Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them

This paper explores the phenomenon of flow states, characterized by optimal performance and a perceived loss of self-awareness, using the active inference framework. The authors propose that flow's phenomenology stems from high-precision weighting over expected sensory consequences of actions and beliefs about action sequences. This mechanism minimizes free energy through exploiting pragmatic affordances. The challenging dynamics of flow-inducing situations necessitate focused attention and restrict counterfactual planning, leading to a loss of self-as-object but not entirely eliminating self-awareness, which remains pre-reflective and bodily. The model is applicable to other agentive experiences, offering insights into selfless experiences, embodied expertise, and well-being.

Darius Parvizi-Wayne, Lars Sandved-Smith, Riddhi J. Pitliya, Jakub Limanowski, Miles R. A. Tufft, Karl J. Friston