Farmer perspectives on carbon markets incentivizing agricultural soil carbon sequestration

The study examines how farmers perceive emerging U.S. voluntary carbon markets that incentivize soil organic carbon (SOC) sequestration, a negative emissions strategy within climate mitigation. Context: agricultural soils can be significant carbon sinks through practices like conservation tillage and cover cropping, delivering co-benefits such as soil health and resilience. Purpose: to understand motivations and concerns of both farmers participating in carbon markets (primarily conventional row-crop producers) and organic farmers not eligible for these markets, to evaluate whether these markets effectively drive additional SOC sequestration. Hypothesis: participating farmers adopted SOC practices for environmental co-benefits and financial reasons linked to credit payments, whereas organic non-participants adopted these practices primarily for environmental co-benefits alone. Importance: insights inform the design and assessment of carbon market mechanisms, especially around additionality, verification, and farmer adoption dynamics.

Prior research shows farmers adopt carbon-sequestering practices mainly for local environmental and soil health co-benefits rather than climate mitigation or direct financial returns. Identified barriers include limited information, unfamiliarity with practices, and implementation costs despite incentives; much prior work focuses on rangelands/biodiversity programs rather than row crops. Protocol challenges in voluntary markets include accurate quantification and ensuring additionality, with registries such as VCS, CAR, and ACR providing protocols. Critiques (e.g., of CAR’s Soil Enrichment Protocol) suggest protocols may create an appearance of stringent additionality while treating most practices as additional. There are multiple, sometimes inconsistent, definitions of additionality across stakeholders. Literature also notes administrative burdens as barriers and that early adopters are more likely to participate because perceived uncertainties and costs are lower.

Design: qualitative, semi-structured interviews with two farmer groups: (1) conventional row-crop farmers in the U.S. Midwest and South participating or seeking to participate in voluntary soil carbon markets (Indigo, Nori) and (2) certified organic row-crop/vegetable farmers in New York State engaging in SOC practices but ineligible for these markets. Recruitment: participating farmers were identified from Nori and Indigo public listings; organic farmers were recruited from the NOFA-NY certification registry. Data collection: 17 interviews conducted (January 2021–February 2022) via Zoom/phone, 30–90 minutes each, recorded with consent, transcribed using automated software and manually corrected. Interview guide covered farm context, climate change perceptions, SOC practices and motivations, hypothetical incentives/regulations, program experiences for participants, and views on improving programs and market futures. Analysis: modified grounded-theory approach; iterative codebook development to classify (1) facilitators/motivations for SOC practice adoption and (2) concerns about soil carbon markets, refined with reference to prior literature. Coding performed using NVivo 12 (Mac) and manual coding; double-coded by two authors with 91% percentage agreement; saturation assessed after 17 interviews. Ethics: Hamilton College IRB approval and confidentiality maintained.

Sample and response rates: Among carbon market participants, 9 positive responses from 13 solicitations (69%); 6 had received payments and 3 were enrolled but not yet paid. These farmers were in the Midwest (n=6) and Southeast (n=3), including field crops (corn, soybeans, cotton, winter wheat) and mixed crop-livestock operations. For organic farmers, 9 positive responses from 20 solicitations (45%); all in New York State across multiple regions; diversified vegetables and mixed operations. Total N=17 interviews. Motivations: Across both groups, primary motivations to adopt SOC practices were farm profitability/resilience and long-term soil and crop health; intergenerational sustainability and adaptation to extreme weather were frequently cited. Carbon credit payments were not a primary motivator; participants characterized payments as a helpful bonus (“gravy on top”) for practices they already adopted or intended to adopt. Concerns shared by both groups: (a) Payments too low to induce practice change—e.g., cited ~$15 per acre insufficient to drive new adoption; (b) Significant administrative burden and record-keeping demands (e.g., detailed data for up to a decade, digitization challenges); (c) Unpredictable, opaque payout calculations (“black box”), deterring participation without guaranteed compensation; (d) Perceived bias favoring large-scale, conventional monocrop systems and potential influence of agrochemical companies, potentially privileging no-till with high chemical inputs over diversified practices; (e) Risk of greenwashing by credit buyers, undermining genuine emission reductions; (f) Additionality rules viewed as unfair to early adopters, creating perverse incentives to pause good practices to re-qualify, and excluding long-term practitioners or acres that don’t meet recent-change baselines. Overall pattern: Existing markets disproportionately reward farmers already practicing SOC-enhancing activities or already inclined to adopt them, challenging the additionality necessary for credible climate mitigation.

Findings indicate convergence of motivations and concerns across participating and non-participating farmers: adoption is driven by soil health, resilience, and profitability rather than by carbon credit revenues. Shared critiques—low and uncertain payments, heavy administrative demands, opaque methodologies, perceived industry bias, and greenwashing risks—suggest trust deficits in current market structures. Critically, farmers’ perceptions of additionality emphasize fairness and continuity of support for long-term good practices, whereas market protocols emphasize recent practice changes relative to baselines. This misalignment undermines both perceived legitimacy and the environmental integrity of credits, as markets may end up paying for non-additional outcomes. Results reinforce prior evidence that administrative burdens deter participation and that markets primarily attract those already eligible, limiting transformative impact. A standardized, transparent framework with predictable compensation and broader recognition of diverse SOC practices may be needed to reconcile farmer incentives with climate integrity.

The study contributes qualitative evidence that current U.S. voluntary soil carbon markets (e.g., Nori, Indigo) mainly provide supplemental income to farmers already implementing SOC practices, with payments rarely motivating adoption. Both participating and non-participating farmers report similar motivations and concerns, highlighting misalignments between market additionality rules and farmers’ priorities for long-term soil stewardship. Implications: to achieve genuine climate benefits, programs must ensure additionality while offering predictable, adequate compensation, reduced administrative burden, and broader inclusivity of diverse farm types and practices. Future research should evaluate standardized protocols that balance environmental integrity with farmer practicality, test alternative incentive designs (e.g., practice-based payments, hybrid models), expand geographic and sectoral coverage, and rigorously assess actual additional carbon outcomes versus perceived motivations.

Small, qualitative sample limits generalizability; participating-farmer recruitment constrained by a low number of active market participants and incomplete public listings (especially for Indigo). The organic comparison group is geographically concentrated in New York State and focused on diversified vegetable/mixed operations, potentially limiting applicability to other regions/systems. Self-reported perceptions may not align with detailed program rules or measured carbon outcomes. Administrative and market conditions may have evolved since interviews (2021–2022).