Recent research on knowledge, encompassing facts, skills, and objects, has gained prominence across philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. The focus has been on the relationship between intentionality and referential entities, and how their existence enriches knowledge. This paper delves into the fundamental aspects of the judgemental sense, examining its origins. It addresses the historical lack of systematic relationships between knowing and judging, except for notable analyses in Kant and Husserl. The cognitive turn highlighted intuition, imagination, and insight within thinking processes, but the interplay between recall and judgment remains under-explored in relation to knowledge acquisition through perceptual acts. This paper aims to clarify the intentional role of categorial intuition in knowledge advancement, using Husserl's phenomenological framework of the synthesis between signification and intuition as its basis. The paper will specifically analyze how Husserl's concept of categorial intuition contributes to understanding the origins of knowledge, particularly within the context of perceptual judgments.

The author draws heavily upon Husserl's work, specifically his sixth Logical Investigation and his later work, 'Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis' (APAS). Several researchers' contributions to Husserl's concept of categorial intuition are acknowledged, including Sokolowski (1981), Lohmar (2002), Moran (2005), Benoist (2008), Mohanty (2011), and da Silva (2017), highlighting their work on formal and transcendental logic, experience and judgment, and passive and active syntheses. The paper acknowledges critiques of Husserl's conception of knowledge, particularly concerning the role of perception in cognitive processes (Bobrova and Pietarinen, 2019; Staiti, 2015; Theodorou, 2015), but maintains that these critiques represent gradual modifications rather than a complete rejection of Husserl's core ideas. The author's approach involves analyzing Husserl's proposed sources of knowledge to compare two distinct positions, clarifying the origins of knowledge within the framework of the logical investigations. The review sets the stage for the paper's central argument, exploring how categorial knowledge rooted in perceptual intentions forms the basis for categorial intuition.

The paper employs a primarily analytical methodology, interpreting and extending Husserl's phenomenological framework. The author reconstructs Husserl's concept of categorial intuition, starting from section 45 of the sixth Logical Investigation. This involves analyzing the foundational and grounded components of categorial intuition, exploring how it functions as a foundational act built upon simple intuitions. The paper examines the expansion of the 'sphere of sensibility' required for evident knowledge of categorial intuitions, distinguishing between simple sensible intuitions and categorial intuitions. It distinguishes between simple sensible intuitions (operating at a single act-level) and categorial intuitions (operating on foundational acts with multiple objective poles). The paper then analyzes the role of passive synthesis, the fusion of partial perceptual intentions into a global intuitive object, and active synthesis, the constitution of an object through cognitive interests. The author carefully analyzes Husserl's concept of knowledge as a combination of intuition and signification, focusing on how categorial intuitions fulfill signifying intentions through a 'covering synthesis' between partial and global perceptions. The paper delves into the relationship between intuitive acts and meaning, emphasizing the independence of pure thought from intuition. The author then examines Husserl’s 'Perceptual Analysis for Passive and Active Synthesis' (APAS), analyzing how categorial intuitions operate within the context of perceptual activity and cognitive interests. This involves an examination of how perceptual synthesis constitutes objects and knowledge. The paper also explores the role of active synthesis in constituting objects within the perceptual realm and how cognitive interests affect the constitution of the perceptual theme.

The paper argues that categorial intuition is a foundational act dependent upon simple intuitions but distinct from them. It's characterized by a 'covering synthesis' where partial perceptual intentions are implicitly synthesized with global perception, providing intuitive fulfillment for categorial forms. The author establishes a distinction between the realm of meaning and the realm of intuition, arguing that pure thought is independent of intuition and that intuition primarily serves to confirm categorial relations already established through pure thought. This is significant because it emphasizes that intuition's role is not in creating categoriality, but in confirming it. The paper analyzes the two-folded foundational structure of categorial intuition: the primary level, constructed through the fulfillment of signification and intuition; and the secondary level, moving from internal to global articulation. The analysis of Husserl's APAS reveals the importance of perceptual synthesis in constituting objects and knowledge. The paper demonstrates that perceptual synthesis involves not merely the fusion of intuitive contents, but also a synthesis between fully intuitive intentions and non-intuitive intentions (aspects of the object not fully apprehended). This synthesis constitutes the objective global identity of the perceived object. The paper contrasts simple perception and global perception, noting that global perception initially functions implicitly before partial intentions become explicit through categorial signifying intentions. The paper argues that the act of knowing involves a fulfillment synthesis between signification (empty intentions) and intuition (intuitive givenness), which are intentional modalities existing autonomously even in simple perception. The genetic ordering of knowing synthesis and perceptual activity suggests a fulfillment of categorial forms grounded in synthesis, where perception autonomously explores its themes. Therefore, the author suggests replacing categorial intuitions with a perceptual explication process concerning intuitive synthesis, revealing a genetic continuity through intuitive synthesis between sensibility and knowledge for judgments.

The findings of this paper offer a nuanced understanding of Husserl's concept of categorial intuition and its role in knowledge acquisition. By analyzing the relationship between simple intuitions, categorial intuitions, and the act of knowing, the paper clarifies the interplay between perception, judgment, and the formation of knowledge. The paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the origins and nature of knowledge by emphasizing the synthesis between signification and intuition. The distinction between the role of intuition in confirming versus creating categorial relations contributes to a more precise understanding of the relationship between thought and perception. The analysis of APAS deepens the understanding of how perceptual synthesis and cognitive interests contribute to the constitution of objects and knowledge. The study shows how Husserl's later work extends and refines his earlier ideas on categorial intuition. The discussion highlights the limitations of previous interpretations that failed to fully capture the complexity of Husserl's account of knowledge. The paper’s detailed analysis of the interplay between passive and active synthesis enriches our understanding of the dynamic aspects of perception and consciousness.

This paper offers a refined understanding of Husserl's concept of categorial intuition, demonstrating its role as a foundational act within the act of knowing. The analysis emphasizes the synthesis between signification and intuition, and highlights the distinction between intuition's role in confirming, rather than creating, categorial relations. Future research could explore the complexities of the covering synthesis in more detail, investigate the inherent categorial forms within intuitive synthesis infused with cognitive interests, and analyze the second level of perceptual activity.

The study is limited by its focus on Husserl's phenomenological framework. While insightful, this approach may not fully encompass other perspectives on knowledge acquisition. Further research is needed to investigate the applicability of these findings to different philosophical and scientific frameworks. The paper focuses on a specific interpretation of Husserl's work and does not engage extensively with alternative interpretations.