Towards resilient neighbourhood governance: social tensions in Shanghai's gated communities before and during the pandemic

The paper examines how resilient neighbourhood governance operates in Chinese gated communities before and during COVID-19, focusing on social tensions within a triangular state–market–society structure. It challenges explanations based solely on neoliberal urbanism by emphasising the strong role of the state in China and the complex triadic governance relationships. The study views pandemic-period responses as extensions of pre-existing governance mechanisms rather than separate phenomena, and foregrounds social disputes (negative feedback) as lenses to identify vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity. The research aims to reassess the roles of state (street offices and residential committees), market (developers and property management companies), and society (homeowner associations and residents) in building resilience through collaborative governance and social capital.

The study situates resilience within socio-ecological and social resilience frameworks (Holling, Walker et al., Adger), defining it as the capacity to absorb disturbances and reorganize while retaining core functions and identity. Two strategies to enhance community social resilience are reviewed: adaptive co-management (flexible multi-level networks, learning-by-doing, leadership, social memory) and collaborative governance (formal, consensus-oriented engagement of nonstate stakeholders by public agencies). Key shared enablers include flexible multi-level public–private structures, social capital and trust, leadership, and shared understanding. Contextualized to China’s gated communities, governance has shifted from state-controlled work-units to diversified arrangements involving homeowner associations (HOAs) and property management companies (PMCs), but remains state-influenced. The paper proposes a triangular state–market–society model and categorizes neighbourhood governance by its weakest component: weak-society (WSNG), weak-government (WGNG), and weak-market (WMNG). Roles are detailed: SOs/RCs implement and mediate; HOAs represent residents and enable grassroots co-management; PMCs provide services and relay information, sometimes acting as state extensions. Shanghai’s relatively tolerant environment for HOAs makes it a suitable setting to observe these dynamics.

The study employs an event system analysis (Event System Theory, EST) to trace social disputes and governance interactions across three Shanghai gated communities representing WSNG, WGNG, and WMNG. Organisational hierarchy for analysis: (1) institutions (policies/bylaws), (2) governments (SOs and RCs), (3) enterprises (developers and PMCs), and (4) HOAs and individual residents. Data span February 2013 to December 2022 from multiple sources: 37 interviews (householders, tenants, developers/PM staff, security staff, RC/SO personnel, NGO workers, volunteers), public media, WeChat records, daily records, and official notifications by PMCs/RCs/SOs. A total of 125 events were identified and categorised by origin: 26 RC-based, 27 PMC-based, 68 HOA-based, and 4 institution-based (noting overlaps). The three cases vary by environment, composition, and size: Neighbourhood-A (WSNG; hybrid residential/commercial; small ~500 households), Neighbourhood-B (WGNG; middle-class mega-community; ~2000 households), and Neighbourhood-C (WMNG; older stock with original residents and tenants; ~1000 households).

- Overall: Governance in Shanghai’s gated communities functions as a counterbalancing game among state, market, and society. Pre-existing collaborative mechanisms shape crisis performance; absence of any sector undermines resilience. During COVID-19, civic participation surged to maintain order and supplies; the state monitored/mediated; the market (PMCs) provided services and information flows. - WSNG (Neighbourhood-A): A dysfunctional or absent HOA impeded consensus and maintenance (e.g., elevator failures, parking conflicts). RC/SO interventions were needed (e.g., special funds for elevator repairs). During COVID-19, a volunteer leader (university teacher) mobilized a working group, coordinated supplies, and fundraising, temporarily stabilizing governance. However, reliance on individual leadership and lack of formal HOA made gains unsustainable; fee payment declines and mistrust persisted. WSNG proved inefficient and slow to reach consensus, heavily dependent on volunteer leaders. - WGNG (Neighbourhood-B): Weak RC participation led to prolonged developer–owner disputes (extra 3% fee demand; parking space conflicts), large protests, and media attention. Initial HOA capture by developer-linked members caused irregular PMC hiring; later invalidated, with PMC-B selected after 1.5 years. PMC-B improved operations (e.g., parking management) and raised management fee payment to 90% in the first year. During COVID-19, poor coordination among RC/HOA/PMC led to conflicts; informal owner groups (group-buying, public welfare, group leaders) assumed emergency roles. PMC staff infections and accommodation issues exposed fragility. Overall governance resilience and co-management capacity were weak without active RC mediation. - WMNG (Neighbourhood-C): Owners’ dissatisfaction led to PMC ouster; HOA-led self-governance managed collections, security/cleaning via contractors, and waste classification. Financial transparency and volunteer engagement increased fee payment to 94.5% (2019). RC later added social workers and community-building activities, strengthening trust and grassroots democracy. During COVID-19, absence of a professional PMC hindered supply distribution and services; volunteer infections triggered conflicts and calls to reintroduce a PMC and reselect the HOA. Self-governance worked in normal times but was vulnerable in crisis without professional services. - Quantitative/contextual notes: 125 events analysed (26 RC-based; 27 PMC-based; 68 HOA-based; 4 institution-based). Case sizes approx. 500, 2000, and 1000 households; payment rate improvements: 90% (Neighbourhood-B post PMC-B) and 94.5% (Neighbourhood-C pre-COVID).

Findings address how resilience emerges from the interplay of state, market, and society over time. Crisis performance largely reflects pre-crisis social capital, trust, and collaboration mechanisms. Civic participation is pivotal, especially in emergencies, acting as a last line of defence when formal systems falter. However, state involvement remains indispensable for mediating disputes and ensuring legal compliance; state dominance alone does not ensure resilience if grassroots organisations (HOAs) or professional services (PMCs) are absent. PMCs enhance crisis capacity by delivering professional services and relaying information, which became critical during COVID-19. The counterbalancing dynamics among the triad shape whether collaborative governance is achieved; gaps in any sector (WSNG, WGNG, WMNG) lead to coordination failures, governance chaos, or collapse under shock. Strengthening pre-crisis collaborative practices, mutual trust, and leadership development improves adaptive capacity and reduces conflict escalation.

The paper conceptualises resilient neighbourhood governance as a product of long-term, everyday collaborative practices among state, market, and society that determine crisis responses. It proposes a triangular framework and categorisation (WSNG, WGNG, WMNG) and, through event system analysis of three Shanghai communities, shows that: (1) civic participation is essential and often escalates during crises; (2) government participation is necessary for mediation and oversight but not sufficient alone; and (3) market actors (PMCs) provide indispensable professional services and information flows in emergencies. Policy implication: build and maintain balanced, flexible public–private–civic collaboration, social capital, and leadership before crises to enhance resilience and reduce conflict. Future research should test the framework across diverse social contexts beyond China and under different hazards (e.g., climate-related disasters) to assess generalisability and differing threat dynamics.

The study’s insights are situated in China’s state-influenced governance context and may not generalise to market-led Western settings. The cases focus on COVID-19; other crises (e.g., floods, hurricanes) may produce different governance challenges and dynamics. More empirical work across contexts, neighbourhood types, and hazard types is needed.