Controversial border and territory issues between the Mac dynasty (Dai Viet) and Ming dynasty (China)

The study examines Sino–Vietnamese relations during 1527–1541, from the Mac dynasty’s founding through its 1541 investiture by the Ming, a period when the Mac regime faced non-recognition by Ming China and internal warfare with the Revival Lê. Confronted with threats of Chinese intervention amplified by Lê appeals for Ming assistance, the Mac rulers had three strategic choices: resist to the end, surrender unconditionally, or pursue calibrated submission to preserve peace. The paper interrogates prevalent condemnations of the Mac as treasonous for territorial concessions, asking: What was the nature and rationale of the Mac’s policy toward China? Were the dynasty’s acts of humility on border and territorial questions merely formalities, and did they compromise national independence and popular peace? By situating the Mac–Ming interaction within broader power asymmetries and historical border claims, the study aims to reassess the Mac dynasty’s diplomatic strategy and its implications for Dai Viet’s sovereignty.

The paper situates itself against traditional narratives that emphasize unidirectional Chinese aggression and Vietnamese resistance or rely on outdated notions of Sinicization and a rigid tributary order. It references scholarship noting varied Sino–Vietnamese relational equilibria (e.g., Anderson, 2013; Womack, 2004) and critiques from prominent Vietnamese historians (Ngo Si Lien; Tran Trong Kim) and Nguyen-dynasty historiography that portray the Mac as usurpers and puppets. Works such as Kathlene (2016) on early modern border negotiations, Taylor (1993) on performative submission, and Woodside (1988) and Tsuboi (1992) on Vietnamese statecraft and cultural autonomy frame the re-examination. Vietnamese scholars Dao Duy Anh and Ha Van Tan previously questioned claims that the Mac “cut” Quy–Thuan lands, aligning with Chinese records that place these areas under earlier Song/Yuan/Ming administration.

The study employs historical-critical analysis and comparative source triangulation using primary and secondary materials from both Vietnamese and Chinese corpora. Vietnamese sources include Complete Annals of Dai Viet (Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư), The Imperially Ordered Annotated Text Completely Reflecting the History of Viet (Khâm định Việt sử thông giám cương mục), Systematic Historical Great Viet (Đại Việt thông sử), Categorized Records of the Institutions of Successive Dynasties (Lịch triều hiến chương loại chí), Dai Viet geography texts, and epigraphic compilations. Chinese sources include Ming Shilu (Veritable Records), History of the Ming (Mingshi), Song histories (including accounts on Guangyuan/Guangzhou), Qinzhou History, Lingwai daida, and Special Domain Consultation Record. The author cross-checks annalistic entries, memorials, edicts, border gazetteers, and local administrative records (e.g., village and hamlet lists, population counts, chiefs’ seals and appointments) to assess claims regarding specific territories (Quy–Thuan; villages linked to Nhu Tích and Chiêm Lang), the number and status of villages in 1540, and the character of Mac–Ming interactions. The analysis also contextualizes events within geopolitical conditions (Ming internal factions and constraints; Dai Viet civil war; regional actors) and applies relational power frameworks (Strong/Weak dyads) to interpret tribute and recognition dynamics.

- Power context (1527–1541): Both Ming China and Dai Viet exhibited weaknesses (peasant rebellions, Mongol pressure, piracy and factionalism in Ming; internal South–North war in Dai Viet), aligning with a Weak China/Weak Vietnam equilibrium that facilitated formal submission and recognition without war. - Quy–Thuan issue (1528): Vietnamese and Chinese records indicate Quy and Thuan (historically Quy Hoa and Thuan An) derived from Vat Duong and Vat Ac, submitted to the Song by local leaders Nùng Trí Hội and Nùng Tôn Đán in the 11th century, and subsequently administered by Chinese dynasties (Song, Yuan, Ming). Repeated Ly and Tran attempts to reclaim them failed. Thus, the claim that the Mac “cut” these prefectures in 1528 is unfounded; any acknowledgment pertained to lands long outside Dai Viet’s control. - 1540 Qinzhou villages: Sources disagree on the number of villages—some Vietnamese records cite six (Tế Phù, Kim Lạc, Cổ Sam, Liễu Cát, An Lương, La Phù), others five; Chinese records emphasize four (Tư Lâm/Tu Lam, Kim Lạc, Cổ Sam, Liễu Cát). Qinzhou histories list seven villages in the Nhu Tích/Chiêm Lang/Thôi La area, with overlaps to the Vietnamese lists. Evidence shows these villages belonged to Qinzhou historically and that in 1427 four village chiefs (Tu Lam, Cổ Sam, Kim Lạc, Liễu Cát) shifted allegiance to the Early Lê, prompting Ming protests in 1442 regarding 281 households and border encroachment. - Nature of 1540 act: By late 1540, prior to Mac Đăng Dung’s prostration at Friendship Pass, the four villages had already been re-registered under Qinzhou. Mac correspondence framed the act as returning Qinzhou’s old land mistakenly taken by the previous dynasty. Therefore, it was a formal acknowledgment/return rather than cession of Dai Viet’s land. - Strategic humility and preparedness: While performing submission (accepting investiture, tribute, calendar, and formal inferiority), the Mac simultaneously fortified borders (citadels across Lạng Sơn, Cao Bằng, Hưng Hóa, etc.), readied naval forces, conducted reconnaissance (e.g., 1537 scouting leading to 1543 Ming penalties), and monitored Ming troop movements. This dual posture deterred invasion and allowed the Ming to withdraw without loss of face. - Recognition and autonomy: The Ming recognized the Mac in 1541 by conferring the title of Annam General Governor (with a silver seal). Ming records acknowledge Mac noncompliance with regular tribute and effective self-rule thereafter. The Mac never invited Chinese troops into Dai Viet, unlike the Revival Lê who repeatedly sought Ming military intervention. Domestically, Mac kings used imperial titles and granted royal ranks, signaling cultural resistance and substantive sovereignty. - Quantitative details: In 1427 the four villages had 29 hamlets with 292 households; various episodes cite forces such as Vũ Văn Uyên’s 10,000 men; multiple dates document repeated Lê embassies to solicit Ming intervention (1529, 1533, 1536–1538).

The findings directly address the research questions by demonstrating that the Mac dynasty’s ostensible humility was a calculated diplomatic instrument rather than capitulation. Reassessed through bilateral sources, the 1528 Quy–Thuan and 1540 Qinzhou cases reflect acknowledgment or restoration of territories long or historically administered by Chinese authorities, not betrayal via territorial dismemberment. This reframing undermines historiographical accusations of treason and situates Mac actions within a pragmatic strategy of survival amid internal war and external coercion. The combination of performative submission and credible defense preparations reduced Ming incentives to invade, provided the Ming a face-saving exit amidst domestic constraints, and stabilized Dai Viet’s northern border. Strategically, the Mac leveraged tributary formalities to secure recognition and time, while preserving de facto autonomy—evidenced by irregular tribute, independent internal governance, and royal titulature. The contrast with the Revival Lê—who solicited Ming military intervention—highlights how different uses of Sino–Vietnamese relations produced divergent implications for sovereignty and internal balance of power.

The Mac dynasty adopted a flexible, dual-track policy—formal submission to the Ming coupled with military preparedness—to avert invasion, maintain internal stability, and preserve substantive independence. The much-criticized territorial episodes are better understood as returns or acknowledgments of historically Chinese-administered lands rather than cessions of Dai Viet territory. This strategy enabled Ming troop withdrawal without loss of face, neutralized militant factions within the Ming advocating war, and secured recognition of the Mac, which bolstered their legitimacy during prolonged internal conflict. Post-1540, despite nominal investiture as Annam General Governor, Mac rulers acted as independent sovereigns, using imperial titles and autonomous decision-making. Future research could further map micro-level border administration changes, integrate archaeological and epigraphic data across the disputed locales, and compare Mac-era practices with earlier and later Vietnamese regimes to refine understanding of tributary politics as statecraft.