Disruptive (dis)engagement: platformisation as a global social policy

The paper examines how global labor platform companies implicitly or explicitly shape global social policy, using the framework of rights, regulation, and redistribution. While platform work is often discussed through precariousness, the authors ask: what kind of global social policy do transnational labor platforms (e.g., Uber) seek to achieve; what challenges does platformisation pose in Europe; and what countermeasures and socially responsible alternatives are possible? The introduction contrasts early expectations of the sharing economy with the subsequent evolution toward corporate platform capitalism and notes that digitalization could, in principle, support stronger social policy through datafication and oversight. The study positions the absence of formal social policy or disruptive avoidance practices as a de facto social policy with significant implications for national and global governance.

The article situates platformisation within a body of work on the gig economy, precarious labor, and platform capitalism, noting the shift from collaborative sharing models to corporate, investor-driven platforms (e.g., Srnicek; Calo and Rosenblatt; Thelen; Schor et al.). It highlights extensive legal and policy debates around worker status in the EU and UK, the role of algorithmic management, and the strategic self-identification of platforms as technology or service providers governed by commercial rather than employment law. From a global social policy perspective, the authors review the central role of the ILO in defining statutory social security and social health protection (e.g., Social Protection Floors Recommendation No. 202) and the exclusion of purely voluntary commercial insurance from social health protection. They contrast this with the OECD’s future-of-work agenda, which platforms often find more congenial given its commercial policy orientation. The literature also covers COVID-19’s exposure of protection gaps, proposals for basic income and portability of benefits, and examples of regulatory and judicial responses (e.g., ECJ rulings, Spain’s Riders Law, UK tribunal decisions). The authors discuss trade and investment agreements’ spillovers into social policy and the practice of forum shopping by corporations to favor commercial policy venues. They note how investor preferences legitimize disruptive models and how CSR, ESG, and “doing good” metrics often fail to capture treatment of workers and subcontractors.

The study employs an abductive research approach integrating conceptual analysis with mixed-methods empirical work. Sources include: (1) academic literature on social policy and platforms; (2) documentary analysis of platform company materials; (3) European Union regulatory consultations and debates on the 2021 European Commission proposal on platform work; (4) key informant interviews with officials from the European Commission, Finnish regulatory authorities, trade unions (national and European), social policy researchers, intergovernmental organizations, and platform companies; and (5) semi-structured thematic interviews with Uber drivers in three cities—Helsinki (Finland), London (United Kingdom), and St Petersburg (Russia). For the driver component, approximately 20 interviews were conducted per city (2019–2022, before and after the pandemic), recruited by taking rides and inviting drivers to participate; interviewees received compensation. All interviews were conducted with informed consent, recorded, transcribed, translated, and coded in Atlas.ti for thematic analysis. Conceptual analysis used the rights–regulation–redistribution framework; interview data were used to complement, test, and elaborate the emerging argument.

• The core operational model of labor platforms constitutes an implicit global social policy comprised of five strategic elements: (1) denial or avoidance of employer status, (2) self-identification as technology/service providers, (3) emphasis on private/voluntary insurance over statutory social security, (4) promotion of market-based social security via voluntary partnerships and micro-insurance leveraging data, and (5) an investment-led growth/market dominance model including tax management.
• These strategies shift governance into the commercial policy domain (trade in services, IP, data), undermining labor rights tied to employment law and shifting social risks and costs to workers.
• Driver interviews across Helsinki, London, and St Petersburg indicated drivers often compensated for reduced margins by increasing working hours; many reported pronounced power asymmetries, including unilateral disconnection practices.
• Voluntary insurance partnerships (e.g., Uber–AXA) had low awareness and limited uptake among drivers interviewed in London, providing modest benefits while yielding reputational gains for platforms.
• Evidence of upward redistribution and cost shifting: in Finland, shifting social insurance costs to contractors can save platforms approximately 34.4% on wages; in California, platform lobbying for Proposition 22 totaled about USD 203 million; Spain fined Glovo €79 million for labor law breaches; Delivery Hero anticipated €200–400 million in related costs.
• Legal and regulatory arenas are central: platforms frequently litigate or arbitrate status disputes, and court decisions (e.g., UK Uber worker status, ECJ rulings) have compelled selective compliance; the EU Platform Work Directive process has been contentious, with narrowing of the presumption of employment and limited applicability to tax/social security/criminal proceedings.
• Investor preferences reward disruptive models, reinforcing the first four strategic elements; platforms tend to respond more to reputational issues (e.g., diversity) than to labor rights or social protection obligations.
• Platformisation risks normalizing fissured workplaces and outsourcing beyond gig sectors, potentially eroding employment protections across industries while enabling data-rich private governance that could, in principle, support formalization if made public or regulated.

The findings indicate that platformisation’s social policy effects stem primarily from business models rather than technology per se. By redefining the firm as a technology/service intermediary and workers as independent contractors, platforms shift regulation into commercial policy and away from employment law, weakening rights, enforcement, and redistribution. This supports upward redistribution, tax minimization, and privatized or voluntary social protection that lacks statutory guarantees. The European context shows both resistance and adaptation: national court cases, sectoral regulations (e.g., Spain’s Riders Law), and licensing constraints (e.g., London) have prompted partial compliance and experimentation (e.g., subcontracted employment models), while the EU’s Platform Work Directive process illustrates the difficulty of securing a robust presumption of employment. Countermeasures operate via three main avenues: regulation (including algorithmic transparency and data-sharing requirements), litigation (to enforce minimum wage, worker status, unfair disconnection), and enabling alternatives (e.g., cooperatives, socially responsible platform models). Global governance dynamics matter: platforms gravitate to OECD, trade, and investment forums more than ILO tripartite processes, and practice forum shopping to lock in commercial policy advantages. CSR and ESG, as currently operationalized, often fail to address labor treatment in platform supply chains. However, platform-held data could be leveraged to extend contributory social protection and formalize informal work if mandated. A global framework supporting national regulatory space—analogous to the WHO FCTC—could help align investor behavior, corporate accountability, and social protection goals across jurisdictions.

Platformisation represents a de facto global social policy model characterized by avoidance of employer obligations, relocation of governance to commercial policy arenas, privatization and marketization of social protection, and investor-driven expansion—together producing upward redistribution and weakened labor protections. Yet this trajectory is a political choice, not a technological inevitability. The paper contributes: (1) a conceptualization of five strategic elements linking platform business models to rights, regulation, and redistribution; (2) empirical insights from EU policy debates, company documents, and multi-city driver interviews; and (3) a mapping of countermeasures across governance levels (global, regional, national, local). Future directions include: adopting robust presumptions of employment or equivalent protections; mandating algorithmic transparency and data-sharing for social protection; strengthening transnational frameworks for corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment; and supporting cooperative or public-interest platform models. A Global Framework Convention for Social Contract and Corporate Social Responsibility could provide a scaffold to protect policy space, ensure platforms contribute to taxation and social protection, and align digital transformation with social justice.