'Carrot and stick' approach to housing demolition and relocation under flexible authoritarianism in urban China

China's state-society relations have evolved, moving beyond purely repressive conflict resolution. This study focuses on the 'carrot and stick' approach, a blend of rewards and coercion, used by local governments to manage conflicts arising from housing demolition and relocation projects, specifically focusing on the challenges posed by 'nail households' – those who resist relocation. The research uses Dalian, China, as a case study to examine how this approach, a facet of flexible authoritarianism, balances economic development with social stability. The authors posit that the 'carrot and stick' strategy, while seemingly effective in achieving project goals, potentially reinforces existing socioeconomic disparities due to its reliance on informal negotiations and unequal application of incentives.

The article reviews existing literature on China's authoritarian governance, highlighting the shift from purely coercive measures to more flexible strategies. It examines different models of authoritarianism, including consultative and responsive authoritarianism, and contrasts them with flexible authoritarianism, which emphasizes the local state's adaptive responses to reconfigured state-society relations. The literature also explores various methods employed to manage urban redevelopment conflicts, including the use of formal and informal strategies, and the role of market mechanisms in resolving social unrest. Existing studies on nail households and their diverse motivations for resistance are also reviewed, highlighting the complexities of these conflicts and the need for nuanced approaches to their resolution.

This research employs a case study approach focused on a housing demolition and relocation project in Dalian, China. Data collection involved semi-structured interviews with local officials, private developer representatives, and over two dozen households. The authors also participated in internal project meetings and conducted site observations. Supplementary data included government documents, reports, meeting minutes, and news articles. The timeframe for fieldwork spanned from 2016 to 2022. The authors acknowledge challenges in obtaining data due to the political sensitivity of the subject matter and the initial reluctance of interviewees to share information. However, existing personal connections helped overcome some of these obstacles.

The Dalian case study revealed that the coalition of local government and private developers employed a multifaceted 'carrot and stick' strategy. 'Carrots' included increased monetary compensation (reaching 18,000 yuan/m² in some cases), provision of resettlement housing with additional benefits (free extra area, refined decoration, and preferential school zone placement), and special, non-disclosed compensation packages for influential households. These measures aimed to appease resistance and maintain social harmony. 'Sticks,' employed against households less receptive to the incentives, involved cutting off utilities, harassment, verbal abuse, and physical threats. The coalition actively managed information flow, controlling media coverage to prevent negative publicity. The study reveals that the strategy's application was tailored to individual households, favoring those with strong social and political connections, exacerbating existing inequalities. The study also notes the use of misleading propaganda, presenting a contrast between official communication and on-the-ground realities. The case highlighted how the informal system operates alongside formal rules, often contradicting them to meet immediate project goals.

The findings demonstrate how the 'carrot and stick' approach functions as a practical mechanism for managing conflict within flexible authoritarianism. The strategy's success in achieving project goals hinges on the ability of the state-developer coalition to leverage resources and manipulate information. While superficially addressing societal concerns, the informal approach reinforces existing power imbalances and economic inequalities. The reliance on negotiation and unequal compensation creates discrepancies in treatment based on households’ social capital and connections, raising questions about fairness and transparency. The study’s findings challenge the notion of flexible authoritarianism as a purely innovative mode of governance and expose its inherent limitations in ensuring equitable outcomes.

This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the 'carrot and stick' approach under flexible authoritarianism, highlighting its effectiveness but also its limitations. The approach proves efficient in facilitating redevelopment projects but at the cost of potentially exacerbating social inequalities and undermining the rule of law. Future research could explore the long-term social and economic consequences of this approach and examine comparative cases across different Chinese cities to determine the generalizability of these findings. Furthermore, investigating the effectiveness of alternative conflict-resolution mechanisms in the context of urban redevelopment would be beneficial.

The study's limitations include its reliance on a single case study, potentially limiting the generalizability of the findings. Data collection challenges, stemming from the political sensitivity of the subject, might have led to some information biases. The authors acknowledge that the experiences of the interviewed households may not fully represent the diverse experiences of all households affected by the project.