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Collective action improves elite-driven governance in rural development within China

Sociology

Collective action improves elite-driven governance in rural development within China

Y. Li, X. Qin, et al.

This research conducted by Yurui Li, Xiaofei Qin, Abigail Sullivan, Guangqing Chi, Zhi Lu, Wei Pan, and Yansui Liu explores the crucial role of collective action in enhancing rural development in China. The findings reveal how village collectives can mediate the influence of rural elites, fostering innovative strategies that encourage elite participation while preventing capture. Authority's role in sustaining these efforts is also highlighted, paving the way for future rural advancements.

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Playback language: English
Introduction
Despite progress, rural areas globally continue to face challenges like poverty and inequality, hindering the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Effective governance is crucial for rural development, but elite actors, while influential, can lead to "elite capture"—the domination and corruption of local governance for self-interest. This study focuses on rural China, where elite-driven governance is prevalent. While some elites promote development, others can hinder it through resource misallocation and inefficiency. Collective action, the collaborative effort towards shared goals, is posited as a potential mediator between elite influence and development outcomes. Existing research highlights the role of collective action in engaging elites and non-elites, but the conditions under which it can remedy elite capture require further investigation. This study aims to elucidate the mediating role of collective action (specifically village collectives and farmer cooperatives) in the relationship between governing and economic elites and rural development, and to explore how collective action mitigates elite capture. By examining these distinct forms of collective action, the research seeks to understand the varied roles of elites and provide insights for effective collective action designs, contributing to improved rural governance and SDG attainment.
Literature Review
The literature on rural development highlights the crucial role of elite actors in local decision-making. However, elite capture, where elites prioritize self-interest over community needs, presents a major obstacle. Existing research explores collective action's potential to counter elite capture by fostering participation and accountability. Studies in diverse settings, like Indonesia, demonstrate the success of collective action projects where elites and non-elites collaborate. However, the specific mechanisms and conditions for successful collective action remain unclear. This study builds on this literature by focusing on the distinct roles of governing and economic elites within two types of collective action prevalent in rural China: village collectives and farmer cooperatives. By differentiating these, the study addresses the incomplete framing of elites in existing literature and investigates their diverse impacts on rural development through different collective action mechanisms.
Methodology
This mixed-methods study utilizes a large-scale quantitative dataset encompassing 604 villages across seven counties in Jiangsu Province, China, complemented by qualitative data from eight villages within three of those counties. The quantitative data, sourced from the annual village statistical system ("village card"), includes indicators on village development, geography, resources, demographics, agriculture, elites, and collective action in 2017. The qualitative data comprised in-depth interviews with village officials (including the standing member of the local Communist Party and the head of the village leadership committee), questionnaires with elites (governing and economic) and non-elite farmers, and archival material. Quantitative analysis employed multiple regression and path analysis to examine the relationships among rural development (measured by per capita net income), governing and economic elites (operationalized based on political power and economic influence, respectively), collective action (village collectives and farmer cooperatives), and control variables (sociodemographics and agriculture). The path analysis models tested direct and indirect effects of elites on rural development through collective action. Qualitative data enriched the understanding of mechanisms and contextual factors revealed in the quantitative analysis. The study uses the income of village collectives and farmer cooperative participation rate to measure collective action capacity, while acknowledging the limitation of this approach and the qualitative data's role in strengthening the analysis. The study also used an alternative measure of governing elites (head of the village leadership committee) to ensure robustness.
Key Findings
Quantitative analysis revealed that collective action significantly correlates with rural development, with village collectives showing a stronger effect than farmer cooperatives. Governing elites exhibited a positive association with rural development, while economic elites did not show a direct effect. Path analysis demonstrated that collective action mediates the relationship between elites and rural development, particularly for governing elites. While economic elites had no significant direct impact, their indirect influence through village collectives and farmer cooperatives was significant. Bootstrap analysis confirmed the robustness of multiple mediation effects. Qualitative data from case studies illuminated the mechanisms by which collective action drives rural development. Village collectives, primarily generating income from asset leasing, provide essential public goods and services, fostering resource efficiency. The study found that a higher level of participation and democracy strengthens the success of collective action, as seen in villages where more villagers felt active participation and strong influence correlated with better village collective income. The survey indicated that collective actions increased villagers' income, improved environment, fostered trust, and promoted a more equitable society. Innovative institutional designs, like point-based reward systems and public infrastructure sponsorship, were found to encourage elite participation and discourage elite capture by leveraging reputation effects.
Discussion
The findings address the research question by demonstrating the mediating role of collective action between elites and rural development. The stronger effect of village collectives highlights the importance of public goods provision and community engagement. The significant indirect effect of economic elites underscores their contribution through collaboration with smallholder farmers within collective action frameworks, particularly in knowledge diffusion and efficiency improvement. The positive and more impactful role of governing elites in organizing and facilitating collective action justifies the inclusion of authority intervention in collective action initiatives. The study's emphasis on social capital, particularly reputation effects, underscores the importance of transparency and trust in successful collective action. The findings contribute to the ongoing debate in commons governance by showing the benefits of authority intervention in catalyzing and sustaining collective action while simultaneously highlighting the critical role of democratic participation in enhancing the effectiveness of elite governance.
Conclusion
This research demonstrates the crucial mediating role of collective action in linking elites to rural development in China. Village collectives, in particular, effectively mobilize resources and improve resource-use efficiency. The study highlights the vital role of governing elites in organizing and facilitating collective action, while emphasizing the importance of democratic participation in preventing elite capture and fostering reciprocity. Innovative institutional designs that leverage reputation effects and transparency are crucial for successful collective action and sustainable rural development. Future research should explore the interactions between economic and governing elites in collaborative networks and examine the cross-scale dynamics of collective action.
Limitations
The study's reliance on a single province (Jiangsu) limits the generalizability of the findings. The use of per capita net income as the sole measure of rural development might not fully capture the complexities of social well-being. Data limitations restricted the operationalization of certain variables, including the quantification of economic elite leadership. The findings are specific to the context of rural China and its specific institutional arrangements, and may not be directly transferable to other contexts.
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