Evidence of direct and indirect reciprocity in network-structured economic games

Formal theoretical models propose that cooperative networks can be maintained when individuals condition behavior on social standing. Here, we empirically examine the predictions of such models of positive and negative indirect reciprocity using a suite of network-structured economic games in four rural Colombian communities (N_ind = 496 individuals, N_obs = 53,876 ratings/transfers). We observe that, at a dyadic-level, individuals have a strong tendency to exploit and punish others in bad standing (e.g., those perceived as selfish), and allocate resources to those in good standing (e.g., those perceived as generous). These dyadic findings scale to a more generalized, community level, where reputations for being generous are associated with receipt of allocations, and reputations for being selfish are associated with receipt of punishment. These empirical results illustrate the roles that both positive and negative reciprocity, and costly punishment, play in sustaining community-wide cooperation networks.

Daniel Redhead, Matthew Gervais, Kotrina Kajokaite, Jeremy Koster, Arlenys Hurtado Manyoma, Danier Hurtado Manyoma, Richard McElreath, Cody T. Ross