Careocracy or isocracy? A feminist alternative to the neoliberal meritocratic discourse

The paper examines the alliance between neoliberal capitalism and meritocratic discourse, which claims that free, unregulated markets reward merit and thus confer social justice. The author identifies two key problems arising from this discourse: (1) the moral legitimation of inequalities by both winners and losers of market outcomes, and (2) the reduction of social value to market value. Prior critiques often focus on educational inequality and the failure of equality of opportunity. This paper instead interrogates whether, even under imagined conditions of substantial equality of opportunity, meritocracy coheres with free markets, and then advances a feminist critique centered on care. The study proposes to evaluate two possible counter-discourses—careocracy and isocracy—to address the harms of neoliberal meritocratic discourse while reconsidering the place of care in public life.

The author reviews scholarship showing how the meritocratic ideal is intertwined with neoliberalism and how it legitimizes inequality and narrows social value to market metrics (Littler 2017; Sandel 2020; Piketty 2020; Markovits 2019). Empirical and historical work indicates Western societies fall short of true meritocracy, especially via educational systems that entrench advantage (Karabel 2005; McNamee & Miller 2009; Mijs 2016). Feminist economics and ethics critique neoliberalism for marginalizing care and romanticizing or feminizing it, relegating it to the private sphere and undervaluing paid care work (Nedelsky 1992; Tronto 1993; Nelson 1995, 2016; Folbre & Nelson 2000; England 2005; Duffy 2011; Fraser 2022). The paper engages motivation literature distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic motives and the crowding-out effect (Deci 1975; Ryan & Deci 2000; Frey 1997), and market-focused arguments that success depends on luck and other non-merit factors (Frank 2016) and that market rewards reflect benefits to others rather than individual effort (Bruni & Santori 2022). It also draws on Hayek’s critique of ‘just prices’, Rawlsian legitimate expectations, and Bellanca’s concept of isocracy (2019) to frame alternatives.

Non-empirical, theoretical and normative analysis. The author conducts a conceptual inquiry into whether meritocracy coheres with free markets, independent of empirical equality of opportunity. Methods include: (a) reconstructing the logic of meritocracy and its fit with neoliberalism; (b) developing a working definition of care with eight caveats to bridge interpersonal and institutional dimensions; (c) employing thought experiments of an imagined ‘careocracy’ (a society centered on care) to test its ability to solve the identified problems; and (d) proposing ‘isocracy’ as an alternative discourse, drawing on Bellanca (2019), and arguing its advantages via philosophical reasoning and engagement with motivation theory, feminist economics, and political philosophy. No empirical data are collected or analyzed.

- Free markets are not meritocratic: Market success depends on factors beyond individual effort (luck, circumstances, cooperation), and market rewards reflect others’ valuation, not intrinsic merit. The meritocratic narrative thus falsely legitimizes inequalities (Problem 1) and reduces social value to market value (Problem 2). - Definition of care: “To care for someone or something means to be intentionally concerned for its well-being and to act accordingly,” accompanied by eight caveats (information gathering; recipient involvement; reciprocal recognition; not confined to private sphere or women; non-instrumental/non-prudential though compatible with rewards; involves effort not necessarily self-sacrifice; non-quantitative valuation; multi-level institutional relevance). This bridges interpersonal and institutional perspectives and resists neoliberal reductions. - Careocracy critique: A meritocracy of care would appear to solve Problem 2 (broadening social value beyond markets) but would likely reintroduce instrumentality/prudentialism into care through merit-based rewards, risking motivational crowding-out and loss of authenticity. It also fails to solve Problem 1: by elevating care as the singular source of social value, it risks elite capture, renewed exclusion over what counts as ‘care’, and legitimation of new inequalities (a shift from market to care value reductionism). - Isocracy proposal: An isocratic discourse pluralizes sources of social value and distributes legitimization across institutions through citizen deliberation. It retains markets while rejecting neoliberal meritocracy, legitimizes care (paid and unpaid) in the public sphere, and reduces the moral legitimation of inequalities (Problem 1) while avoiding reductionism (Problem 2). The isocratic formula conditions entitlements on institution-specific, publicly discussed criteria rather than a single hierarchy of merit. - Additional advantages: (a) Enriches economic anthropology beyond homo oeconomicus by integrating care as a non-instrumental dimension alongside contractual motives; (b) Improves prospects for governing commons by legitimizing care-based practices and collective action insights (Ostrom, Coman).

The paper’s findings address the central question of how to counter neoliberal meritocratic discourse and reintegrate care into public life without reproducing inequality and reductionism. By showing markets are inherently non-meritocratic, the analysis undermines the moral basis for inequality legitimation. The careocracy thought experiment reveals that replacing one monistic value metric (market value) with another (care value) reproduces similar problems—instrumentality in care and new hierarchies. Isocracy offers a pluralistic alternative: citizens deliberate across institutions on what constitutes social value and how to reward it, enabling care to be recognized within markets and beyond without totalizing public life. This pluralization weakens the ideological justifications for persistent inequalities and encourages horizontal rather than vertical distributions of power and recognition. The discussion reframes policy and social narratives from seeking a single measure of worth to cultivating institutional diversity and public reasoning about values.

The paper advances a feminist alternative to neoliberal meritocratic discourse by rejecting monistic value regimes (market or care) and proposing an isocratic discourse that pluralizes sources of social value through citizen deliberation across institutions. It contributes a clear definition of care that bridges interpersonal and institutional dimensions, demonstrates why careocracy is an inadequate remedy, and argues that isocracy can include care within markets while reducing inequality legitimation and avoiding reductionism. Future research should broaden the moral and political vocabulary in public debate (e.g., human dignity, needs, digital citizenship, gender equality, intersectionality, ecologism), and explore how isocratic processes can be operationalized and assessed in practice.

The contribution is theoretical and abstract, relying on conceptual analysis and thought experiments rather than empirical evidence. It does not provide concrete policy designs or measurement frameworks, and its generality may limit immediate operationalization. The envisioned isocratic deliberation processes and their outcomes remain to be specified and tested empirically.