Post-2018 Ethiopia: state fragility, failure, or collapse?

State fragility, state failure, and state collapse have become key research agendas since the end of the Cold War. Using Weber’s notion of the state as the entity that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, the paper frames fragility, failure, and collapse as conditions tied to that monopoly and to the state’s ability to provide security and basic services. These conditions are prevalent in the Horn of Africa. The study focuses on Ethiopia, arguing that pre-2018 the state exercised greater control and a monopoly on violence, while post-2018 unrest escalated with interethnic conflicts, displacement, massacres, humanitarian crises, and the proliferation of militant groups. The paper aims to clarify concepts and assess whether post-2018 Ethiopia is best described as fragile, failed, or collapsed, noting a gap in comprehensive, rigorous analysis beyond media reports. The study addresses three questions: What do state fragility, state failure, and state collapse mean? What does the situation in post-2018 Ethiopia look like? Which condition (fragility, failure, or collapse) characterizes post-2018 Ethiopia? The study contributes to scholarship by offering a qualitative analysis and has policy implications for mitigating risks to Ethiopia and regional stability.

Conceptualization of terms: The labels fragile, failed, and collapsed states are politically contested and often instrumentalized by external actors (Nay, 2013), while weak states may also leverage these labels to obtain support (Clausen and Albrecht, 2022). Synthesizing multiple sources, fragile states are defined as low-income polities with weak capacity and/or legitimacy that leave citizens vulnerable to shocks, fail to protect citizens, provide adequate public services, or maintain legitimacy, and may lack monopoly over the legitimate use of force (McKay and Thorbecke, 2016; Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005; Stewart and Brown, 2009; The Fund for Peace, 2021; Rotberg, 2003). State failure denotes a more severe condition marked by enduring conflict, loss of effective territorial control, government attacks on citizens, limited services, high criminality, economic decline, institutional deterioration, loss of legitimacy, and the shrinking of state power toward the capital, prompting citizens to rely on non-state providers (Rotberg, 2003; Woodward, 2006; Pickering, 2014; Okeke et al., 2021). State collapse is an extreme, rare form of failure characterized by the breakdown of structure, authority, law, and political order, leaving an authority vacuum and no functioning central government (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2003; Gros, 1996; Emmanuel, 2012). The three conditions form a continuum with overlapping indicators; distinctions are primarily of degree. The paper proposes three diagnostic questions to distinguish failure from fragility: whether state authority/monopoly on violence is limited to the capital; whether non-state actors are taking over public service provision; and whether locals turn to non-state actors for protection.

The study employs a qualitative, descriptive research design. Data were gathered primarily from secondary sources, including books, journal articles, reports, and news, and are supplemented by the author's observations of ongoing events.

• Ethiopia presently exhibits core features of fragility and signs of descent toward state failure. The state’s authority is contracting in parts of the country, and monopoly over the legitimate use of force is compromised. • Legitimacy: Initial reforms under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (release of political prisoners, legal and media reforms) raised expectations, but subsequent arrests of opponents and journalists, exclusionary practices, and a constrained political space generated a legitimacy crisis and spreading political and ethnic violence. • Monopoly on violence: Significant armed conflicts include the Tigray war (TPLF control at times beyond Tigray; government counteroffensives with fragile gains), persistent violence in Benishangul Gumuz (targeted attacks on Amhara and Agew; alleged external support to militias), and an expanded insurgency in Oromia by the OLA, which operates freely, maintains camps, recruits, captures arms, and reportedly controls 8 of 21 zones in Oromia. In Amhara, Fano militias operate outside formal state structures and are increasingly at odds with federal authority. Overall, Ethiopia exhibits a shift from monopoly to an oligopoly of violence. • Protection and criminality: The state struggles to protect citizens across multiple regions. Documented abuses include OLA kidnappings, raids, displacements, executions; TPLF’s destruction in Amhara and Afar; Gumuz militia attacks; and armed robberies. Between April 2, 2018 and May 20, 2022, there were 2,942 organized violence events and 16,091 fatalities, including 7,270 civilians (OCHA, 2022). Al-Shabaab has attempted arms smuggling and conducted an unprecedented cross-border attack. Civilians increasingly express trust in local armed groups for protection (e.g., Fano in Amhara; OLA support in parts of Oromia). • Public services: War and insecurity have severely degraded service delivery. Reported damage includes 1,600 schools damaged and 300 destroyed, leaving more than 1.2 million students out of school; four universities in Tigray and one in Amhara closed; over 3,000 health facilities destroyed in Afar and Amhara. The government remains the primary, though inadequate, service provider. • Humanitarian situation: Over 4.2 million IDPs and approximately 25.9 million people require humanitarian assistance (ACAPS, 2022). Addis Ababa reportedly receives more than 1,000 refugees per day. Living conditions have deteriorated with hunger, ill health, high living costs, and poverty. • Economic indicators: Economic downturn due to war, COVID-19, drought, and the Ukraine crisis. Real GDP growth slowed from an average of 9.7% (2010–2018) to 9.0% (2019), 6.1% (2020), 6.3% (2021), and is projected at 3.8% (2022) (IMF, 2022). Suspension from AGOA led to job losses (e.g., >3,000 layoffs at Best Garment, Hawassa Industrial Park). National debt has risen markedly. • Despite deterioration, the state’s authority has not shrunk to the capital, and the government remains the primary provider of security and services in much of the territory; non-state actors have not supplanted the state nationwide.

Applying the conceptual framework, Ethiopia meets multiple indicators of fragility: erosion of legitimacy, partial loss of monopoly over the legitimate use of force, failure to adequately protect citizens, and inadequate public service provision, compounded by economic decline and humanitarian crises. Some indicators of state failure are emerging—expanding insurgencies, territorial control by non-state actors in parts of the country, citizen recourse to militias for protection, and the contraction of state authority in multiple regions. However, the state continues to function in much of the territory and remains the primary security and service provider; authority has not collapsed to the capital alone, and non-state actors have not systematically taken over core governance functions nationwide. The findings therefore address the research question by situating post-2018 Ethiopia on the fragility–failure continuum: Ethiopia is fragile and descending toward failure but has not reached the finality associated with failed states nor the authority vacuum of collapse. The implications are significant for regional stability in the Horn of Africa given Ethiopia’s historical role as an anchor state, large population, and extensive borders.

Ethiopia is currently a fragile state and has begun a descent into state failure. It exhibits weaknesses in monopolizing violence, protecting citizens, providing public services, and maintaining legitimacy, yet it has not reached the degree of finality or territorial contraction characteristic of failed states, and it is far from collapse: an elected government continues to operate and remains the primary provider of security and services across large areas. Without corrective action, however, Ethiopia risks further deterioration toward failure and potentially collapse, with destabilizing effects on the broader region. Given Ethiopia’s history of resilience, reversal is possible but requires concerted efforts by all stakeholders to address polarization, governance deficits, security sector challenges, and humanitarian needs.