Post-2018 Ethiopia: state fragility, failure, or collapse?

The concepts of state fragility, failure, and collapse have gained prominence since the end of the Cold War. This paper focuses on Ethiopia, a country with a complex history and significant regional influence. While pre-2018 Ethiopia, despite authoritarian rule, maintained relative control and a monopoly on violence, the ascension of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 saw the resurgence of long-suppressed problems. These include interethnic conflicts, displacement, humanitarian crises, and the proliferation of militant groups. Some scholars argue that Ethiopia has already failed, while others offer varying assessments. This study aims to provide a nuanced analysis by defining state fragility, failure, and collapse, identifying key indicators, and applying these to the post-2018 Ethiopian context to determine which condition best describes the current situation. The research questions addressed are: What do state fragility, state failure, and state collapse mean? What does the situation in post-2018 Ethiopia look like? Which condition (fragility, failure, or collapse) characterizes post-2018 Ethiopia?

The paper reviews existing literature on state fragility, failure, and collapse, noting the lack of consensus on definitions and the political motivations often influencing their application. It draws on various scholarly definitions, emphasizing the importance of the state's monopoly on violence, provision of security and basic services, and legitimacy. The author points to the prevalence of these conditions in African states, particularly in the volatile Horn of Africa region, where Ethiopia's case is unique due to its historical role as a stabilizing force.

The study employs a qualitative methodology using a descriptive approach. Data was gathered primarily from secondary sources, including books, journal articles, reports, and news articles. The author also incorporates their observations of the situation. The study relies on a framework built around several key indicators of state fragility, failure, and collapse, including the state’s monopoly on violence, ability to protect citizens, provision of public services, and legitimacy.

The study finds that post-2018 Ethiopia exhibits characteristics of state fragility and shows signs of descending into state failure. The government's legitimacy has been eroded by political repression, despite initial optimism following Abiy Ahmed's accession to power. The state's monopoly on violence has been challenged by conflicts in Tigray, Benishangul Gumuz, and Oromia regions, where various militant groups operate and control significant territories. The government has struggled to protect its citizens from violence, and criminal activities are widespread. The inability to provide adequate public services is linked to economic decline exacerbated by conflict, drought, and the loss of access to the US market via AGOA. The humanitarian crisis, with millions displaced and in need of aid, further strains the state's capacity. While the state is not completely disintegrated, it shows clear signs of weakness in fulfilling its core functions.

The findings indicate that Ethiopia is not a failed state in the sense of a complete collapse of authority, but it is fragile and clearly on a trajectory towards state failure. The key indicators—loss of monopoly on violence, inability to protect citizens, inadequate public service delivery, and erosion of legitimacy—are all present to a significant degree. The author contrasts Ethiopia's situation with that of Somalia and South Sudan, highlighting that while challenges are considerable, the Ethiopian state still retains the primary role in providing security and services. The fragility of the situation however increases the risk of full-scale state failure, with potentially devastating regional consequences.

The study concludes that Ethiopia is currently a fragile state on the brink of state failure. The ongoing conflicts, humanitarian crisis, and economic decline undermine the state's ability to perform its core functions. Urgent action is necessary to prevent a complete collapse, which would have dire implications for the region. Future research could focus on specific regional dynamics, the role of external actors, and potential pathways for state strengthening.

The study's reliance on secondary sources may limit the depth of analysis. The qualitative nature of the research prevents the use of quantitative data for comparative analysis. The author's own observations, while valuable, may also introduce some subjective biases.