The interplay of emotion and imagination is a crucial aspect of human cognition, yet understanding their relationship remains challenging. Questions arise regarding the possibility of feeling emotions when engaging with imaginative representations, the nature of emotional responses to fiction, and whether imagining an emotion constitutes a genuine emotional experience or a facsimile. This article shifts the focus from how emotions are felt in imagination to what it means to imagine an emotion. By acknowledging that various ways of imaginatively engaging with emotions exist, the authors aim to clarify the issues at stake and highlight an under-explored type of emotional imagining: emotion-like imagination (X-Im). Unlike B-Im, which involves imaginatively accepting a proposition as true, or E-Im, where emotions are a response to imagined representations, X-Im entails reenacting the emotional state itself, making emotional phenomenal properties the main content of the imagination. The article provides a detailed analysis of X-Im and explores its cognitive realizability through the lens of emotion regulation mechanisms.

Existing literature on the relationship between emotion and imagination often focuses on the paradox of fiction, examining how emotional responses arise from engaging with fictional narratives. This implicitly links emotional imagining to emotional responses (E-Im) rather than focusing on the direct experience of imagining the emotion itself (X-Im). The article argues that this focus on E-Im overshadows the crucial role of X-Im and highlights the need for a comprehensive account of this under-researched area of cognitive experience. The authors acknowledge Currie and Ravenscroft's (2002) work which, while recognizing the significant role of imagination, argues against emotion-like imagining, asserting that emotions are 'transparent to imagination'. However, the authors contend that the existence and usefulness of E-Im does not preclude the possibility of X-Im. Previous work, like that of Goldman (2006), hints at the concept of X-Im but lacks a fully developed exploration.

The article employs a conceptual analysis approach, systematically differentiating three types of emotion-related imagination: B-Im, E-Im, and X-Im. B-Im is defined as imaginatively believing a proposition about an emotion, while E-Im involves responding emotionally to imagined representations. X-Im is defined as imaginatively experiencing an emotion from the first-person perspective, thereby possessing emotional phenomenal properties as its core content. The authors address potential objections regarding X-Im's conceivability, its existence, and its usefulness, arguing that the concept is coherent, empirically plausible, and possesses significant explanatory value. The article proposes that emotion regulation strategies are pivotal for realizing X-Im. It delves into the phenomenological features of emotional experience, identifying valence, bodily sensations, arousal, and motivation as key components that X-Im would need to replicate. The intentional nature of emotions is also highlighted, as emotions always concern specific objects or states of affairs. The intentional base for X-Im can vary; it could be based on other imaginings or perceptions, but the authors note that the intended emotional properties don't necessarily need to predate the imagining. The article then contrasts X-Im with other forms of emotional imagination, emphasizing the mapping relationship between the evoked emotion and the intended imaginative output in X-Im. The authors argue that in successful X-Im, the subject's mental action is the cause of the emotional state, unlike in E-Im where the subject is a passive recipient of emotional responses to imaginings. The article uses the established Gross's process model of emotion regulation to suggest that X-Im involves a reverse-engineering process, strategically manipulating emotional responses until the target emotion is generated. While acknowledging the difficulty of evoking intense emotions without other emotion-related strategies, the authors illustrate this process with the example of imagining Napoleon's anger at Waterloo.

The paper's key contribution lies in its introduction and detailed analysis of emotion-like imagination (X-Im), a previously under-explored type of emotional imagination. The authors distinguish X-Im from belief-like imagining emotions (B-Im) and emotional imagination (E-Im), highlighting its unique characteristics. X-Im involves the first-person reenactment of an emotional state, making emotional phenomenal properties its central content, unlike B-Im, which focuses on propositional belief, and E-Im, where emotions are a secondary response to imagined events. The authors show how X-Im can be differentiated from genuine emotional experiences. While in X-Im, an emotional state is brought about intentionally through a voluntary mental action, in genuine emotional experiences, emotions are typically involuntary responses to external stimuli. The article provides empirical grounding for X-Im by linking it to emotion regulation (ER) strategies. This connection is particularly insightful since X-Im differs from commonly studied ER involving emotional suppression or intensity modulation. Instead, X-Im involves the intentional generation of a specific emotional experience. The authors leverage the process model of ER to illustrate how X-Im works as a reverse-engineered process, employing ER strategies to generate the target emotion. The authors emphasize the role of intentionality in X-Im; emotional phenomenal properties are evoked in relation to intentional objects, often scaffolded by other imaginings or perceptions. Finally, the authors discuss the potential implications of X-Im for affective forecasting and empathetic understanding, arguing that it can improve our capacity for emotional perspective-taking.

The paper's findings significantly advance our understanding of the intricate relationship between imagination and emotion. The proposed typology of emotional imagining clarifies the different ways we can engage with emotions imaginatively, moving beyond the traditional focus on emotional responses to imagined events. The in-depth analysis of X-Im sheds light on a previously neglected aspect of human cognition, offering a more nuanced perspective on how we can generate and manipulate emotions in our minds. The integration of emotion regulation mechanisms within the framework of X-Im offers a plausible cognitive mechanism for this imaginative process. The discussion of X-Im's implications for affective forecasting and empathetic understanding illustrates the practical significance of the model and opens new avenues for future research. The authors' challenge to existing views on emotion and imagination prompts further inquiry into the cognitive and neural underpinnings of these processes. By providing a theoretical framework grounded in phenomenological analysis and empirical findings, this work makes a significant contribution to both cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

This article successfully introduces and elaborates on emotion-like imagination (X-Im), a novel form of imagining emotions that involves a first-person reenactment of an emotional state. By clarifying the differences between X-Im and other forms of emotional imagination (B-Im and E-Im) and linking it to emotion regulation strategies, this work enriches our understanding of the complex interplay between imagination and emotion. The discussion of X-Im's potential role in affective forecasting and empathic understanding suggests promising directions for future research. Investigating the neural correlates of X-Im and further exploring its applications in diverse psychological contexts are key areas for future exploration.

While the article offers a compelling conceptual framework, it relies primarily on conceptual analysis and draws upon existing research in emotion regulation rather than presenting original empirical data. Future research employing empirical methods (e.g., neuroimaging, behavioral experiments) would strengthen the claims about the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying X-Im. Furthermore, the article primarily focuses on the individual experience of X-Im. Further investigation into the social and cultural aspects of X-Im, and how they might shape our understanding of others' emotions, would enhance its scope.