Sociological grand theories have been criticized for their lack of practical use in empirical research. This paper proposes a general theory centered around the concept of "social games," aiming to bridge the gap between abstract theory and empirical work. The author argues that the "game" concept, used not metaphorically but as a heuristic tool, can provide a unifying framework for understanding social phenomena. The theory draws inspiration from various sociological perspectives, including Goffman's work on roles and interaction, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, Elias's figurations, and Coleman's emphasis on emergent outcomes. It also integrates insights from economics (game theory), mathematics (probability theory), philosophy, biology, and cultural studies. The author addresses criticisms that the game concept is too simplistic or artificial compared to the complexity of real-life social interactions, arguing that a broader definition of social games can effectively account for such complexity. The article aims to demonstrate the generalizability of the theory of social games and its straightforward translation into middle-range theorizing and empirical research.

The paper reviews relevant literature from sociology, economics, mathematics, philosophy, biology, anthropology, cultural studies, and game studies. Key sociological contributions cited include Goffman's analysis of social interaction as performance or game-playing, Garfinkel's work on tacit and explicit rules, Elias's emphasis on figurations, and Coleman's focus on emergent outcomes. The author draws on game theory from economics and mathematics, probability theory, Searle's work on social construction, Winch's use of games to understand social phenomena, Huizinga's view of culture as game-like, and Caillois's classification of games. The author also addresses criticisms of applying game models to social phenomena, acknowledging concerns regarding the complexity of social life, rule ambiguity, and the lack of a 'time-out' option in real-life situations.

The paper employs a theoretical methodology, outlining a new "grand theory" of social games. This theory is not directly testable but serves as a framework for generating testable hypotheses and guiding empirical research. Three main heuristics are presented to link the theory to empirical work: 1. **Descriptive-Interpretive Heuristic:** This involves systematically applying a series of questions to understand the different components of a social game. These questions focus on identifying the players, resources, actions, goals, rules, representations, objects, game space, time, context, and outcomes involved. This resembles grounded theory's coding paradigm and is suitable for qualitative research methods such as participant observation and interviews. 2. **Explanatory Heuristic:** This consists of general hypotheses derived from sociological insights that are expressed as game mechanisms. The author provides three example hypotheses related to rule changes, sanctioning (anomie), and social closure, illustrating how these mechanisms can be used to generate and test more specific hypotheses. The approach resembles analytical sociology, focusing on causal relationships and mechanisms within social games. It facilitates both reconstructive explanations (tracing historical sequences of game moves) and statistical explanations (analyzing the effects of game parameters on outcomes). 3. **Formal Modeling:** The theory is compatible with formal game theory, using it to clarify game structures, create ideal types for comparing real cases, and to simulate the effects of different parameters on game outcomes. Agent-based modeling is also seen as a useful tool for understanding emergent behavior.

The paper's key contribution is the outline of a general theory of social games. This theory defines a social game as having specific elements including players with resources, actions shaped by goals, rules, and representations, objects, game space and time, outcomes, and a context. The theory is general enough to encompass different levels of social interaction (interactions, groups, organizations, markets, etc.). The theory proposes three heuristics for linking the abstract framework to empirical research: 1. **Descriptive-Interpretive Heuristic:** A set of questions used to reconstruct a model of a social game from qualitative data. 2. **Explanatory Heuristic:** General hypotheses based on sociological insights that can generate specific testable hypotheses about the mechanisms of social games. 3. **Formal and Agent-Based Modeling:** Using mathematical models and simulations to understand the structure and dynamics of social games. The author illustrates these heuristics using Peter Blau's study on the dynamics of bureaucracy. Blau's work, although not explicitly using game theory, is analyzed using the suggested heuristics to demonstrate how the framework can be applied to existing research. The comparison highlights the potential of the social game theory to systematically integrate qualitative, quantitative, and formal methods in studying social phenomena.

The theory of social games addresses the limitations of existing sociological grand theories by offering a framework that is both generalizable and directly applicable to empirical research. The three heuristics proposed in the paper provide a systematic approach for analyzing social phenomena as social games. This is a valuable contribution since it facilitates the integration of qualitative and quantitative methodologies within a unified theoretical framework. The paper further emphasizes that while the theory draws upon insights from various established theoretical perspectives, it uniquely emphasizes the causal and symbolic aspects of social game mechanisms. The illustration using Blau's study demonstrates the theory's potential for providing new avenues for research and comparative analysis, unifying diverse phenomena under a common theoretical lens.

This paper outlines a new grand theory of social games, offering a more direct link between abstract theory and empirical research compared to existing sociological theories. The theory integrates insights from various disciplines and employs three heuristics to bridge the theoretical-empirical gap. The author argues that this framework is not just a metaphor but a powerful tool for understanding and explaining social phenomena at various levels of complexity. Future research should focus on testing the proposed heuristics, developing further aspects of the theory (e.g., trust, power), and expanding the range of social games to which it is applied.

The paper acknowledges its limitations as an initial outline. It notes that it only provides a general overview of the theory, leaving many deeper issues for future research. This includes a more detailed exploration of different game types and their interlinkages (nested, coupled), a more comprehensive presentation of the descriptive and explanatory heuristics, and a deeper investigation of concepts like trust and power. Furthermore, although the paper suggests formal game theory and agent-based modeling, the application of the descriptive and explanatory heuristics remains to be fully tested.