Naive ideas, or misconceptions about natural phenomena, are prevalent and often resistant to change, posing a challenge to science education. While previous studies using neuroimaging have shown that students activate frontal brain areas associated with inhibitory control to overcome naive ideas, no study has examined this in highly trained scientists. This study addresses this gap by investigating the brain activations of Ph.D. physicists when evaluating the scientific value of statements incorporating naive ideas in physics and biology. The central question is whether even advanced scientific expertise completely eliminates naive ideas, or whether scientists still need to actively inhibit these ingrained conceptions. Understanding this is critical for improving science education and training, as it informs strategies for effectively addressing persistent misconceptions and promoting conceptual change.

Existing literature highlights the persistence of naive ideas despite scientific training. Behavioral studies demonstrate that even experts exhibit biases towards naive ideas, particularly under speeded conditions, indicating increased demand on executive control. Neuroimaging studies show a correlation between expertise and increased activity in brain areas linked to inhibitory control (e.g., inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) when individuals overcome naive ideas. However, these studies primarily involved undergraduates, leaving the question of naive idea processing in highly trained scientists unanswered. This study bridges this gap by exploring the neural mechanisms involved in expert scientists' responses to naive ideas.

Twenty-five right-handed Ph.D. physicists (23 male, 2 female; age range 28–60 years) participated. Participants performed a statement-verification task during fMRI scanning. The task involved judging the scientific correctness of 128 statements (64 physics, 64 biology), presented in pairs of congruent (naive and scientific ideas align) and incongruent (naive and scientific ideas conflict) statements. Statements were matched for readability and length. fMRI data were acquired using a 3-Tesla Siemens Prisma scanner. Data processing involved motion correction, co-registration, spatial normalization to MNI space, and smoothing. Statistical analysis employed a two-level analysis (individual subject and group level) using a general linear model with two within-subject factors: expertise (physics vs. biology) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent). The main effect of CONGRUENCY and the interaction between EXPERTISE × CONGRUENCY were analyzed to identify differences in activation patterns.

Behavioral data revealed that physicists were significantly more accurate and faster at judging congruent statements than incongruent statements in both physics and biology. The difference in response time between congruent and incongruent trials was larger for physics than biology. fMRI analysis revealed a main effect of congruency, with incongruent statements eliciting greater activation than congruent statements in the left IFG, bilateral superior frontal gyrus, and bilateral ACC. The interaction between expertise and congruency showed a significant cluster in the bilateral dorsal ACC, with post-hoc analyses revealing distinct activation patterns for physics and biology. For physics, incongruent statements activated the left supplementary motor area, left middle occipital gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus, bilateral MFG, and left IFG. For biology, incongruent statements activated the left IFG, bilateral ACC, bilateral caudate, right insular cortex, bilateral superior frontal gyrus, and right midcingulate gyrus. Congruent statements in both domains primarily activated the middle occipital gyrus.

The findings support the hypothesis that even Ph.D. physicists need to actively suppress naive ideas to arrive at scientifically accurate judgments. The increased activation in frontal regions associated with inhibitory control during incongruent trials highlights the ongoing cognitive effort required to overcome persistent misconceptions. The larger response time difference between congruent and incongruent statements in physics might reflect the higher level of expertise and more efficient inhibition in this domain. The differential activation patterns between physics and biology, particularly the ACC involvement in biology, suggest a possible role for error detection and uncertainty in situations where expertise is less advanced. The results challenge the traditional view of conceptual change as a complete replacement of naive ideas with scientific ones, instead pointing towards a model of co-existence and active control.

This study demonstrates the persistent presence of naive ideas even in highly trained scientists. The reliance on inhibitory control mechanisms, reflected in increased frontal brain activation, underscores the ongoing cognitive demands of scientific reasoning. Future research should investigate longitudinal changes in brain activity and behavior as novices gain expertise and explore the interplay between naive and scientific concepts. A broader investigation of expertise across scientific domains is warranted.

The study's relatively small sample size and the underrepresentation of women in the sample limit the generalizability of findings. The reverse inference approach used in interpreting brain activations introduces potential ambiguity. Direct comparison between physics and biology should be cautious given potential confounds of content differences and time elapsed since formal training in these domains. Finally, the use of a verbal task in the study focused on the language aspect of misconception-oriented task which restricts the scope to verbal related processing.