“Don’t confuse me with facts”—how right wing populism affects trust in agencies advocating anthropogenic climate change as a reality

The paper addresses why segments of the public deny anthropogenic climate change (ACC) and how this relates to trust in environmental institutions, right-wing populism, anti-elitism, and anti-immigration attitudes. Set in Norway—a country with a strong environmental reputation but an oil-dependent economy—the study notes persistent skepticism toward climate science and the political salience of climate narratives. Prior international evidence shows broad public acceptance that climate change is real, but divisions remain about human causation. The authors argue that distrust of climate science has become an ideological marker often associated with conservative/right-wing identities, though nuances exist. Populist communication frames juxtapose “ordinary people” against “elites,” potentially fueling skepticism toward science and governance. The study proposes that CC denial is intertwined with broader resistance to social change, relative deprivation, and perceived threats to existing socio-economic benefits. The key research question is: What is the extent of CC denial among the Norwegian public, and how is it linked to socio-demographic factors, trust in environmental institutions, anti-elitist and anti-immigration attitudes, and environmental worldviews?

The literature links climate change denial to opposition to formal science and elites, defense of industrial-capitalist systems, and ideological conservatism. Populism—especially on the radical right—is characterized by nationalist, authoritarian, and anti-elite stances, with communication strategies framing “the people” versus a corrupt elite. Prior work shows climate skepticism/denial often correlates with right-wing populism, xenophobia, and exclusivist, anti-egalitarian preferences. Digital far-right ecosystems help circulate denialist narratives. Relative deprivation theory suggests that perceived unfair losses in status or benefits can foster resistance to policies like climate mitigation and to multiculturalism, intensifying in-group/out-group distinctions. Trust in institutions is central to acceptance of climate science; anti-elitism and distrust of experts can undermine this trust. Environmental worldviews (e.g., ecocentrism) also shape climate attitudes, with ecocentric values typically associated with greater acceptance of ACC.

Design: Cross-sectional online survey conducted in 2017 among Norwegians aged 18–80. Sampling: Respondents (N = 3032) were drawn from a nationally representative TNS Gallup panel (target panel ~5000). The sampling was stratified by age, sex, geography, and education; response rate approximately 39%. The link closed at target sample size, allowing adjustments during data collection. After excluding missing/unsure responses to the key climate question, the analytical sample was n = 2834. Measures: Climate change belief was assessed with three options: (1) CC is happening now, mainly caused by human activities (ACC); (2) CC is happening now, mainly caused by natural forces (attribution skepticism); (3) CC is not happening now (trend skepticism); plus unsure/don’t know. Skeptics combined trend and attribution skeptics. Trust in environmental institutions: Index from five items (trust in climate science, national and local authorities, media, and experts), 5-point response scale, recoded 0–4; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87. Socio-demographics: gender, age, education, income, and residence (rural–urban). Ecocentric view of nature: Three statements rated on a 5-point scale; index 0–4; alpha = 0.66. Immigrant skepticism: Agreement with “We have enough immigrants and asylum seekers in our country” on a 5-point scale (0–4). Anti-elitism: Index of five 5-point items (e.g., elites decide at the expense of ordinary people; experts decide too much; lay knowledge vs. education); alpha = 0.81. Analytic strategy: Bivariate logistic regressions predicting CC skepticism from each predictor separately, followed by multiple logistic regression models including trust and adding blocks of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables to assess changes in effect sizes and significance. Descriptive statistics were also reported.

Prevalence: According to Figure 1, 54.4% believed CC is happening now and is mainly caused by human activities; 6.2% believed CC is happening now but mainly due to natural forces; 0.3% believed CC is not happening now (unsure/missing not reported). Thus, attribution skepticism dominates among skeptics; outright trend denial is rare. Bivariate logistic regressions (ORs): Lower trust in environmental institutions strongly predicts CC skepticism (B = −1.35, OR = 0.26, p < 0.001). Other significant predictors include male gender (OR = 1.73), older age (OR = 1.02 per year), lower education (OR = 0.61 per level increase), higher income (OR = 1.08), more rural residence (OR = 0.82 per urbanization step), less ecocentric view (OR = 0.21 per unit increase in ecocentrism), stronger immigrant skepticism (OR = 1.71), and stronger anti-elitism (OR = 2.04), all p < 0.001. Multiple logistic regressions: Trust in environmental institutions remains a significant predictor across models, but its effect diminishes when adding attitudinal variables, particularly immigrant skepticism and anti-elitism, suggesting that low trust is partly embedded within broader anti-elitist and anti-immigrant orientations and environmental worldviews. Gender loses significance when controlling for trust and other covariates. Attitudinal variables (ecocentrism, immigrant skepticism, anti-elitism) show stronger associations with CC skepticism than socio-demographic factors. Overall, lack of trust in environmental institutions is robustly associated with increased CC denial, but is interwoven with right-wing populist attitudes and views on nature.

The findings indicate that denial of ACC is significantly associated with low trust in environmental institutions that communicate climate science and implement mitigation policies. Such institutions and expert communities may be perceived by some as instruments of elite-driven societal change, potentially provoking resistance among groups who feel relatively deprived or threatened by shifts in power, identity, and livelihoods. Emphasizing transparency and scientific authority alone may not rebuild trust if underlying grievances about fairness and social change remain unaddressed. Attitudinal factors—anti-elitism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and less ecocentric views—are more influential than socio-demographic variables, aligning with research that political-ideological orientations more strongly shape climate attitudes. The analysis suggests a latent resistance to change and a form of nostalgia underpinning both opposition to modern environmentalism and to immigration, which together correlate with diminished trust and increased CC skepticism. Organized disinformation and far-right media ecosystems likely exacerbate distrust and denial by manufacturing uncertainty and legitimizing counter-narratives.

Trust in environmental organizations is a central correlate of CC denial, and this trust is intertwined with right-wing populist and anti-elitist attitudes, skepticism toward immigration, and environmental worldviews. The study highlights that climate skepticism is not merely a rejection of scientific facts but is embedded in broader ideological and identity-related conflicts over social change and perceived fairness. Because attitudinal factors reduce the explanatory power of trust when included together, efforts to enhance public acceptance of climate action should consider addressing underlying grievances and values—not solely providing more information. The broader media and political environment, including organized disinformation, plays a significant role in shaping trust and denial, underscoring the need for comprehensive strategies that go beyond scientific communication.

Limitations are not explicitly detailed by the authors, but several features may affect interpretation and generalizability: (1) Single-country context (Norway) limits external validity to other cultural and political settings; (2) Cross-sectional design (2017) precludes causal inference and captures attitudes at one time point; (3) Online panel survey with an approximate 39% response rate raises potential for nonresponse bias; (4) Exclusion of “unsure/don’t know” respondents from analyses (n reduced to 2834) may affect prevalence estimates and associations; (5) Some measures rely on self-report single items (e.g., immigration skepticism), and one index has moderate internal consistency (ecocentric view alpha = 0.66).