and its maintenance of ties with Soviet-backed regimes (Rais, 1993; Sharma, 2011). Post-1992, India’s pragmatic engagement with Mujahideen factions and its subsequent loss of influence under the Taliban are highlighted (Paliwal, 2015). Following 2001, works noting India’s soft-power emphasis and expanding role in Afghan reconstruction are cited (Pant, 2011; Mullen and Ganguly, 2012). The literature also covers India’s strategic infrastructure efforts (e.g., Chabahar access) and regional trade initiatives (Bhatnagar and John, 2013), as well as analyses of international diplomatic shifts toward talks with the Taliban, especially by the US after 2012.

The study employs a qualitative research design to trace the evolution of India’s Afghanistan policy, drawing on primary sources (official communiqués, treaties, statements by governmental actors in India and Afghanistan) and secondary sources (scholarly articles, commentaries, and news reports related to Indo-Afghan relations). The analysis is framed by neo-realist international relations theory, emphasizing states as rational actors operating under anarchy, self-help imperatives, capability assessments, and enduring conflict dynamics. This framework is used to interpret India’s efforts to gain influence in Afghanistan as a means to balance Pakistan and prevent anti-India use of Afghan territory, and to elucidate the Indo-Pak rivalry as it plays out in Afghanistan.

• India pursued an assistance-driven, soft-power strategy post-2001, deliberately avoiding direct military engagement while rebuilding diplomatic ties and investing in reconstruction and capacity building.
• Scale and scope of assistance: India pledged more than US$3 billion since 2001, becoming the fifth largest bilateral donor; initial US$100 million reconstruction aid; subsequent packages including scholarships, health, education, and infrastructure projects.
• Signature projects: 218-km Zaranj–Delaram highway; increased Afghan connectivity to Iran’s Chabahar Port to reduce dependence on Pakistani ports; construction of the Afghan Parliament building; Afghan-India Friendship (Salma) Dam and associated power transmission line; renovation of Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health; regular medical missions; 500 ICCR scholarships annually.
• Diplomatic and security cooperation: 2003 Preferential Trade Agreement; broadened cooperation across development, defence, education, energy, trade, and counterterrorism; 2011 India–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement including ANSF training and strategic dialogue; transfer of four Mi-25 attack helicopters in 2015, marking a limited shift toward security assistance.
• Public perception: Opinion polls and local sentiment reflected a positive image of India among Afghans due to visible, people-centric projects.
• Strategic shortfall: Overreliance on the Afghan state and failure to engage the resurgent Taliban (despite signs from 2005–06 and growing international emphasis on talks since 2012) left India vulnerable; New Delhi faced a loss of presence and closure of its embassy/consulates during the Taliban’s 2021 takeover.
• Post-2021 recalibration: India supported a UNSC resolution under its presidency recognizing the Taliban as a state actor (with Russia and China abstaining); provided humanitarian aid including a commitment of 50,000 MT of wheat via WFP (with consignments already delivered and lauded by WFP); allocated Rs. 200 crores (~US$27 million) in the 2022–23 budget for Afghan assistance; initiated contact through an MEA technical team and meetings with Taliban leadership on aid delivery and trade; received Taliban assurances on embassy security and requests to restore consular services.
• Opportunity amid tensions: Deteriorating Taliban–Pakistan relations (e.g., April 2022 Pakistani airstrikes and disputes over TTP) may create openings for India to reestablish a strategic footprint through calibrated engagement with the Taliban and expanded humanitarian-economic support.

The findings indicate that India’s soft-power approach successfully built goodwill and delivered tangible development benefits, but it proved insufficient to secure enduring strategic space once Western military and financial backing receded. Within a neo-realist lens, India’s reluctance to engage with the Taliban created a capability and influence gap that Pakistan was positioned to exploit, and the 2021 collapse of the Afghan government exposed the fragility of India’s state-centric bet. Addressing the core research question, the analysis suggests that while India achieved considerable influence during the 2001–2021 period, its strategic presence was not resilient to regime change. The paper argues that to regain leverage and protect national interests—especially preventing anti-India use of Afghan territory—New Delhi must pragmatically engage the Taliban, expand calibrated assistance, and utilize regional frameworks. Emerging Taliban–Pakistan frictions present a window for India to diversify ties beyond humanitarian aid toward a functional relationship that could enhance India’s bargaining power, contribute to inclusive governance, and stabilize regional dynamics.

India has devoted substantial diplomatic and financial capital to Afghanistan since 2001, earning widespread goodwill through development projects and people-centric initiatives. The Taliban’s 2021 return, however, underscored the limits of a purely soft-power, state-centric strategy that lacked sustained engagement with non-state and opposition actors. The paper urges prompt, pragmatic engagement with the Taliban—without implying formal recognition—to preserve and rebuild strategic space, restore limited diplomatic presence and consular services (including facilitating travel for Afghan scholarship students), and support pathways toward an inclusive, broad-based government. India should leverage regional platforms such as SAARC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to coordinate pressure and incentives for inclusivity and stability. Working with like-minded states on a regional framework for engagement can help ensure Afghanistan does not relapse into renewed conflict and can align India’s security interests with humanitarian and developmental priorities.