Expressivism, self-knowledge, and rational agency

The paper contrasts a family of epistemic accounts of self-knowledge—the regulative model—with a Wittgensteinian expressivist alternative. The regulative model holds that authoritative self-ascriptions are higher-order judgments whose special warrant stems from their role in rational agency and reflective control. The author argues this model retains a Cartesian theater picture and faces serious problems. In its place, a deflationary, first-order expressivist account explains the asymmetries of self-ascription (immediacy and authority) without higher-order cognition. The paper aims to show that rationality and authoritative self-ascription can be understood without positing a distinct second level of mind, drawing on Davidson and Moran to sketch a first-order picture of rational agency.

The paper surveys central positions in contemporary debates on self-knowledge and rationality: (1) Boghossian (1998) articulates a challenge for epistemic accounts of self-knowledge, arguing inference and inner observation fail, leaving either insubstantial knowledge (indexicals, self-verifying judgments, Burge’s basic self-knowledge) or skepticism, but stressing that fallibility suggests genuine cognitive achievement must be involved. (2) Shoemaker (1996) defends the necessity of self-knowledge by self-acquaintance for rational belief revision and agency, arguing against the possibility of self-blindness and positing second-order monitoring of first-order states. (3) Burge (1998) ties entitlement to self-knowledge to the constitutive requirements of critical reason: reflective second-order judgments must be warranted and generally true for critical reasoning to guide first-order attitudes; this underwrites responsibility and agency. (4) Moran (2001) distinguishes theoretical vs deliberative self-knowledge, emphasizes the Transparency Condition, and links non-alienated first-person awareness to deliberation and commitment. (5) Owens (2000) raises the ‘idle wheel’ worry about higher-order judgments as motivators. (6) Wittgensteinian and neo-/expressivist traditions (e.g., Finkelstein, Bar-On) frame self-ascriptions as expressions rather than reports. (7) Davidson’s holism of the mental and Principle of Charity (2001, 2004) support a bottom-up conception of rationality embedded in first-order attitudes. The review positions the paper’s contribution as a defense of a deflationary, expressivist account compatible with rational agency without higher-order regulation.

Philosophical-conceptual analysis and argumentative critique. The author: (1) analyzes asymmetries between first-person and third-person ascriptions; (2) evaluates epistemic models (inference, inner observation, insubstantial knowledge) via Boghossian’s challenge; (3) reconstructs and critiques rational agency models (Shoemaker, Burge, Moran), targeting the roles of second-order beliefs in motivation and rational regulation; (4) advances a Wittgensteinian expressivist account of self-ascriptions, including a performative analogy to explain immediacy and reliability without knowledge; (5) integrates Davidson’s holism and Principle of Charity to sketch a first-order, bottom-up conception of rationality; and (6) responds to potential regress and motivational concerns, arguing that rational adjustments can occur at the ground level without higher-order oversight.

• The regulative model, which ties authoritative self-ascriptions to higher-order beliefs necessary for rational agency, faces two major problems: (1) Motivational ‘idle wheel’ objection (Owens): second-order judgments that one ought to be moved by reasons add no independent rational motivation beyond the first-order reasons already in view. (2) Infinite regress: if second-order judgments must themselves be warranted and reliably true to regulate first-order states, a third-order level would be needed to regulate them, and so on; if not needed, higher-order regulation is not necessary for rationality per se.
• A Wittgensteinian expressivist account explains asymmetries (immediacy, authority, groundlessness) of first-person present-tense self-ascriptions by treating sincere self-ascriptions as expressions of the very states they ascribe. Thus, when sincere, such avowals are reliably true without constituting higher-order knowledge; no special inner observation or inference is required.
• The performative analogy clarifies the epistemic deflation: like explicit performatives, sincere first-person avowals are guaranteed true in virtue of their expressive role, not due to a cognitive achievement or privileged access.
• Moran’s Transparency Condition is accommodated: because self-ascriptions express first-order attitudes, answering ‘Do I believe p?’ by considering p itself follows naturally from expressivism.
• Davidson’s holism and Principle of Charity support a bottom-up, first-order conception of rationality: a degree of coherence is constitutive of mentality, and interpretability requires attributing broadly rational networks of attitudes. This undermines the atomistic, top-down regulation presupposed by the regulative model.
• Therefore, rational agency and responsibility can be grounded in first-order responsiveness to reasons, without essential reliance on second-order monitoring or knowledge.

The analysis addresses the initial challenge of explaining first-person authority without resort to problematic epistemic mechanisms. By demonstrating that higher-order regulation neither provides independent motivational force nor avoids regress, the paper undercuts the necessity claim of the regulative model. The expressivist view accounts for immediacy and reliability of avowals via their expressive function, thereby dissolving the need to model them as knowledge claims. Integrating Davidson’s interpretive framework shows that rationality is already embedded in the web of first-order attitudes required for mindedness and communication, aligning with a practice-oriented picture of agency where deliberation proceeds by engaging first-order reasons (transparency) rather than policing them from a second-order standpoint. This reconception preserves responsibility and rational control as first-order achievements, reframing self-knowledge as authoritative expression rather than epistemic access, and thus responding to Boghossian’s dilemma with a deflationary alternative.

The paper argues that the regulative, higher-order model of self-knowledge and rational agency is not mandatory. Second-order judgments fail to provide the requisite motivational role and trigger a regress if made responsible for rational coherence. A Wittgensteinian expressivist account explains first-person authority over present-tense mental states non-epistemically: sincere avowals express the very states ascribed and are thereby reliably true without constituting knowledge. With support from Davidson’s holism and charity, the author sketches a first-order, bottom-up view of rationality in which coherence is constitutive of mentality and rational adjustments occur at the ground level. Thus, authoritative self-ascription and rational agency can be understood without essential higher-order thought. Future work could elaborate a fuller first-order model of deliberation and agency, address complex phenomena like self-deception, and further integrate insights from transparency and interpretation theories.

The paper offers a conceptual sketch rather than a fully developed alternative theory of rational agency; it does not provide detailed formalization or empirical validation. The expressivist account is primarily limited to first-person present-tense self-ascriptions and acknowledges exceptional cases (e.g., self-deception). The discussion defers a comprehensive treatment of how first-order mechanisms handle all varieties of rational failure and deliberate change without any higher-order input.