Stakeholders' perspective on collaboration barriers in low-income housing provision: a case study from Pakistan

The study addresses the critical shortage of adequate and affordable housing for low-income groups in Pakistan, where approximately 47% of urban households live in informal settlements lacking essential services. Despite global recognition that multi-stakeholder collaboration improves feasibility and long-term affordability of housing projects, little is known about barriers to such collaboration in developing-country contexts, particularly Pakistan. Prior research highlights fiscal, institutional, legislative, market, knowledge, and technological impediments to sustainable and affordable housing delivery. Pakistan’s rapid urbanization, rising housing prices, and inequitable distribution of housing exacerbate the problem, while recent government initiatives (e.g., Naya Pakistan Housing Project) have struggled to benefit the most vulnerable. This study targets the research gap by exploring, from stakeholders’ perspectives, why stakeholders cannot collaborate effectively within current institutional arrangements for low-income housing provision in Pakistan, focusing on Lahore as a key urban context.

The literature identifies a range of barriers to collaboration in affordable and sustainable housing, including government and policy shortcomings, legislative and regulatory constraints, limited political will, and contextual/environmental challenges. Regulatory authorities’ limited network access constrains knowledge creation for sustainable procurement. Policy discussions underscore the importance of land, research and development, schemes, and government roles in enabling affordability. Institutional constraints include parallel and overlapping policies and legislation, slow administrative processes, lack of comprehensive codes, and weak inter-stakeholder communication networks. Mismatched partnerships and misaligned missions hinder collaboration, reinforcing the need for alignment on community-focused objectives. Market actors (developers, builders, consultants, academia) face knowledge-related barriers, and the private sector tends to avoid low-income housing due to perceived high risk and low returns. Within Pakistan, existing work addresses related themes (e.g., finance models, urban sprawl, institutional overlaps, foreign capital impacts), but there has been no focused analysis of collaboration barriers in low-income housing delivery—establishing a clear gap this study aims to fill. Table 1 in the paper consolidates reported barriers across themes of institutional complexity, government sector, legislation, political will, environmental/contextual factors, and policy.

A qualitative case study approach was adopted to explore stakeholder experiences and perspectives regarding collaboration barriers in low-income housing. Lahore (Punjab’s capital and largest metropolitan city) was selected due to its prominence in public low-income housing projects (e.g., Ashiana Housing Project). Stakeholders were sampled purposively across three categories: state (federal, provincial, local housing authorities and regulators), market (developers, professional consultants, commercial banks), and civil society (NGOs and social enterprises). Selection was informed by prior literature on housing providers (e.g., microfinance bodies, end users, government bodies, academia/research centers). Data collection proceeded in two phases: initial in-person interviews in Lahore, followed by online interviews with federal housing authorities in Islamabad. In total, 18 in-depth interviews of one hour or more were conducted across 2019–2020 with representatives from organizations listed in Table 2 (e.g., HBFC, MHW, HTF, PHATA, PLDC, LDA, ABAD, consultants, Bank of Punjab, Akhuwat, Ansaar Management Company, The Urban Unit, academia). Researcher reflexivity was used to enhance validity by maintaining a journal of abstract interpretations before and after data collection and analysis to control bias. Data were analyzed in NVivo 12 using three-stage coding: initial, focused, and theoretical coding, to derive categories and properties of collaboration barriers and suggested ways forward.

• Collaboration barriers cluster into interrelated categories, summarized in the GLIPP framework: Government capacity, Legislation, Institutional complexity, Policy (and practice gaps), and Political willpower & intervention. Government capacity, institutional complexity, and political will emerged as especially dominant.
• Institutional complexity: Procedural delays (e.g., poor land records, cumbersome inter-departmental information flows, two-week cycles per file, bureaucratic slowdowns), weak organizational performance (failed institutions, poor data practices, rent-seeking, limited technical understanding), complex legislative processes (mortgage pledging hurdles, cabinet delays in approval of foreclosure laws, PPP acts, RERA ordinance status), and institutional duplication/overlapping jurisdictions (e.g., LDA acting as both regulator and developer; >10 NOCs needed for private developers).
• Constrained capacity of the government sector: Issues of accountability and transparency (e.g., NAB’s limited sector understanding; reputational and legal risks from high-profile cases like Ashiana), poor coordination patterns (weak federal–provincial–local linkages, inconsistent bylaws, low consistency of interaction), limited fiscal funds and mortgage facilities (Pakistan mortgage ratio <1% vs. 6–7% India and 80–90% globally; high interest rates; undocumented incomes), shortage of human capital (irregular hiring, limited professional expertise), and poor efficiency (very low delivery: e.g., only 5,500 federal units from 1999–2016; prolonged project timelines; flawed master planning; inactive PHATA periods).
• Incompetent state legislation: Unregulated real estate sector (weak foreclosure laws leading to court stays and bank risk aversion; speculative vacant plots—40–45% of plots in Lahore vacant; 60–75% of Bahria Town Lahore vacant on average; land inequity where top 20% occupy 56% land while bottom 20% occupy 6%); corruption in authorities (bribes in land record processes; bureaucratic lobbying); and poor enforcement of existing policies.
• Absence of political will: Vested interests (political mileage, personal ambitions influencing committees and project awards), constant shifts in higher management (frequent changes of secretaries/CEOs disrupting continuity), and poor trust in government (limited vision and delayed responses reducing investor and volunteer engagement).
• Poor environment for collaboration: Limited culture of collaboration (random stakeholder selection; superficial meetings; lack of institutionalized collaboration), poor acknowledgment of technical expertise (underpaid/underutilized consultants; preference for international consultants; lack of enabling environment), and weak civic responsibility (absence of volunteer platforms; elite capture; limited proactive private-sector role).
• Policy and practice gaps: Weak intention/direction (policies lacking clarity on backlog, demand, targeting, budget, materials; federal–provincial misalignment post-18th Amendment), inadequate frameworks (mis-targeting beneficiaries; weak treatment of finance tools; irregular bylaws), and weak housing finance policy (limited implementation, outdated amid price escalation/inflation; e.g., land prices +60% and construction costs +75% in a year while mortgage tenors remain short).
• Ways forward: Institutionalized collaboration by revising organizational hierarchies (merging/streamlining authorities; clarifying supervisory roles; decentralization), collaborative alliances with private sector (open tendering, JVs, cross-subsidy models, PPPs, participatory policy design including academia and civil society), and transforming attitudes toward civic responsibility and market segmentation (build-and-sell, proactive leadership).

The findings directly answer the research question—why stakeholders cannot effectively collaborate under current institutional arrangements for low-income housing in Pakistan—by demonstrating how multi-layered institutional complexity, constrained government capacity, legislative weaknesses, political interference, and policy/practice gaps intersect to suppress collaborative action. The GLIPP framework integrates these domains, placing government capacity at the nexus with two-way linkages to legislation, political leadership, and institutional arrangements, and one-way impacts from policy gaps and political will on government processes. The study explains how effects cascade into a poor collaboration environment (e.g., fragmented stakeholder engagement, underutilized expertise, and weak civic infrastructure), undermining planning approvals, enforcement, and delivery. These insights have substantial relevance to urban governance and housing policy, illustrating that strengthening institutional coherence, depoliticizing appointments, improving legislative clarity/enforcement (notably foreclosure laws and real estate regulation), and aligning finance policy with macroeconomic realities are prerequisites for effective public–private–civic collaboration and for achieving SDG 11 targets on affordable housing.

This study contributes a stakeholder-informed, context-specific framework (GLIPP) that conceptualizes cross-cutting barriers to collaboration in low-income housing provision in Pakistan. It reveals how government capacity constraints, legislative shortcomings, institutional complexity, policy/practice gaps, and political will/intervention collectively disrupt coordinated action across state, market, and civil society actors. Practically, the study recommends: (1) revising organizational hierarchies to reduce duplication and clarify roles (e.g., umbrella structures, decentralization, defined supervisory functions); (2) enabling collaborative alliances with private and civil actors through open tendering, PPPs, joint ventures, cross-subsidy mechanisms, and inclusive, participatory policy-making; and (3) fostering civic responsibility and market segmentation strategies to better match products to low-income needs and accelerate delivery (e.g., build-and-sell). Future research should apply and refine GLIPP across different regional and institutional contexts, examine project-level collaborations, and empirically evaluate the impact of specific institutional reforms and finance policies on low-income housing outcomes.

The study is a qualitative case study centered on Lahore (with federal perspectives from Islamabad) and relies on purposive sampling and stakeholder interviews, which may limit generalizability. Data are perception-based and context-dependent, and while reflexivity was employed to mitigate bias, self-reporting and institutional sensitivities may influence responses. The research primarily diagnoses barriers and only preliminarily outlines solutions; it does not quantitatively evaluate policy impacts or collaborative interventions. Broader, multi-city, mixed-method studies and project-level evaluations are needed to validate and extend the GLIPP framework and proposed reforms.