This paper uses an evolutionary game model to study the interaction between firms' corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) behaviors and consumers' perception of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The model explores the trade-off between firms prioritizing economic performance over social responsibility and the maximization of social welfare when firms are socially responsible and consumers have strong CSR perceptions. Two evolutionary stable strategy scenarios are identified based on industrial environments. A healthy market depends on increased consumer bargaining power and initial conditions, exhibiting path dependence. While consumers' added willingness to pay for CSR doesn't affect evolutionary outcomes, it increases the likelihood of a healthy market with high consumer bargaining power. The findings highlight the dynamic nature of firms' CSI behaviors influenced by transaction costs, industrial structure, and consumer willingness to pay.
Publisher
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS
Published On
Jan 20, 2024
Authors
Xiaoyang Zhao, Jie Mi
Tags
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Irresponsibility
Evolutionary Game Model
Consumer Perception
Social Welfare
Market Dynamics
Bargaining Power
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